Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/11–1651: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Embassy in France ¹

secret

London, November 16, 1951—3 p. m.

1067. For Secretary and Byroade. We have revised paper ref EDC–NATO relationships² which we feel shld serve as guide for adoption US position for consideration by NAC Rome.

We have endeavored to incorporate suggestions made in Todep 317.³ In light of recent discussions in Paris (Depto 609⁴). Ref special relationship covering Ger (para 5a Depto 584³) has been omitted but statement that “attack on forces, vessels or aircraft of any of parties includes attack on EDF” remains as originally drafted. We believe that since this refers to no geographic area but only to forces under the exclusive command of SACEUR it does not raise question of congressional sanction. Security guarantee problem (pending definitive solution of Ger membership NATO might be met by Fr suggestion for statement by NATO members using Bonn formula which merely restate tripartite New York communiqué of Sept ’50.⁵ We question whether such statement, which presumably wld be unilateral on part of US although made in conjunction with similar statements by other NAT parties and therefore not an agrmt, wld need any greater sanction than we had contemplated for Bonn formula and that it wld be covered by sanction for latter.

Re section dealing with obligations under NAT 3, 3a, 3b, we believe these questions shld be spelled out to provide for any possible contingency. While paper may, as dep suggests, reflect assumption EDF membership contemplates greater break with NATO than may be warranted, we believe strongly that it wld be equally unwise to assume that EDC–NATO relationships will develop along lines desired unless firm agrmt is reached prior to finalization EDC treaty.

Revised paper fols: In joint report of Council deps and mil. Comite dated Dec 13, 1950, which was approved in Brussels at 6th session of NAC⁶ it was agreed that any EDF, if and when created, must: (a) strengthen NAC and integrated def of NA area; (b) Be integrated into NATO framework, and (c) promote closer association of countries of West Eur and tie West Ger more firmly to West. This same report also expressed opinion that final test any arrangements for EDF must be whether, in judgment NATO, they were militarily effective and served to strengthen NAC. It is therefore duty of NAT organs, particularly Council Deps and Council itself, to estab certain principles which shld govern relationship of ED community to NAT org. It important to reach agrmt upon such principles while the ED community treaty is still being finalized in order that they may be appropriately reflected in its provisions.

These principles shld be directed at two sets of problems arising out of creation ED community: (1) correlating obligations of ED community treaty with North Atlantic treaty; (2) organizational arrangements.

In defining these principles account must be taken of fact that relationships will probably change as concept of ED community develops. There will be initial period in which EDF will come into being but development of ED community institutions, particularly those at polit level, will not have been completed. The principles governing EDC–NATO relationships therefore shld be subj to modification as both organizations evolve.

1. Objective. ED community and NAT org have one basic identical objective—to strengthen collective def West Eur.

2. Gen concept. Relationship between them in all fields shld be one which will permit this common objective to be most effectively attained. To this end relationship shld be not one of two separate bodies, but of one group within another, in such manner as to enable each to benefit from operations and developments in either and to promote closer association of all NAT members.

3. Obligations under NAT. Under art 8 of NAT each party undertakes not to enter into internal obligations in conflict therewith. Accordingly, obligations undertaken by these parties to NAT who are also parties to ED community must be in conformity with their obligations under NAT. It is therefore, understood that:

a. Obligation ED community members under art 3 of NAT to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack may in part be performed through ED community. This in no way limits their obligation under art 3 nor obligation under NATO as whole to seek development of all necessary collective strength of parties to NAT to resist aggression.

b. Obligation of each party under art 5 of NAT to regard an armed attack on any one of them as attack upon all and to take such action as it deems necessary is in no way modified by creation of ED community. Insofar as ED community members are concerned, use of armed force under art 5 may be effected through EDF.

c. Ref in revised art 6 as contained in Gr–Turk protocol to attack on forces, vessels or aircraft of “any” of parties includes an attack upon forces, vessels or aircraft of EDF as part of integrated NATO forces.

4. Organizational arrangements. Relationship between two organizations shld maintain maximum flexibility and shld seek to avoid duplication of responsibilities and functions. For this purpose, maximum practicable use of same personnel for corresponding positions in both agencies is desirable. Consistent with foregoing, fol arrangements shld be applied:

a. ED community will contribute forces to command of SACEUR to extent of agreed contributions under approved NATO plans.

b. SACEUR will continue to receive his higher strategic direction exclusively from standard group with respect to all sources under his command, including EDF. Standard group will continue to receive its polit guidance from NAC and Council Deps.

c. During initial period representation of ED community in other NATO agencies will be by representatives of ED community countries in these agencies.⁷

Spofford

1. The source text telegram was sent as Depto 625 to the Department of State and was repeated for information to Frankfurt and Bonn.
2. Regarding the paper under reference here, see footnote 2, p. 917.
3. Not printed, but see ibid.
4. Dated November 13, ibid.
3. Not printed, but see ibid.
5. Regarding the “Bonn formula” and the communiqué under reference here, see telegram 2528, October 19, to Frankfurt, p. 1555, and Basic Documents, p. 1711.
6. The reference here is to NATO document C 6–D/1 regarding which, see the Department of State paper, Pleven D–2/1a, January 26, p. 755.
7. Telegram Todep 356, November 17, to London, repeated to Paris, not printed, observed that in general the paper presented here provided a useful basis for an American position at the Rome session of NATO. The Department of State believed that it would be useful to convey the general character of the points in the paper to those participating in drawing up the EDC treaty, provided their work had gone far enough to justify as specific a discussion as the paper would involve. The Department nevertheless felt strongly that final action on the question ought not be taken at the Rome NATO session and that it also ought to be delayed until at least a draft text of the EDC treaty was available. The Department also offered specific drafting suggestions on the paper. (740.5/11–1651) The text of the paper presented here, as revised in the light of the Department’s comments offered in Todep 356, was circulated to the United States Delegation to the Rome session of NATO as document Rome D–18a, November 21, not printed (CFM files, lot M 88, Rome).