611.00/12–550: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
niact
[Received December 5, 1950—10:57 p. m.]
1400. 1. I talked to Nehru for perhaps half hour. He was courteous and apparently received what I had to say in friendly spirit. I told him that as result bitter experience US Government and people had become convinced during course last war that only way to prevent fresh world wars would be for all peaceful peoples to make it clear that they would unite to oppose aggression anywhere from any source; therefore since last war principle of collective security had become almost article religious faith for American people. It was to discourage aggression—not to advance any selfish US interest—that US had played so prominent role in opposing aggression in Korea. In interest maintenance world peace US had expended blood and treasure and had assumed great risks in Korea. Now much that had been accomplished was being undone as result of new massive aggression which was placing great strain on UN forces, backbone of which was elements from US armed forces. US people did not want another war. In particular they did not desire fight Chinese people with whom they were historically friendly. US Government and military leaders had been and were leaning over backward to prevent extension of hostilities beyond Korea. What US had done in Korea had been in pursuance of decisions of UN. US continued to act in framework of UN. Nevertheless in this hour of crisis and anxiety many voices condemning US and US leaders for events in Korea were being heard in various parts of world. In some countries which US considered as most friendly various individuals and newspapers instead of giving words encouragement were criticizing US, not the aggressors. Unfortunately even in India with which US had uniformly maintained friendly relations and which was also committed to oppose aggression there were loud criticisms of US and practically no criticism of Communist China in spite fact US was supporting and Communist China opposing by force execution decisions of UN. Tomorrow there would be debate in GOI Parliament on foreign affairs. What was said in this debate would be important.
Would substance debate be of comfort to, and encourage, forces of aggression? Would debaters under leadership Congress Party concentrate on criticizing US for not following Far East policy to India’s liking and overlook fact that Communist China with Soviet backing was openly attacking forces of UN? I deeply hoped Prime Minister with all of his great influence would do what he could to prevent debate from following such trends.
[Page 1419]2. Nehru maintained he was exerting his full influence to prevent debate from degenerating into series of blame-casting speeches. Situation was so grave nothing could be gained at this late date by looking for scapegoats for mistakes of past. He could not of course be responsible for all that various debaters might say but he hoped for display of temperance and restraint.
3. Prime Minister said he was sorely troubled as to what could best be done to prevent onrush of war. It was true that collective opposition to aggression seemed in long run most effective deterrent to war. But when house was on fire efforts for moment must be concentrated on extinguishing fire rather than on applying fire preventative methods. Fire was blazing in Korea. Problem was how to put it out. UN, he regretted to say, did not seem to offer much hope in this respect in present circumstances. He thought that only hope was across the table talks between powers most immediately concerned such as US, UK, USSR and Communist China—latter must be included because it was party to hostilities. First cease fire, then talks on subjects which had become inextricably interrelated—Formosa, entry of Communist China into UN, and settlement of Korean problem. Perhaps it was already too late for talks of this kind; perhaps war was inevitable and all that was left was for each power to get in or keep out of war as gracefully as possible. If single great power should be convinced that war was inevitable and should base its actions on that conviction war was of course inevitable. He had some concern lest Communist China had already decided that war was inevitable and therefore could not be deflected from its course.
4. Nehru said that he had sent some of his views re situation to US through Attlee and direct to Mme Pandit. I told him that I was sure that his views which were always welcomed by my government would be given careful consideration.