Subject: The “Working Doctrine” for the Foreign Aid
Presentation
[Annex]
Statement of Working Doctrine for Presentation to
Congress of Foreign Aid Programs
secret
[Washington, April 16, 1951.]
Memorandum for the Executive Group
Colonel Bonesteel
Ambassador Wood
Colonel Lincoln
1. There is urgent necessity for a foundational working doctrine from
which will be derived the many detailed decisions required to finalize
the Presidential submissions to the Congress on foreign assistance
programs. There follow guide lines for such a doctrine:
2. The United States holds the position of leadership of the free world
in a vital struggle for survival. To meet our responsibilities requires
a tremendous effort in production, resources and personal service during
the next 2–4 years, and a probability of a continuing substantial effort
thereafter. The U.S. security program, including
foreign assistance elements thereof, must be such as to assure
sustained effort and continued support by the U.S. public and
Congress. Therefore, projects presented to the Congress in the
foreign assistance program must have both intrinsic merit and
demonstrable importance to national security and fundamental
national interest.
3. The U.S. position today requires a program which:
-
a.
- Will accomplish, as rapidly as feasible, the simultaneous
build-up of military strength in being
of:
- (1)
- the United States,
- (2)
- the other North Atlantic Treaty Nations,
- (3)
-
in terms of operational
requirements, those other areas in the Far East
and Middle East, as well as Germany and Yugoslavia, now
threatened by the Soviet system, whose loss would be of
critical importance to our
national security, and
- (4)
- those elements of Latin American armed forces which
can provide military strength essential to hemisphere defense.
-
b.
- Will permit the build-up of general strength in the free world
to be planned and executed to provide:
- (1)
- production and facilities directly required for
military forces and necessary support in depth,
including bases,
- (2)
- economic foundations capable of sustaining short and
long-term military preparedness, with particular
emphasis on the quick development on the part of those
countries and regions having major economic potentials
to a position of self-support of their defense
efforts.
-
c.
- Will provide reasonable assistance to underdeveloped areas to
help them help themselves to develop their resources,
productivity and strength, thereby deterring further internal
subversion or aggressive adventures by communist forces, giving
a sense of positive purpose through association with the more
developed democracies, and laying the foundation for cooperation
with these areas that will expedite effective development and
use of their resources including scarce and strategic materials
in their own interest and in the interest of an expanding
defense requirement and expanding world trade.
-
d.
- Is aimed at attaining maximum realistic contributions by each
free nation to the sum total of free world military strength and
the development of their capabilities and potential, singly and
mutually.
4. Finalizing of this program for Congress will take into account the
necessity for adjustments as compared with previous programs to reflect
the important changes which have taken place since the aggression in
Korea. Among major changes are:
-
a.
- The change in the international economic situation, including
the improvement in the external financial position of many
countries, the scarcity of raw materials and of commodities
desired by raw materials producing areas, and of increasing the
production of scarce raw materials.
-
b.
- The scarcity of many materials and finished goods in the U.S.
will necessitate defense priorities to obtain these items for
all exports of such items including those financed by foreign
loan and grant programs.
5. In order to have a program of maximum effectiveness under the changed
conditions since Korea, it must have:
-
a.
- Sufficient flexibility to permit resources to be used in such
a way as to contest most effectively the shifting tactics of
communism.
-
b.
- Realistic appreciation of fundamental political factors in
other free nations.
-
c.
- The integrated utilization of economic, military, political
and spiritual resources of the United States, powered and guided
by efficient streamlined organization and teamwork in the
Government and in the field.
6. Planning will include maximum efforts to eliminate administrative
clogging of the functioning of the U.S. programs. Emphasis will be
placed on gaining, as an integral part of building the mutual security
to which the U.S. will be contributing so heavily, the maximum
cooperation from all free nations in development, distribution and
conservation of scarce resources.
7. The basic concept of U.S. tactics is to build U.S. power in being, to
encourage the maximum effort to build strength and stability in friendly
countries, and to exert psychological, economic, and other pressures to
interfere with the accomplishment of communist programs.
