Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

top secret

[Washington,] December 7, 1950.

Subject: Truman–Attlee Talks

Participants:	United Kingdom	United States
	Sir Oliver Franks	The Secretary of State
	Sir Roger Makins	Mr. Matthews
	Mr. Robert Scott	Mr. Rusk
		Mr. Nitze
		Mr. Jessup

Sir Oliver suggested the desirability of a short meeting tomorrow morning between the President and the Prime Minister to tie things up. Presumably it could not be held before that because the group working on the raw material question would not be ready. This was agreed upon.

There was some discussion as to whether there should be an attempt to draw up agreed conclusions as a private record. It was agreed that there should be a public Communiqué. In regard to that, Sir Oliver said that anything in the Communiqué on the Far East was very important. In phrasing it, one must keep in mind that the worry in Europe, including the United Kingdom which the Prime Minister has represented in person here, is a very real thing. Sir Roger Makins suggested that the Communiqué might contain the thought that it had not been the purpose of these meetings to reach conclusions. There was no decision on these matters.

Sir Roger said that the Prime Minister this afternoon would want to make a statement on Indochina since he had talked with the French about this in London. This statement would not contain any concrete request and would not call for action. Mr. Attlee would also say something about Japan, but again there would be no specific points.

The Prime Minister may also touch on the question of US–UK organization and may hand the President a paper on this. He indicated that the Prime Minister approved the action which we have taken in sending the letter to M. Schuman, and that we could go ahead with the whole Spofford Plan operation. On the question of the armament effort, he did not think the Prime Minister was yet clear and that this would have to come up later.

Mr. Nitze reported on certain intelligence items which had come to us indicating the possible link between stepped up activities in East Germany and the developments in Asia.

The Secretary then went over orally the memorandum entitled, “United States Position on Two Principal Alternative Courses in Korea.”¹ The following reactions were noted. The British agreed on 3a, made no comment on 3b, c, or d. On e iii, they agreed on the importance of the question; and on iv, Sir Oliver agreed on the first sentence. He and Sir Roger agreed that some United Nations forces would have to stay in Korea during the period of negotiations.

On f dealing with Formosa, Sir Oliver asked whether the foreign policy referred to included the following three points:

(1) Continued recognition of Chiang,

(2) Denial of Formosa to the mainland, and

(3) An assertion that in some way and at some time in the future Formosa would belong to China.

He wondered whether this was correct, or whether 2 was the main point. The Secretary said that was at least a starting point, and it was difficult in such matters to use such words as “forever”. Sir Oliver said he had raised this question for general reasons.

Skipping to the second course, which is the failure to get a cease-fire, he thought the United States was assuming United Nations support which he thought would be hard to get.

In regard to Formosa, the British recognize the force of the military considerations which we had advanced and their military people also agreed. They were not however impressed by our position on continuing to recognize Chiang Kai-shek. They understood that the recognition of the Peking Government by the United States was out, but they questioned the continued recognition of Chiang.

The Secretary agreed there was a lot of trouble wrapped up in this problem, and he did not know the answer. If one starts with the proposition that we want to deny Formosa to the mainland, there is no question that Chiang is a factor in this denial. He is on the spot. While we did not like the situation any better than the British do, it is dangerous to talk about the point Sir Oliver raised.

Mr. Scott said he thought there were two alternatives and not three. The first was to make an effort to reach a settlement with the Chinese Communists, and the second was to get into war with them. On the first alternative, he said we must make the effort since so much world opinion and United Nations opinion expected it. Speaking personally, he thought it would be possible to make a settlement. He left to one side the question of recognition of the Chinese Communists by the United States, but they thought that in the United Nations there should be effective representation of China which was not now the case. The United Kingdom does not believe that the conduct of the government is the test to determine whether it should be seated. If they were seated, then they must either comply with their Charter obligations or be denounced. The Secretary asked whether their situation would be any different from that of the Soviet Union. Mr. Scott said no but Chinese Communists were now outlaws and there was much support of the idea that they ought to have the seat in the United Nations. The United Kingdom would like to put this to the test and see how they behave. He then analyzed their arguments about the way in which they were merely helping North Korea which is a government they had recognized, and he said they made out “quite a strong legal case” which appeals to a great many.

