Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/10–1851: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

London, October 18, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 473. If decisions are to be taken at Rome² on Ger participation in West defense thru EDC, considerable preparatory work will be necessary in NATO as well as that going on in Paris conf and contemplated for big three mtgs.³ We know contemplated schedule from Byroade and Reinstein.

Byroade’s suggestion that Fr keep CD fully and currently informed of developments at Paris EDC conf has been given Burin in Alphand’s absence. Understand Alphand will present full report in CD on Monday.⁴

Wld appreciate early indication Wash thinking (and SHAPE’S if it wishes) on timing and nature of other preparatory work, including that on question of how Eur Def Force is to be integrated into NATO. This is question which will obviously require NATO attention before Rome and one to which Brit as well as Dutch and others attach much importance. They, like we, are concerned not merely that EDF achieve stated “European” objectives of Paris conf but also that it be so developed as to fulfill less clearly stated objective of assuring that EDC both in short term and long term, will serve common interest of NAT nations rather than becoming possible divisive element or more serious long-range problem. Effective integration of EDC into wider North Atlantic framework on firm basis of common interests appears to be key to situation.

We accordingly welcome indications both in interim report⁵ and in Paris 2182 to Dept⁶ early discussions on EDC–NATO relations are contemplated. Question however, Alphand’s use of word “agreement” between EDC and NATO. Situation of fact appears to be not one of two separate groups but of small tightly-knit unit within larger loosely-knit one and relationship cld presumably be spelled out in EDC treaty and in Rome council decision. (In this connection see Brussels agreement, C6–D/1,⁷ paras 10, 12, and 15 (3)).

Fol is our preliminary thinking on problem of EDC integration into NATO. As we see it, problem has two aspects. First is to assure effective control over EDF. Second is to serve best interest of both EDC and NATO.

First aspect is apparently being developed along sound organizational lines with respect to EDF (as distinct from EDC) in that “all command functions and other functions relating to employment of European forces” will be under SACEUR from outset (first para of para 3, chapter I, interim report). SACEUR is subject to higher strategic direction from SG and SC subject to polit guidance from NAC and CD. This aspect organizationally therefore seems to present problem only of further developing NAC and CD along lines already charted into effective instruments for extending coordinated polit guidance. NATO control cld be effective counterpoise to exercise of undue dominance by any one nation in EDC. How effective its control wld be in event, for example, of De Gaulle or a similarly-minded German acquiring leadership of EDC wld depend upon degree and effectiveness of NAT integration.

On second aspect, we believe objective of serving best interests of both EDC and Atlantic community can best be achieved thru development of some form of “osmosis”. While EDC will be more tightly integrated than NATO, both, while based on separate formal treaties, are living and developing structures with substantially similar objectives and many common functions. Relationship of smaller to larger shld avoid rigidity as far as possible. There shld be maximum meshing of procedures, free two-way flow of ideas and results, and absorption by each body of practical and beneficial developments in other.

We note that second para of para 3, chap I, interim report, states “establishment and functioning of EDC shld be assured in close liaison with appropriate organs of NATO” and lists fields in which liaison considered specially necessary. Do not believe “liaison” enough substantively. Furthermore, this may cloak possible Fr desire to keep Ger out of NATO indefinitely. Believe best answer neither liaison nor representation of EDC bodies as such in NATO bodies but rather use to maximum extent of same individuals in comparable positions in both.

This wld appear both to provide maximum effectiveness and to avoid problem of natl vs. corporate representation. To extent greater corporate entity of some EDC bodies might require, some form of supplemental corporate liaison cld be considered.

Spofford

1. This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and Frankfurt.
2. The reference here is to the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council held in Rome November 24–28; see pp. 693 ff.
3. The American, British, and French Foreign Ministers planned to meet in Paris and Rome during November.
4. Regarding Alphand’s report to the Council Deputies on Monday, October 22, see telegram 496, October 23, from London, p. 897.
5. The reference here is to the Interim Report of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, July 24, p. 843.
6. Not printed.
7. Regarding the NATO Council document under reference here, see document Pleven D–2/1a, January 26, p. 755.