330/5–2551: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1584. USSR Presidency of SO in June.
1. In planning for Malik1 (USSR) Presidency of SC, we see Chinese representation issue as possibly tying up SC in prolonged procedural wrangle. If UK will support US on a careful adherence to SC rules, likelihood will be reduced. Also, we feel it would be most unfortunate to unity of UN if split develops between US and UK at this time.
Given the present membership in SC we shall probably need a majority of eight votes to challenge rulings of President because Malik may deny validity of Tsiang’s2 vote as rep of China. Of course, if Malik refuses to put his challenged rulings to a vote, and this was his tactic in Aug 1950, he can tie up the SC in debate on procedure, because we assume US will be unwilling to waive challenge to any move of Malik’s attempting to deny Tsiang his right to sit, speak or vote in SC.
Malik might deny the validity of the Chinese vote. That wld mean that he wld deny that we had overruled any of his improper rulings as President if our majority does not include seven votes in addition to China. This means we need solid support on questions of a proper application of rules of procedure from Brazil, Ecuador, Turkey, Netherlands, France and UK in addition to our own and China’s votes. Support from Yugoslavia wld be desirable but was lacking in Aug 1950. We understand UK is being approached in London on this general question and wonder whether related approach in Paris, Quito, The Hague and Belgrade might not be desirable precaution.
2. On Chinese rep issue.
- (a)
- We cannot see more than four possible votes in support of any clear cut motion for unseating Tsiang and seating pro rep. USSR, Yugoslavia, India and perhaps UK unless its present standing instructions are changed wld support such motion.
- (b)
- If Malik attempts to rule as President, as he did on Aug 1, 1950 that Tsiang does not represent China and therefore shld not sit, we wld challenge this ruling3 and hope UK wld vote with us as it did last Aug. It takes seven votes to overrule such a ruling.
- (c)
- There are other procedural ways in addition to (b) above in which Malik might raise the point. He might as Soviet rep object to Tsiang’s credentials and then as SC President put question: “Those in favor of approving Tsiang’s credentials”; here the US on a point of order under rule 30 wld challenge the question as a violation of SC rule 17. To have a clear cut overruling of Malik’s form of putting the question, we need the UK vote. Otherwise the seven votes, including China but not the UK, might be disregarded by Malik and we wld then be tied up in fighting for Tsiang’s right to speak or to vote under rule 17. We conclude that on this point as on Aug 1950 question of seating the ROK and not seating the NKs we shld not waive the question but insist that the SC continue to consider it until we succeeded in preventing a denial of any of Tsiang’s rights as rep in the SC.
3. In planning the substantive work of the SC for June we wld recall informal agreement among SC members of last July that if Malik refuses to call a meeting, the President for the fol month, the UK, wld with the consent of all other SC members except USSR act in his stead if necessary to keep SC functioning. Two substantive matters on which attention of SC may be needed during June are Palestine and Kashmir. We assume Dept also has in mind possibility Iranian question might be brought to Council, possibly by USSR. In any of these cases if SC meeting is required this wld be additional reason for urging wide support from UK and others for firm approach to any of Malik’s tactics attempting to tie up Council.
- Y. A. Malik, Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations.↩
- Tingfu F. Tsiang, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations.↩
- Marginal notation here reads: “on ground he has no power”. The word “Yugo” is also inscribed marginally, in parentheses, in apparent addition of the name of Yugoslavia to that of the United Kingdom in this sentence.↩