740.5/11–1351: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State 1
Depto 609. Re Depto 584.2 Met with Alphand and Hoyer-Millar Nov 10 EDC–NATO problems and relationships and extent to which NAC might act at Rome on EDC and Ger problems. Mtg included representation from three FonOffs (Perkins, Byroade and Knight for US) and from three dels to EDC conf.
Much of mtg devoted to juridical aspect of reciprocal guarantees between EDC and NATO to cover Ger. Alphand envisaged dealing with this through provision in EDC treaty that attack on one wld be considered attack on all, plus two reciprocal statements, one by all EDC members and other by all NATO members, that attack on any member of other wld be considered attack on all.
Hoyer-Millar emphasized EDC must strengthen NATO and must not by any unanimity requirement or otherwise impede its action in event of attack. Obligation in Art 5 NAT3 was on each. In view corporate nature EDC he feared unwillingness one member to act might immobilize whole body. Alphand stated Fr view was that SHAPE, acting under NAC and not subj to decision by EDC, shld engage EDF and that this wld in practice be automatic although inability of US and probably UK and others to accept obligation for “automatic” action wld make it impossible to include specific provision for this in EDC treaty. US and UK confirmed they cld not accept any form of obligation for automatic action.
US also stated any commitment covering attack on Ger wld presumably require formal or informal Senate approval and cld not [Page 918] go beyond Art 5. Alphand contemplated statement by NATO members wld use Bonn formula4 which was itself merely restatement of tripartite NY communiqué of Sept 1950.5 UK suggested that formula, preferably for inclusion in EDC treaty, might be “armed attack on any member EDC shall be considered attack on all and shall automatically engage EDF on recommendation of NAC to employ armed force”. Alphand agreed SHAPE must get its instrs from one single source, NAT through SG, but cited presumable Ger insistence on voice in decision. He requested further indication Wash and London thinking on this whole problem soonest so that he might take it up in EDC conf.
Discussion on other aspects EDC–NATO relationships brief. US did not submit paper in view Todep 3176 (it had been decided previously to omit any ref to special relationship covering Ger). Alphand suggested leaving all organizational matters other than those between EDF and SHAPE to Eur def commissioner who wld be charged with working out relations with other orgs including NATO. He thought that EDC shld be represented in NATO at least initially by natl reps, with possibly some corporate representation eventually.
US assumed agrmt on gen concept of relationship designed enable each most effectively assist in attaining common objective and believed details cld be worked out later.
On question of action to be sought at Rome mtg, US suggested council pick up where it left off at Brussels by (1) disposing of Petersberg phase, (2) receiving Fr report on EDC conf and noting principle with approval and (3) taking action under para 10 (a), (b), and (c) on C 6–D/17 on such aspects of EDC report, particularly milit, as were sufficiently advanced. This wld require prior or concurrent SG and MC consideration. Fr and UK pessimistic as to action. Alphand said Schuman cld present full progress report, but council, in absence of whole EDC agrmt, cld do little beyond extending encouragement even on milit aspects. UK emphatic that action at Rome on milit aspects wld be premature in absence complete picture, especially financing of Ger contribution. US cited adverse public reaction if council achieved no progress year after Brussels and importance NATO consideration EDC problems and relations to NATO before EDC treaty finalized. UK and Fr agreed early consideration of milit aspects by SG or MC and of other aspects by CD wld be useful but felt too little time before Rome to contemplate really concrete action.
[Page 919]It was agreed Schuman’s report wld be circulated to all 12 just before Rome (Nov 23) as wld report on contractual negots which US, as current chairman HICOM, requested to prepare. Three dels will further explore nature and extent of possible council action.
After mtg Spofford again stressed to Alphand importance from Congressional and other points of view of taking maximum action at Rome and also desirability of bringing other nine into discussions on matters of NATO concern before EDF finalized. He seemed to recognize validity of point, but said they cld not do anything which implied taking of decisions pending Fr parliamentary consideration. He has apparently changed emphasis on this since first brush on EDC with Fr Assembly comite which he says did not go well.
- This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, Bonn, and Frankfurt.↩
- Dated November 8, from London, not printed; it transmitted a preliminary draft outline of a paper defining the American position on the relationship between the European Defense Community and NATO (740.5/11–851). The comments of the Department of State, later confirmed and supplemented by Defense Department officials, were sent in telegrams Todep 317, November 8, and Todep 320, November 9, both to London, neither printed (740.5/11–851). Todep 317 observed that the proposed paper would be highly valuable in informal consultations on the problem but pointed out that any American suggestions would require very careful working out in the light of the political situations in France and West Germany. For the text of the proposed paper as later revised in the light of comments from Washington, see telegram 1067, November 16, from London, p. 921.↩
- For the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, see Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 1328 or Basic Documents, p. 812.↩
- A version of the formula presumably under reference here is set forth in telegram 2528, October 19, to Frankfurt, p. 1555.↩
- For the text of the communiqué on Allied policy toward Germany issued at Washington by the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers, September 19, 1950, see Basic Documents, p. 1711.↩
- Regarding the paper under reference here and Todep 317, see footnote 2, above.↩
- Regarding the paper under reference here, see Department of State paper, Pleven D–2/1a, January 26, p. 755.↩