Mr. Scott then argued that we should try to establish a position of consistent and unwavering policy. Regarding Formosa, we had once said it was of no strategic importance and now we say it is. We ought to reaffirm the Cairo Declaration. In doing so, we would say it must stand or fall as a whole. We would argue that the part on Korea is the most important and that, before we looked at the question of Formosa and other questions, we should get implementation of the agreement on Korea. We should point out that this is a new Chinese Government which has repudiated some of the earlier Chinese obligations and we should ask whether they accept the principles of the Cairo Declaration which includes the renunciation of aggression and of any desire for territory. These general principles were stated in the Declaration in regard to Japan, but they were of general application. If China accepted them, that would be good. He did not think this course would settle the whole Far Eastern problem, but if war broke out in the East it would become a world war. At that point Korea would be very similar to the case of Greece in World War II. He admitted that the success of the policy he outlined was doubtful, but it would carry world opinion with us. It would safeguard both Korea and Formosa. It would show that our policy is not based on expediency and opportunism, but is consistent. He stressed the responsibility of the United Nations regarding Korea and said that his proposal offered the only hope for a United Nations solution regarding Korea. The United Nations might be able to do its job if the Chinese Communists were seated instead of having the United Nations in the ingenuous position of negotiating with outlaws.

The Secretary, without commenting on the proposals, inquired whether in the end this policy would mean that both Korea and Formosa would be in communist hands.

Mr. Scott recalled that, even before the present situation developed, we had both felt that at some time Korea might become communist. This was a risk but the risk would exist under any plan, for example, if we had all-Korean elections. He did not know whether under this plan Formosa would eventually be in communist hands, but this plan would not increase our risks.

The Secretary said that, while it was true Mr. Scott had outlined what might be considered a consistent and logical policy, he feared the end of it would be grave danger. He mentioned that as a matter of fact we did give Formosa to China but said that he did not wish to prolong the discussion by arguing what might seem to be merely a lawyers point.

Sir Oliver said he would like to recall certain elements of British foreign policy over the last two centuries. They had never been a large land power and therefore they had always had to act on the basis of working with other countries. The United States, in addition to being a sea and air power, was also a large land power with all of the industrial capacity which that involved. He thought, however, even if this great power of the United States were, contrasted with the large world mass, the United States would need to accept the same principle which the British had followed. This principle of solidarity with other countries now works, whether for good or ill, through the United Nations.

The meeting had to adjourn so that the Secretary and Sir Oliver could keep a luncheon engagement.

Philip C. Jessup

[Annex]

U.S. Position on Two Principal Alternative Courses in Korea²

I. The first course: Early and unconditional cease-fire.

1. The first course assumes:

(a) A cease-fire, probably in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, without political conditions.

(b) Regrouping of UN forces in South Korea.

(c) Freedom of action on the part of the Chinese to regroup their own forces north of the cease-fire line.

(d) Probable negotiations on Far Eastern questions (not to be proposed by U.S.).

2. Under this course of action, there would be a cease-fire on the ground, air operations against the enemy would be suspended, and hostile military action would not be undertaken against any part of the China mainland.

3. During the course of any negotiations or UN action which might follow a cease-fire, the United States should take the following positions on the questions indicated:

(a) Six-power resolution: Further consideration of the six-power resolution would be temporarily suspended in the UN General Assembly.

(b) Discussion of Korea in the Security Council: The United States should not accept any Communist demand that, as a precondition for the discussion of Korea in the Security Council, the UN should oust KMT delegates and seat Communist delegates in the Chinese seat. Otherwise, the United States should be willing to discuss Korea in the Security Council and to have the Peiping representatives seated at the table for that purpose.

(c) Discussions outside the Security Council: The United States should be prepared to take part in a negotiation respecting Korea with the interested governments and authorities, including representatives of the Peiping regime. Presumably, these discussions should be held at the seat of the UN.

(d) The agenda of negotiations: Every effort should be made to deal first with the question of Korea in any discussions or negotiations. We should specifically reject the linking up of other questions such as Formosa and the Chinese seat in the UN, in such a way as to reward the Chinese for their aggression in Korea. We should resist inclusion of any irrelevant items on the agenda in the first instance, particularly by thorough discussion of the matter and its implications with our friends. If it becomes necessary to enlarge the agenda to maintain unity with our friends, we should accept the inclusion of items other than Korea without, however, making any prior commitments with respect to our views on any particular problem. In this case, we might well include items of interest to us (e.g., Communist recognition and support of Ho Chih-Minh, Tibet, treatment of U.S. persons and property in China) along with items which the Communists may insist upon raising.

(e) Korean settlement: Our maximum aim in negotiation would be an orderly unification of Korea with extensive UN participation in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly. Our minimum aim would be a restoration of the status quo ante June 25, 1950.

In considering the details of a negotiated settlement in Korea, we must take into account the following:

(i) We now know that we cannot impose a full UN settlement in Korea by force in the present world situation.

(ii) We should like to reach a conclusion which gets our forces out of Korea by stages under honorable conditions and in such a situation as not to require their return.

(iii) We must take into account the fate of the South Koreans in any settlement.

(iv) Any solution for Korea must take into account the great pressure which will be exerted by its large Communist neighbors to turn Korea into a Communist state. At the present time, a unified Korea would be more likely to turn to Communism than would the southern part of a divided Korea. To the extent that UN supervision could be effective, the threat of Communism in Korea would be reduced or retarded.

