Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 720 UK

United Kingdom Record of a Meeting Between the British Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley), London, June 8, 1951¹

London, June 8, 1951

top secret

Lord Fraser, in welcoming General Bradley, said how grateful the Chiefs of Staff were that he had been able to find the time to visit them. There were, he said, a number of points which they would like to discuss with him.

General Bradley replied that he much regretted that it had not been possible to bring with him Admiral Sherman, as had been proposed^* by the British Chiefs of Staff, so that they could discuss in detail Command arrangements for the Mediterranean. General Vandenberg was already in Europe, and they had endeavoured to make it a rule since operations in Korea commenced that there should be at least two of their number in Washington the whole time. He went on to say that he was not able to commit the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in any way, but he would naturally take back for their consideration any views that were expressed at the meeting. He would also inform the State Department of their views, where necessary and appropriate, at one of their weekly meetings.

Command Arrangements in the Middle East

Sir William Slim said there seemed to be general agreement on the necessity for an allied Middle East Command Organization. The proposals for this Command Organization which had been put forward by the United States went a long way on the lines on which the British were thinking. He considered, however, that the Command Organization for the Middle East must be something very much more definite than the United States had so far proposed and must be capable of functioning in war. The United States had suggested that various Middle East countries, should, if they so wished, take their place on a “Middle East Co-operative Defense Board.” He did not consider that this would be a wise move initially, although naturally it might become possible as the result of subsequent developments. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that, at the outset, members of the Board should be drawn from those nations only who were in fact members of N.A.T.O. or who were associated with NATO. Turkey and Greece should be part of the Middle East Command Organization which must be linked in some way with NATO. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff did not consider that the Middle East should necessarily—at any rate in peace—come under the Standing Group, but rather under some separate body in Washington composed of the present members of the Standing Group wearing different hats and joined, possibly, by representatives of Turkey and Greece.

General Bradley expressed his general agreement with the necessity for an effective Allied Command Organization in the Middle East—effective in both peace and war. He said that it was debatable whether Greece should be part of this Organization or whether she should come within General Eisenhower’s Command. Politically, it could be argued that Greece was part of the Balkans. However, this question of Greece could be settled later as the result of discussion. Turkey’s role was of necessity purely a defensive one, and she would naturally wish to command her own forces on the home front. On the other hand, Turkey must be part of some Command Organization and under some outside Commander both for purposes of planning and in order that any support which might be given her, particularly from the air and the navy, could be properly co-ordinated. General Bradley was of the opinion that the Turks themselves would not like being under the British Commander in the Middle East.

As regards the question whether the Middle East Command should come under N.A.T.O., General Bradley pointed out that it was unlikely that the State Department would agree to such an arrangement, since it would mean that the N.A.T.O. Organization would be becoming world-wide, and the time was probably not yet ripe for such a step.

The French would certainly jump at any suggestion that the Standing Group should control the Middle East, since it would mean that the Standing Group was in fact assuming responsibility for the global direction of war. Such a step might have serious repercussions in other parts of the world; for example, there would certainly be objections from the South American countries, and Commonwealth countries would no doubt also express strong feelings against it.

General Bradley agreed that the suggestion that the Middle East Command should come under a separate body in Washington, composed of the present members of the Standing Group wearing different hats, might well produce a workable compromise, but that this solution would require further considerations.

Command Arrangements in the Mediterranean

Lord Fraser said that careful consideration had been given to the United States suggestion for the division of the Mediterranean, with the British Mediterranean Fleet confined to the Eastern end. This suggestion would, in fact, mean that the whole British Mediterranean Fleet would have to be withdrawn from the remainder of the Mediterranean and it would entail leaving the British bases in Gibraltar and Malta. From the British point of view the United States proposal was not a practicable proposition. The First Sea Lord then outlined the British counter-proposal which, he stated, had received Ministerial approval, the previous evening and had already been transmitted to Washington for discussion with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. This counter-proposal was as follows:—

(i) Under the British Supreme Commander, Middle East, would be the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who would command and operate all the British naval forces and bases throughout the Mediterranean to meet the naval requirements of the Middle East Command and any additional allied requirements from British bases.

(ii) Admiral Carney would be the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Flank, and would command and operate all United States naval forces in the Mediterranean to meet the naval requirements of General Eisenhower.

(iii) The British Naval Commander-in-Chief and Admiral Carney would keep in very close touch and co-ordinate naval and maritime air operations throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. They would also co-ordinate the activities of allied naval forces in the Mediterranean.

He gave General Bradley a copy^† of this proposal in diagrammatic form.

Lord Fraser continued that he felt that this proposal overcame the difficulties of both sides and would enable the United States Sixth Fleet to accomplish its primary mission of supporting the Southern Flank. He said the British Naval Commander in the Mediterranean would at the same time be the British naval member of the Middle East Command Organization. He would be responsible for the running of British bases in the Mediterranean and for the routing of British convoys through the Mediterranean. Gibraltar would certainly be a bottleneck which would require very careful co-ordination, as would the various other problems connected with the naval operation of the Mediterranean. However, given good-will on both sides, there was, he contested, no reason why joint functional control of the Mediterranean should not present a practicable proposition.

