G/PM Files, Lot 68 D 349
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay)
secret
Washington, July 19,
1951.
Memorandum for: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of
Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Subject: Cooperation With The United Kingdom and Canada on
Atomic Energy Matters
References: A. Memo for Addressees from Executive Secretary,
NSC, subject: “Effect of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 on Scientific Intelligence Operations”, dated June 14,
19511
B. Memo for Addressees from Executive Secretary, NSC, subject: “Cooperation With The United
Kingdom and Canada on Atomic Energy Matters”, dated May 21, 19512
C. Memo for Addressees from Executive Secretary, NSC, subject: “Effect of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946 on Scientific Intelligence Operations”, dated March 29, 19511
D. Memo for Addressees from Executive Secretary, NSC, subject: “Exchange of Atomic Energy
Information”, dated April 18, 19511The attached memorandum by the Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission, on the subject is submitted herewith for your consideration as
members of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic
Energy.
The attached memorandum by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, on the
subject is submitted herewith for your consideration as members of the
Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy.
[Page 747]
A meeting of the Special Committee to consider this subject will be arranged
at an early date.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission (Dean) to the Executive Secretary
of the National Security Council (Lay)
secret
Washington, July 19,
1951.
It is the Commission’s view that in respect to the authority of the
Commission to make restricted data available to other nations, the
Atomic Energy Act is ambiguous. Applying the Act in this field has
become increasingly difficult in the light of atomic energy developments
in other countries since the passage of the Act about five years
ago.
The Commission is of the belief that a relationship among the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and possibly other nations,
involving technical assistance and exchange of information along certain
lines and an allocation of raw materials similar to that now in effect,
is essential if the atomic energy program of the United States is to
contribute its maximum to the common defense and security of this
nation. The Commission believes that because of the vital importance of
this matter to the American people, its actions in this field should be
based on an affirmative and unequivocal legislative expression.
Such legislation should vest the authority in the President for
undertaking to determine the cases in which cooperation with other
nations will promote the security of the United States. In this manner
the President may obtain the views of all interested agencies of the
Government on proposed cooperative actions with other nations and thus
assure an Executive Branch position that specific cooperative actions
will, in fact, promote the security interests of this country.
Examples of the kinds of future cooperative action which the Commission
believes might well promote the security interests of the United States
follow:
[Here follow points A, Canadian Reactor Program; B, Canadian Uranium
Purification; C, U.K. Reactor Program; D, Research; and E, Intelligence
Cooperation.]
F. Security
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have a common concern
to withhold from the Soviet Union and its satellites information and
ideas which might aid the atomic energy program of the USSR. At the end
of the war it was possible to define certain
[Page 748]
bodies of classified information held by all three
nations, or by pairs of them, and to set up procedures for insuring that
none of the information held in common should be made public except by
joint consent. This approach was also made on the control of the export
of material and devices which might be specifically useful to the atomic
energy program of the USSR.
There now appears to be a substantial and growing danger that any one of
the three nations, out of ignorance of the common interest, may allow
the publication of information which one of them has good reason to
withhold.
[Here follows additional discussion on the subject of security.]
Another example relates to the control over the export of certain
materials and devices, which also faces a growing practical difficulty
of the same type. The Commission considers that it is essential to
inform the United Kingdom and Canada from time to time, and within
essential limits, of the nature of particular programs and projects
concerning which premature publication on the part of another country
would jeopardize the security of the Commission’s program
objectives.
In conclusion, it is the view of the Commission that legislation to amend
Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act along the following lines should be
requested of the Congress as soon as feasible:
Delete Section 10(a) (1) and substitute the
following:
- “That any arrangement which involves the communication of
restricted data to any other nation, shall not be placed in
effect until after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been
informed and the President has determined that the arrangement
will promote the security of the United States.”
