Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/10–2351: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

London, October 23, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 502. Re Todep 256² and 250³ At lunch yesterday I urged on Alphand necessity of mtg Nov 24target date for council. While he considered time very short, was uncertain how loose threads might best be pulled together and was not sure EDF treaty cld be completed by then, he appeared to agree desirability of mtg target date if possible.

Alphand and Burin des Rosier themselves brought up question of Ger membership in NATO, several times using phrase that Ger was not a member of NATO “for time being”. They spoke of it as being responsible for many complications in EDF and its relations to NATO “which wld otherwise be simple” and in general their attitude on subj was much softer than in previous conversations. They nevertheless expressed view that obtaining Fr ratification of EDF treaty wld be difficult in any event and that prior raising of Ger membership might swing balance against ratification. Alphand volunteered, however, that Ger wld undoubtedly raise it before that time and stated frankly he saw no logical answer to Ger demand for NAT representation. We expressed understanding of Fr polit problem and said we wld welcome any Fr ideas as to how Ger membership question might be treated. They had none to offer.

Alphand was thinking of EDC–NATO relations primarily in terms of who decided when what forces shld be committed. While he had obviously given much thought to problem of duality in this field, he stated it was probably “temporary” complication due to Ger absence from NATO. They both seemed to react favorably to suggestion that problem might be met provisionally by concurrent (and adjoining) mtgs of NAT and EDC Council of Mins shld emergency arise, with all members of Council of Mins other than Ger also representing their govts in NAC. They were initially casual about other aspects of EDC-NAT relationships. However, with a view to securing decision at Rome, avoiding adverse repercussions from other 9 NATO members and of avoiding repetition of complications similar to those we are still having over MEC, they appeared to agree that it wld be desirable to work out in CD as well as Paris conference prior to Rome, principles, where necessary in some detail, which shld govern relationship.

It did not appear possible either in conversation with them or in subsequent discussion in CD to fix timetable for deps discussions on Ger and EDC but, as reported separately, it was agreed by CD that subj shld be kept concurrently on our agenda, that Fr and other occupying powers wld keep deps as fully and currently informed as possible on developments with respect to Ger and that we wld deal with specific problems whenever adequate material was available.

Incidentally, Alphand believed NATO shld give prompt attention to Ger unity problem, primarily from informational point of view. Cabling separately on this.

Spofford

1. Repeated for information to Paris, Frankfurt, and Bonn.
2. Dated October 20 p. 894.
3. Dated October 20, to London, not printed. In it the Department of State re-viewed arguments against postponement of the Rome session of the North Atlantic Council. It also observed, inter alia, that it was becoming daily more clear that the question of German membership in NATO would soon have to be faced. It observed that the French view that a German relationship to NATO be exclusively through the EDC was unacceptable to Germany as it would give Germany a status inferior to other EDC members. It was suggested that the least Germany could accept was a firm tripartite assurance, at the signing of the contractual relations agreement and European Defense Force treaty, that the allies would support German candidacy in NATO. Ambassador Spofford was asked to consider whether Alphand’s visit to London would provide Spofford an opportunity “to edge into this problem with him in private conversations in which you would be speaking in a private capacity.” It was also suggested that Ambassador Bruce might also wish to take up the matter with Foreign Minister Schuman and other key French officials when the opportunity offered. (740.5/10–1851)