In view of the above, the United States should be willing to accept a settlement for Korea along the following lines:

(i) Initially the Republic of Korea should be supported and strengthened south of the 38th Parallel. This should include action in the political, economic and military fields to place it in an effective position to maintain itself against pressures short of major overt aggression. Special attention might be given to friendly association between South Korea and Japan in order to introduce some countervailing influence to that of its Communist neighbors.

(ii) A United Nations commission should be given the task of arranging for the ultimate unification of Korea and to supervise the electoral and constituent steps by which this unification might be accomplished.

(iii) Pending the unification of Korea, the United Nations rehabilitation program should be limited to the Republic of Korea.

(iv) A United Nations Commission should arrange the phased withdrawal of Chinese forces from North Korea.

(v) Similarly, a United Nations commission should arrange for the phased withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea; it should be understood that the situation in Korea may require the retention in that country of certain UN contingents for a considerable period to deter the early resumption of fighting. If other Members of the United Nations were themselves willing to accept the responsibility, the United States would be willing to withdraw all of its own forces.

(f) Formosa: We should seek to exclude the subject of Formosa from any negotiations about Korea, unless its inclusion is essential to maintain unity among our friends. If it is included, our position would be to maintain our present policy. We cannot alter our present position on Formosa as a reward for Chinese aggression in Korea. We are willing to have the question of Formosa considered in any appropriate forum for peaceful settlement. Pending a final disposition of the question, we reserve freedom of action to use U.S. forces to prevent a forcible seizure of the island. In any final disposition, account must be taken of the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of the island as well as of the existing strategic situation in the Pacific.

(g) Chinese seat in the UN: We oppose the seating of a representative of Peiping in the UN. We must take a very strong position on this issue so long as Peiping is in the role of an aggressor. If the issue is considered in a UN body in which there is no veto, the United States will oppose the Chinese Communists and will make no commitments about the use of its influence to support this position but will accept a parliamentary result and not walk out of any UN body. In the Security Council we should adopt the same position but should maintain that this question is not subject to the veto.

(h) Japanese Peace Treaty: The United States can make no commitment which involves a veto by the Soviet Union or by Communist China on the conclusion of the Japanese peace settlement.

II. The second course: Continuation of Hostilities.

1. The second course assumes:

(a) Rejection by the Communist High Command of a cease-fire, or the attachment of unacceptable conditions to a cease-fire.

(b) Continued resistance by UN forces to Chinese aggression.

(c) Possibility of evacuation of UN forces from Korea as a result of military necessity.

2. In this contingency, the UN and US will be confronted by the problem of refusing to accept an aggression without, at the same time, becoming increasingly involved in a war in Asia which would further weaken the ability of the free world to deter or meet a Russian attack.

3. All reasonable effort should be made, consistent with the realities of our worldwide military situation, to increase military, material and moral support of the United Nations operation in Korea.

4. Our political effort in the United Nations should be directed toward mobilizing and maintaining the maximum degree of support for such action as it may be necessary to take against Communist China in order to resist the aggression in Korea, including the UN finding of aggression.

5. The United States believes that the United Nations cannot accept an aggression, even by a great power, without taking such action as it can to suppress it. The United States should not place itself in the historical role of accepting an open and flagrant act of aggression. Failing a cease-fire, United Nations forces should attempt to resist the aggression in Korea so long as there is a reasonable prospect of ability to do so; any United Nations evacuation of Korea should be clearly the result of military necessity.

6. In the event of a forced evacuation of Korea, the following course of action should be pursued:

(a) Continued air and naval action on a reduced scale against the enemy in Korea.

(b) The imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the aggressor, including breach of diplomatic relations, postponement of further consideration of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, commercial embargo, and freezing of financial assets.

(c) Covert operations against the mainland of China, with the exploitation of Nationalist capabilities to contribute to such operations.

(d) It would not be our intention to undertake military action against the Chinese mainland, provided the Chinese Communists do not themselves extend the nature of their operations by large-scale air attacks against UN forces, attacks on Japan, Ryukyus or Formosa.

(e) While not excluding the possibility of a naval and air blockade of China, it would probably be desirable to attempt to effect the same result by concerted action of other governments in the field of economic sanctions.

While the above measures could more advantageously be taken as a part of general UN sanctions, the United States may wish to act unilaterally in particular cases, for example the freezing of Chinese Communist assets and trade restrictions. In addition, any or all of the above actions would have to be taken in the light of the global situation and our commitments elsewhere.

1. Annexed to this document.
2. The source text bears no indication of authorship, but presumably this was the paper drawn up by Messrs. Hickerson and Rusk at the request of Mr. Acheson; see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Battle, December 5, p. 1410.