740.5/11–751: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State 1
Depto 580. Re Depto 508. Hoyer-Millar and Hood yesterday amplified to us UK thinking on EDC–NATO relationship in fol terms:
Basic criteria for EDC must be that it strengthen rather than weaken def of West Eur. This was stated in Brussels decision and was at least as important for EDC nations as for UK and US. EDC–NATO relations must be such as to insure immed and effective use of EDF under SACEUR in event of aggression in Eur since otherwise US and UK forces wld be only substantial ones immediately available. Situation wld be satis if chain of auth were clear and unbroken with EDF under SACEUR, SACEUR under higher strategic guidance of SG, and SG subj of polit guidance of NAC. It wld not be satis if chain of auth were complicated by necessity for other action by EDC on basis unanimity since this wld permit Ger or any other one nation to immobilize at least temporarily all available NATO forces on the continent except US and UK.2
- This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, Bonn, and Frankfurt.↩
- In telegram Secto 22, November 8, from Paris, Assistant Secretary of State Perkins, who was serving as an adviser to Secretary Acheson in his talks with the French and British Foreign Ministers in Paris, reported that during a conversation that morning, Sir Pierson Dixon confirmed that the British Government had not changed its opinion regarding Germany’s eventual admission into NATO, but he indicated clearly the British feeling that such admission would have to be postponed for some time. Dixon in particular expressed great concern that a dramatic entrance into NATO by Germany would cause “serious trouble” with the Soviet Union. (740.5/11–851)↩