310/12–750: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

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949. Personal for President and Secretary. Following is memorandum prepared by Ambassador Gross and Minister Ross, considered by USUN staff, and with which I fully concur.

“Mindful of our special responsibilities for and concern with UN affairs and considering that one of the basic premises of our foreign policy is the preservation of the UN, the following are our views:

The British, against their own best interests, are assuming at the UN an initiative with the Commonwealth and the North Atlantic group on a negative and defeatist basis.

They fail to understand the essential reason for pressing for action on the Six-Power resolution. This resolution symbolizes (1) the solidarity of the sponsors and of the other 47 members who supported UN action in Korea—and (2) the fact that the Soviet Union cannot by its veto thwart the will of the UN.

The issue of the cease-fire is a tactical military issue. If a cease-fire arrangement is necessary in order to preserve or liquidate a limited military situation, such an arrangement must not be permitted to undercut the essential requirement of preserving the political and moral authority of the UN.

It will assist, rather than hinder, the accomplishment of both objectives, i.e., obtaining an acceptable cease-fire and maintaining the authority of the UN, if we insist that we proceed to the adoption of the Six-Power resolution.

We must also make clear that if this resolution is defied, we shall urge the UN to name the aggressor and to call for the assistance of all members in repelling the aggression. The UN would thus show its firm intention to vindicate its authority when the means and circumstances permit.

No other course suffices to preserve the moral integrity of the UN. No other course can preserve the solidarity of the free world nor assure the survival of the UN itself. If the UN is thus destroyed, we shall revert to a chaos in which every nation, in isolation, must deal with the threat of Communist aggression and subversion.

Our declaration of intention to proceed on this course is the only way to prevent a rapid deterioration of confidence on the part of people all over the world in the enduring values of the UN and in American leadership. The UN won the first battle in the war against it by accomplishing the objective of repressing the North Korean invasion. It may lose the second battle, now being fought against it by the new aggressor. By following the course here suggested, it can prove that it will persevere in its intention to win the war.”

Austin