Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 723 Near and Middle East

Memorandum by John H. Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Davis)

top secret

[Washington,] July 18, 1951.

Subject: Draft Anglo-U.S. Agreement on Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

Attached¹ is a revision of the draft agreement on the Middle East command² which reflects the views of the State Department. In brief, the revisions are as follows:

a. In paragraph 2 the last sentence has been revised in order to remove the implication that U.S. forces will be available in the near future.

b. In the third paragraph the question of whether or not a system of control over the Middle East command is necessary is left open.

c. In paragraph 4 the desirability of including a Turkish officer in the Middle East command is emphasized.

d. In paragraph 5 it is suggested that if Egypt is not politically possible as the location of the headquarters, Cyprus be considered.

e. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the British draft have been combined in one paragraph and reference to SACEUR has been deleted. It is the State Department view that since the paper deals with the Middle East command it is only necessary to refer to a Greek liaison with such command and that the relationships of Turkey to the NATO commands need not be settled at this time. It is therefore stated that Greece and Turkey will have relations with the NATO command through the Standing Group. This will provide an opportunity for whatever relationships seem most desirable and will also leave open the question of whether the Turks will be asked to or will desire to assign any of their forces to a NATO command

f. In paragraph 8 of the British draft (paragraph 7 in the State Department revision) a reference to the French Naval Commander Mediterranean has been included. Since this paper will be dealt with by the Standing Group, it is felt that it would be better to anticipate French reaction and deal with it when the paper is introduced.

g. In paragraph 9 of the British draft (paragraph 8 of the State Department revision) the cooperative nature of the Board has been spelled out in somewhat more detail so that the emphasis will be on the efforts of the Board to secure cooperation from the Arab States and Israel. The British draft seems to limit possible membership on the Board and the State Department suggests that the Board should be open to participation by all of the Arab States and Israel, irrespective of their present defense capabilities. The State Department draft also spells out in more detail the proposed activities of the Board.

h. Paragraph 10 of the British draft (paragraph 9 of the State Department revision) makes Turkey’s membership in NATO a prerequisite of the establishment of the defense board. The State Department believes that Turkey’s admission to NATO should also be a prerequisite to the establishment of the Middle East command.

John H. Ferguson

Annex

Draft Anglo-United States Agreement Prepared in the Department of State³

top secret

[Washington,] July 18, 1951.

Command in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with representatives of the Department of State and representatives of the British Embassy and British Joint Services Mission, suggest that the following tentative proposals be put to the Governments regarding Command in the Mediterranean, South East Europe and the Middle East:

(1) Greece and Turkey should be admitted as full members of NATO. The U.S. considers that it is desirable that Turkey play a full part in the defense of the Middle East under an Allied Middle East Command, and is prepared to urge this course upon Turkey as soon as it is a NATO member.

(2) There should be an Allied Middle Eastern Command, on the Headquarters of which will be included U.S., U.K., Commonwealth, French and Turkish officers. This headquarters would command such forces as members of NATO (including Turkey) and their associates made available for the defense of the Middle East area. It will also assume command of the forces of such non-NATO states of the Middle East as voluntarily make their forces available. It is not contemplated that U.S. forces would be so available.

3. The Middle East Command will not be a NATO command. It will, however, be closely associated with NATO by virtue of the association of U.S., U.K., Commonwealth, French and Turkish officers at its headquarters. In event that a system of control is required, the representatives of the four NATO participants in the Command might meet in Washington.

4. The Commander of the Allied Middle East Command should be a British officer. The U.S. will use its good offices to make this proposal acceptable to the Turks. It will be desirable for a Turkish officer to hold a high appointment in the Command such as Commander of Land Forces.

5. The Headquarters of SACME should if possible be located in Egypt. The feasibility of the Egyptian location in time of peace will depend on political factors arising from the present exacerbation of Anglo-Egyptian relations and upon Egyptian willingness to permit Israeli officers to come to Egypt. If this is not possible the Headquarters might be located in Cyprus.

6. Greece will be represented at Allied Headquarters, Middle East, by a liaison mission. As members of NATO, Greece and Turkey will have relations with the NATO Command through the Standing Group.

7. In the Mediterranean, the C-in-C, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (who is also C-in-C, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean), the C-in-C, British Mediterranean Fleet, and the Commander of the French Naval Forces, Mediterranean, will each control his own forces and bases and will be responsible for the security of his own sea communications, subject to such joint allocations of area responsibilities as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time. Each would maintain liaison at the other’s headquarters.

8. In order to maintain the voluntary cooperation of Middle Eastern countries in the defense of the Middle East there should be established at SACME Headquarters a Middle East Defense Board to be the focus of indigenous efforts to increase the defensive capabilities of the Middle Eastern States. SACME or his delegate should be the Chairman of the MEDB. On the Board should be representatives of the U.S., U.K., France and Turkey, but the emphasis should be on the Board’s voluntary membership from Middle Eastern States, and every effort should be made to establish the Board in the form most likely to elicit the maximum cooperation from the area. It will represent an opportunity for establishing between the Western Powers and the States of the Middle East equal-to-equal cooperation on defense matters. The Board would be open to the voluntary participation of the Arab States and Israel, irrespective of their present defensive capabilities. Consideration should be given to the manner in which the Commonwealth countries should be associated with the MEDB. The Board would be responsible to the countries participating in its membership and would (a) act in an advisory and consultative capacity to national agencies and to SACME; (b) proceed with defense planning for the area and assure implementation of these plans by ME States; (c) serve as a clearing house for arms aid and training missions requested from the U.S., U.K. and France, and (d) be the medium for dealing cooperatively with any other defense problems affecting the ME as a whole.

9. Prerequisite to the establishment of the Command structure outlined above, including the establishment of the MEDB, is the admission of Turkey to NATO.

1. Annex, below.
2. Reference is to the July British draft proposal of the Anglo-American Agreement on Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 559.
3. A marginal notation states that this draft was written by G. Lewis Jones of NE and approved by McGhee of NEA and Perkins of EUR.