[Annex]
Draft Paper by Colonel Charles
H. Bonesteel, III, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
3
top secret
[Washington,] 1 May 1951.
Doc. P–3(d)
Executive Group
Foreign Aid Presentation
the implications of substantially delayed
deliveries of mdap end-items
(Written in response to paragraph 3(d), Exec. Group Doc. P–3)4
The Problem
1. A superficial analysis by the Bureau of the Budget of U.S. military
production schedules, derived principally from the National Defense
Budget for FY ’52, indicates that very
small expenditures for MDAP end-item
programs can be made in FY ’52. In the
history of MDAP, “expenditures” have
closely paralleled actual deliveries to recipient countries. If this
continues to be true, it is required to analyze the political and other
implications of a sharp curtailment of MDAP end-item deliveries during FY ’52 to the NAT countries and other foreign countries
expecting U.S. military assistance.
Discussion
2. End-item deliveries to non-NATO countries have been programmed on a
basis approximating that of operational requirements (except for Greece,
Turkey and Thailand). Drastic curtailment of the shipment of these
operational requirements could dangerously affect the containment of
Communist aggression in Asia and the Middle East. The loss at this time
of Indonesia or Formosa—or the expansion of successful civil war in the
Philippines—would jeopardize the retention of all of sub-Asia within the
Western World. The loss, progressive or immediate, of sub-Asia would
deprive the Western
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World of
strategic materials and trade essential to the preservation of the
security and economic viability of the West.
3. Substantial reductions in expected MDAP end-item deliveries to NATO countries in the coming
Fiscal Year would have a less immediate, but potentially worse, effect
on the national interest and security of the United States. Some of the
more important resultants to such a situation are set forth
hereafter.
4. The implications of a drastic reduction in expected MDAP end-item deliveries to NATO countries
in the near future must be considered against the background of United
States policies regarding the North Atlantic Treaty as evidenced by our
actions since the Treaty was first considered. The United States was a
prime mover in the creation of the concept of a security treaty among
members of the North Atlantic community. The United States, evidencing
bold leadership, developed the treaty and obtained its ratification by
the governments concerned, very largely on the basis that the acceptance
of “collective defense” was the only answer by the sovereign democracies
of North America and Europe to the threat of outright or piecemeal
aggression by the Soviets. Because of the economic weakness of Europe at
the time of the ratifications of the Treaty, it was implicit in its
concept that the United States would help provide a substantial portion
of the arms required to give the treaty realistic validity. This is made
almost explicit in Article III of the Treaty. The ratifications of the
Treaty by the Parliaments of its European members were courageous
declarations on their part of their considered decisions to oppose
Communist force by the collective strength of the North Atlantic Treaty
countries, rather than to depend on the wishful thinking of neutrality.
These decisions were not easy to make considering the almost total lack
of strength at the time in Western Europe. It was recognized, however,
that the European countries, in themselves, did not have the immediate
capability to produce the physical armament necessary to create the
degree of strength required for the successful deterring of aggression
or for opposing Soviet force with the force of the North Atlantic
community.
5. Economic Implications. The United States has,
since ratification of the Treaty, been forcefully insisting on increases
in the defense efforts of our North Atlantic Treaty partners. The
present financial measures of defense effort on the part of many of the
NAT countries remain, in terms of percentage of national income,
considerably below that of the United States. There is no question but
what greater defense budgets could be safely supported by most of the
NAT countries if the political situation in the countries was such as to
obtain the support of majorities in Parliaments to vote such budgets. On
the other hand, the present financial efforts, when related to the
margins of safety essential to political stability and to the economic
viability
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needed to support
defense efforts, are not too far out of line. If it becomes generally
believed that the United States is insisting on an excessive
proportional effort in Europe which would have drastic effects on the
local economies—as is being suggested by the Bevan5 “insurrectionists” in England—and if, at
the same time, U.S. arrangements implied in past NATO planning to
provide substantial amounts of military equipment did not seem to be
met, there could be widespread dissatisfaction among segments of the
European public. This dissatisfaction might be dangerously increased by
Communist and other accusations that the United States was selfishly
forcing disproportionate burdens of defense on economically weaker
partners without regard to their essential economic viability, at the
same time that it was going back on the “bait” it used to snare them
into the Treaty. Despite the speciousness of such propaganda, there is
no doubt but what it could appreciably affect the “will to fight” in
certain countries. As the results of decreased availabilities of raw
materials and the inflationary aspects of defense production in Europe
became more pronounced, these economic implications could become more
and more serious.
