Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

396.1–PA/3–2751: Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State ¹

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Paris, March 27, 1951—2 p. m.

5697. From Jessup. Davies requested this morning mtg restricted to Parodi, himself and me. I arrived for mtg early but Davies was already closeted with Parodi confirming our impression bipartite position to bring pressure on us. Davies reported conference with Morrison yesterday and then read tel from Morrison to Brit Emb Wash which he said had not yet been sent but which they were sending. Tel instructs Emb to take up with SecState Morrison’s views as follows:

(1) Does not agree Sovs likely to concede to our view if we stand firm.

(2) Believes ref to “question of demilitarization of Ger” must be included in agenda.

(3) Proposes we suggest as first formula that advanced by Davies referred to in ourtel 5664,² para 3 and our telecon Mar 22³ namely separate second item “question of demilitarization of Ger in relation to above”. Second position wld be to substitute for “in relation to above” some such words as “taking above fully into account”. Third position wld be to put in item referring simply to “question of demilitarization of Ger”. Brit Emb to tell SecState also Morrison attaches great importance to ensuring mtg of four Mins,⁴

Parodi said similar approach to Dept wld be made by Fr Amb.

Davies answered my question by saying that if Gromyko turned down successively these three positions they wld then be willing to propose Parodi formula for combined agenda. UK still opposes idea of return to completely neutral agenda which after our original item one wld refer simply to “questions concerning Ger”. Morrison calls this a “skeleton” agenda and says it wld still leave it up to Mins to decide what to talk about.

I said I had no new instructions but had had opportunity thorough discussion Webb⁵ over weekend and that he had stressed effect on Amer opinion including Cong opinion if this mtg resulted in what was interpreted as capitulation to Sov thesis that “question demilitarization of Ger” was subj to debate with Sovs and that therefore implementation of Brussels decisions might be held in abeyance pending CFM. I touched on possible serious effects such a position on Cong action for appropriations for Eur aid. I pointed out to Davies that ticker already carried accurate summary of what he had just told me and noted Fr press has continued to play line of western split with US opposing Franco-Brit willingness reach agreement with Sovs. I told him important point in his statement was willingness to accept eventually demilitarization of Ger as separate item divorced from all other considerations thus repudiating statements three of us have frequently made in quadripartite mtgs. Parodi and Davies argued we wld first propose alternate formula indicating relation to other topics but I insisted they had given away their hand by admitting they wld agree to drop statement of this relationship. They then argued that having this as item 2 wld permit Mins to bring out relationship at CFM. I recalled previous discussion with them in which they admitted in last analysis cld not break on question of order of items. They insisted they would not agree to have this as first item but had no convincing answer to argument that if they wld move step by step as suggested towards Russian position final concessions wld not be forthcoming if Gromyko remained adamant.

I told them since they were taking it up in Wash I did not wish to argue matter further here but felt sure SecState wld be unable agree with their proposal.

All agreed nothing of this kind cld be done for several days pending Wash consultations. Agreed we wld at present attempt overcome newspaper reports by reemphasizing basic position of West, including ref Korea, change of conditions since 1945, fact current western policies adopted as result changed conditions and were fully justified, and finally that Brussels decisions stand until Sov reaches agmt which wld modify factual situation on which our policies are based. Only disagreement was Davies reluctance to mention Korea. Further agreed to table today 3 separate items on Hung, Bulg and Rum peace treaties reading substantially as in our 5694.⁶ Davies still hesitant about mentioning human rights clauses but thought he cld. We will confer on this just before afternoon quadrapartite mtg. Parodi indicated they felt more strongly on Trieste question than on question demilitarization Ger. Re said Fr much concerned effect on Ital and Yugo opinion of current publicity about Trieste discussion in deps mtgs. However, we all agreed listing satellite treaties items cld be coupled with Ital treaty item re Trieste cast in same form.

Only hopeful aspect of present tripartite situation is apparent decision Fr and Brit to make strong statements during next few days firming tripartite unity and fixed determination. They will evidently do this in hopes it will be prelude to accepting item on demilitarization of Germany. Next developments will necessarily await result of conversations in Wash.

Suggest Dept consider desirability telling Br-Fr Ambs since impossible accept Br proposal best procedure is to move at once to Parodi formula for combined agenda regarding which Webb took my explanatory memo for Secty. Wld appreciate Dept’s further views formulation Western position on Parodi formula as forecast telecon Mar 22.

[ Jessup ]

1. Repeated to Moscow and London.
2. Dated March 23, p. 1104.
3. A transcript of this telecon, not printed, is in file 396.1–PA/3–2251.
4. On March 28 the U.S. Delegation was informed that Steel had seen Perkins on that day and left with him the substance of an instruction from Morrison along these lines. Steel was informed that the United States still opposed the inclusion of “demilitarization of Germany” and was determined not to accept an “unneutral or slanted agenda.” Telegram 5082 to Paris (396.1–PA/3–2751).
5. The discussion under reference has not been identified further.

6. In telegram 5694 on March 26, Jessup had transmitted the draft of a new six-point agenda which he hoped might get the meetings “off dead center.” Item 3, Part II, of the proposed agenda read as follows:

   “Treaty of peace with Hungary in regard to its provision on human rights, its military clauses and its final clauses on settlement of disputes.” Parts III and IV read the same for Bulgaria and Romania. (396.1–PA/3–2651) These items were tabled at the 18th session on March 27 as one proposal. Telegram 5721 from Paris, March 27 (396.1–PA/3–2751). For additional documentation on the efforts of the United States to secure implementation of the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, see volume iv .