General Bradley said that this new proposal of joint functional control of the Mediterranean was very much in line with his own way of thinking, and he felt that it might well present a practicable solution to this thorny problem. He would certainly discuss the suggestion with Admiral Sherman and his colleagues on his return to Washington. He agreed that the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean would naturally be responsible for the running of British bases and the routing of British convoys through the Mediterranean. On the other hand, convoys which were proceeding in support of Admiral Carney’s Southern Flank would be the responsibility of Admiral Carney. This dual control of convoys would naturally require extremely close co-ordination between the two Admirals; but it could and would work.

Command Arrangements, Southern Flank

Sir William Slim informed General Bradley that the British Chiefs of Staff had now agreed that General Eisenhower should set up his Command Organization for his Southern Flank under Admiral Carney on similar lines to that of his Northern Flank under Admiral Brind, i.e.:—

Commander-in-Chief, Southern Flank and Commander, Naval Forces, alloted to that Sector	Admiral Carney
Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, Southern Flank	An Italian General
Commander-in-Chiefs, Air Forces, Southern Flank	An American Air Officer

A condition to this agreement was that Admiral Carney’s sphere should not extend to Greece, Turkey or to the Mediterranean as a whole, it being clearly understood that future decisions concerning the position of Greece and Turkey and concerning Command in the Mediterranean, were still under consideration and were not affected by the Command Organization of the Southern Flank. A message^‡ to this effect had that morning been despatched to the Standing Group.

General Bradley expressed his approval of this action and said that it would certainly be a great relief to General Eisenhower; it should enable him to forge ahead with his Southern Flank Command Organization.

Command Arrangements in the Atlantic

General Bradley said that he was concerned with the Command arrangements in the Atlantic. These arrangements, which had been agreed by NATO after long and careful study, had received a very lukewarm reception in the United Kingdom and had been heavily criticized by both politicans and the public, including many renowned retired British Admirals. The United States hesitated in accepting the responsibilities of this Command under such conditions, and he suggested that it might even now be preferable to set up an Atlantic Command Organization on the same lines as that now proposed for the Mediterranean. He pointed out that dual functional control in the Atlantic had worked satisfactorily during the World War II.

Lord Fraser said that he felt that the United States were possibly taking too great account of the publicly expressed views of retired British Admirals on this subject. Even though these Admirals were men of great renown with a wealth of past experience, they did not appreciate the full complexity of the problem and were not aware of all the arguments which had been given careful consideration in producing the present answer—an answer fully supported by the Admiralty. Admittedly joint functional control in the Atlantic had worked satisfactorily in the last war; but it must be remembered that initially the Command arrangements in the Atlantic had been the sole responsibility of the United Kingdom, and that only after these arrangements were fully functioning and operations in the Atlantic in full swing had the United States come in and been able to fit into the existing organization. In the present circumstances, where planning and arrangements were starting ab initio and where two great naval powers were directly interested from the outset, a Supreme Commander in the Atlantic undoubtedly produced the most satisfactory organization for Atlantic Command. He further pointed out that politically it would be almost impossible for the British Government to go back on the present agreement for a Supreme Commander in the Atlantic.

General Bradley expressed his understanding of the position.

[Here follow a discussion of British policy with regard to Persia, Hong Kong, and trade with China and a brief report by General Bradley on the general situation in Korea.]

Annex

Draft Proposal Prepared by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff Committee

top secret

[London ? June 8, 1951.]

Command Arrangements in the Mediterranean: Alternative Solution

Note: SACME (Brit) Command would be a fully integrated command linked to N.A.T.O.
Greece and Turkey would be associated with this Command.

1. This record was included as a confidential annex to the British Chiefs of Staff meeting on June 8. A notation on the source text indicates that this is copy one of two copies and a marginal note reads: “copy 2 handed to Mr. Matthews 6/12/51.” Presumably, General Bradley was given a number of copies of the UK minutes either before his departure from England or soon after his return and he, in turn, passed two copies to the Department of State. Bradley apparently traveled to London to fulfill the invitation extended by Air Marshal Elliot in late May. See memorandum of conversation by John Ferguson, May 31, p. 525. Bradley first visited France, arriving in Paris on June 2 for talks with Generals Eisenhower and Gruenther, French Defense Minister Moch, and various French military leaders. On June 4 Bradley also met with General Marras, Chief of the Italian General Staff. Bradley then visited Britain from June 6 to June 9. In a press conference at Paris on June 2, Bradley declared that he favored the admission of Greece and Turkey, as well as of Spain, to NATO “from the military point of view,” and added: “It is my belief that we ought to have as many together as possible to build up collective defence. The more of us who can be put together the better we are going to be.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1950–1952, p. 11514)
2. COS (W) 38. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Annex. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. COS (W) 44. [Footnote in the source text.]