6. Manpower Implications. The United States has
been a leader in the NATO in trying to lengthen terms of conscription
and training by other NAT countries. The argument has been energetically
advanced by the U.S., multilaterally and bilaterally, that the modern
soldier needs at least two years’ training before he is adequately
fitted to fight as a member of a large unit. The argument frequently
advanced by European countries to the effect that it was not politically
wise in Europe at this time to draft men if they could not be given the
equipment with which to train, has been brushed aside repeatedly by
saying that sufficient equipment, at least on training scales, could be
provided in the near future. It is unfortunately true, however, that
European countries, being so near the Iron Curtain, resist the
suggestion that they scatter available equipment among training
establishments instead of keeping it in combat ready units. This
argument cannot be completely ignored when one considers the shortness
of time which would be available for mobilization in case the Russians
started to march. Unless steady, increasing amounts of basic military
equipment become available in Europe, to keep abreast of the increased
manpower called to the colors, serious political and psychological
strains may result. Certainly, the forward momentum of defense efforts
in Europe would receive a set-back and the public reaction in Europe
might be dangerous to the continuance of the North Atlantic Treaty as a
dynamic mechanism for security.
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7. Political Implications. It is proper to assume
that there is an increasing “will to resist” building up in Europe. This
has not come about spontaneously, but has been slowly built through the
combination of many political, military and economic factors. It has
been helped most by the knowledge that, largely by U.S. end-item aid,
Europe has gradually been getting the arms with which to fight. It is
very hard to develop a will to fight Russian tanks with bare hands. The
somewhat weak and vacillating governments in many of the European
countries have lacked persuasive arguments on which to rest energetic
and positive defense programs before their Parliaments and people. There
has, however, been slowly developed an increasing willingness on the
part of Cabinets to risk political defeat before Parliaments in the
effort to get greater defense efforts—a willingness based on an
increasing popular appeal for the development of collective strength in
which United States end-item assistance plays an essential part.
Irresponsible opposition parties, however, could seize on a substantial
reduction in expected U.S. assistance to upset existing governments for
petty, internal party-politics. The results of a series of governmental
defeats on the issue of increased defense efforts would be dangerous to
the national interests of the U.S.
8. Morale Implications. Communist propaganda has
been concentrating for more than a year on developing neutralism in
Europe. The Soviet “Peace Offensive” has, with some success,
complemented this objective. Despite these Soviet propaganda policies,
however, there has been a growth in morale and determination in Europe
over the last several years. This has come about, in large part, because
of a growing feeling that American arms deliveries were substantially
increasing the ability of Europe to defend itself with modern and
adequate weapons. If there suddenly developed a hiatus in arms
deliveries from the United States, communists and confused nationalists
might create such doubts as to the reality of Europe’s growing ability
to defend itself that a public reaction toward neutrality could result.
There is a dangerous, vicious circle inherent in such a possible
development. Any pronounced increase in such sentiments in Europe would
produce increasing doubt in American opinion, including Congress, as to
the “guts” of the Europeans, leading to the possibility of decreased
American support to the strengthening of NATO—which in turn would
increase the possibilities of neutralism.
Conclusions
9. Unless we are to abandon a vast investment, made in the national
interest, toward filling the vacuum of power in Western Europe, the
above implications must be given full consideration. It seems clear that
arrangements should be made within the U.S. Government to sustain, until
full U.S. production has been reached, a flow of arms, during the Fiscal
Year 1952, from the United States to the European
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members of the North Atlantic Treaty
carefully balanced with the other vital aspects of our national defense.
Such allocating arrangements must, of course, also provide for
appropriate allocations to the danger spots in Asia and the Middle
East.
