740.5/7–1151: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 1

top secret priority

232. Fol is informal translation of FonOff note dated July 10 handed to me last night by Schuman, referred to in Embtel 209, July 112 and in my immed preceding tel. Original text going forward by pouch.

Begin translation. French Govt has already had occasion make known to Govts of US and UK its views concerning the different ways of associating Greece and Turkey with def of the West. In particular, French rep at Council of Deps of NAT has made it known that his preference was for a special pact rather than for direct adherence of the 2 countries in question to the Atlantic Pact, without there being any hostility involved on our part, in principle, toward the latter solution. It was indicated that French Govt wld not take any definitive decision prior to formation of next cabinet, concerning the polit formula which it wld choose.

French Govt has been informed most recently of the suggestions of Brit Govt concerning the politico-mil aspects of this problem. It appears that those suggestions can be summarized as follows:

Brit Govt wld be prepared accept the entry of Greece and Turkey in Atlantic Pact provided the latter country be made part of the Middle Eastern theatre of operations under an integrated command, and provided that theatre, which wld include Egypt and certain members of the Commonwealth in addition to Turkey and the 3 great Western Powers, be placed under a special mil organism that assures its high-level strategic direction. That organism wld be composed of the present members of the standing group, to which wld be added representative of Turkey. As far as Greece is concerned it would be attached to theatre of operations of Supreme Allied Commander, Eur. Finally, according to the indications given to standing group by the Brit rep, there wld not be a naval command for entire Mediterranean but the creation of 2 separate commands, one entrusted to a Brit admiral and attached to Middle East, the other entrusted to an Amer admiral and attached to Eur.

If above summary actually corresponds to views of the Brit Govt—even while it is realized that they are not yet definitive—French Govt deems it necessary to communicate at this time to Brit and US Govts certain observations which these views call forth, inasmuch as the specifically mil aspects of the problem are same for both of the solutions that are envisaged (conclusion of a regional pact or extension of Atlantic Pact to include Greece and Turkey) and those mil aspects are in any event independent of the polit solution.

[Page 557]

Whatever formula therefore which may be adopted definitively for association of Greece and Turkey with Western defense, French Govt must make it known that it wld find it impossible to accept a mil organization in which Turkey wld be part of a theatre of operations that wld not be under the top-level strategic direction of the standing group as it is now constituted. Such an organization, in the view of French Govt, wld run counter to the desired goal for it wld allow neither the close coordination of the def plans among Eur, Mediterranean and Middle East, nor wld it permit the efficient distribution of common resources, both of which are the essential reasons why the Atlantic powers consider it necessary to associate Greece and Turkey with Western def. French Govt has already indicated the view to Brit and US Govts that since we are confronted with a possible adversary who by his very nature responds to a single strategy, it is indispensable that the Western powers shld as soon as possible have at their disposal an organism for the direction of strategy that wld be capable of encompassing at same time the various possible theatres of operation. French Govt considers that only the present standing group can be that organism and that consequently the Middle Eastern theatre which wld be constituted shld be placed under its direction regardless of what the limits of that theatre might be, and that it shld have the same relationship to standing group as the Eur theatres of operation.

As regards the limits of the Middle Eastern theatre, French Govt agrees with Brit Govt in considering that it shld not include territory of Greece, which shld come under the Supreme Allied Commander, Eur.

As far as Turkey is concerned, 2 solutions appear possible either, it cld be attached to SHAPE as in case of Greece, or it cld be attached to Middle Eastern threatre. In any event, particular attention will have to be paid to the polit and mil questions which are involved in problem of the Straits notably in relation with the internatl treaties that are in force and to which Soviet Union is a party: Instrs will be sent concerning this to the French rep on Council of Deps, who will inform his colleagues.

Finally, on the point whether or not single naval command shld be established for entire Mediterranean, and how responsibilities in that zone shld be divided, the French Govt considers that this question must be thoroughly examined by the standing grp; but it wants even now to underline the position that in view of its interests on both shores of Western Mediterranean, notably French presence in North Africa and in view of the strategic bases which France has in that area, organization that is adopted shld allow a French admiral to exercise the principal inter-Allied responsibilities.

Instructions in conformity with above indications have been sent to French rep on the standing group, to allow him to continue the discussions that have been proceeding for several months on the subj of the organization of the command in the Mediterranean and the Middle East; and French Govt hopes that those discussions will now lead to a successful conclusion.

Finally, French Govt hopes very strongly that the 3 govts will stay in the closest possible contact on all problems covered in present note [Page 558] and that moreover, in conformity with jointly agreed decisions, any separate initiative with govts of Athens and Ankara, which might prejudge a commonly agreed solution by the 3 govts, will be avoided.

End translation.

Bruce
  1. Repeated to London for Spofford.
  2. Neither printed. Telegram 209 reported Schuman’s comment that it was impossible at this time for the French Government to take any more definite position than that expressed in the aide-mémoire due to the fact that there was currently “no Fr Govt. in existence.” (740.5/7–1151)