320/12–550: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 5—10:22 p. m.]
Delga 378. Chinese Communists: Following is account given by Sharett to Ross of conversations with Chiao at Trygve Lie dinner last night. Sharett had no conversation at all with Wu other than very brief exchange of amenities.
Sitting next to Sharett at dinner, Chiao said that a Chinese “student” en route through Israel had, without official status or authority, expressed opinion to someone in Israeli FonOff that Israel and Chinese Communist Government should exchange diplomatic representatives. Apparently naive and uninformed on question, Chiao asked Sharett who should take first step in exchange of representatives. Sharett replied question very simple so far as Israel concerned. They wanted peaceful relations with China. Their relations with China not very extensive. They did not know whether it would be necessary for them to maintain a representative in Peiping full time. They had thought they might accredit their man in Moscow to China and he might visit Peiping perhaps once a year. Said to Chiao Peiping might wish to consider some similar arrangement but of course Israeli Government would be glad to receive a Chinese Communist representative.
Sharett then suggested perhaps first step might usefully be exchange of visits by representatives the two countries. Chiao observed that might be very good idea. Sharett went on to say that even this step would of course seem to depend on peace. He then stressed that for a new country like Israel, preoccupied with reconstruction and development, peace was essential. Chiao observed that Communist China was in same situation as Israel. They too were preoccupied with their problems of reconstruction and development and wanted peace so that they could give their full attention to these tasks.
[Page 1416]Sharett said that the principal conversation of the evening took place after dinner from about 9:30 to 10:30. This discussion took place in a group consisting of Chiao, Sharett, Lie, Zafrullah and Jebb. It was a close-knit group, uninterrupted by others. Wu spent the evening after dinner in a larger group with Mrs. Lie, the Lies’ daughter, the woman member of the Communist delegation, Grafstrom, et cetera.
Sharett, according to his account, took the lead in the after dinner conversation with Chiao by asking Chiao how the Korean question could be solved. Chiao replied that question could be solved only by withdrawal foreign forces from Korea. Asked how he defined foreign forces, Chiao defined them as American. Sharett, assisted by Jebb, insisted that forces in Korea were UN forces. This apparently made little impression upon Chiao. Jebb asked Chiao whether the Chinese Communist forces in Korea were not foreign forces. This question evoked no reaction from Chiao.
Sharett observed that if all foreign forces were withdrawn from Korea the result would clearly be war in Korea. Chiao apparently shrugged this off, saying in effect “So what—it would be a civil war”. Sharett then apparently took strong line that UN could not wash its hands of Korea, that UN was in Korea for legitimate purposes.
Chiao argued that if principle of UN intervention in Korea were admitted, then on same analogy one might argue that UN could have intervened in Chinese civil war in support of Chiang. Sharett apparently argued that the analogy did not apply, that the civil war in China, while a matter of importance in international affairs, did not directly involve international equilibrium. Sharett took line that although situation might seem paradoxical to Chiao, he and his government would simply have to learn to face political facts and reality. One political fact was that Korea is part of the world equilibrium. That equilibrium has been upset and peace cannot be restored until the equilibrium is restored.
Chiao then took off on line extreme bitterness Chinese people against US for supporting Chiang against Chinese people’s struggle for freedom.
Sharett, assisted by Jebb, responded with analogy extreme bitterness various times between British and jews but that real statesmen both sides maintained position that one great people could not hate another great people and hope to survive, that bridges for ultimate agreement must not be destroyed if either people hoped to survive.
Sharett then apparently went on to appeal Chinese Communist self-interest. He referred to China’s orientation to the sea. He said he [Page 1417] could not envisage Chinese wishing to become landlocked power. He referred to the great naval (maritime) power of the US which had the capability of forcing China to become landlocked power. He referred in this connection to the great potential strength of US, industrially and otherwise.
To this line Chiao responded that the Chinese people were Asians seeking their freedom and they wanted no interference from outside world. He said that relations had not been broken with American people. He said that Chinese people were still trading with American people. He said that apparently their actions had not created bitterness against China among all Americans, referring in this connection naively, Sharett thought, to the flowers which had been sent to them upon their arrival. He also said, referring to the Seventh Fleet, that US was already blockading China.
On last comment Jebb and Lie asked Chiao if the Chinese Communists did not realize that the presence of Seventh Fleet was as much a protection for the mainland as it was for Formosa. Chiao responded that to say this was simply to repeat the lies of the American ruling clique. At this point there was what Sharett described as a sociological” discussion of just what the term American ruling clique meant.
Jebb inquired if Chiao did not realize that if the Seventh Fleet were withdrawn a new area in the Far East would be plunged into bloody war. There was no reaction from Chiao to this question.
Jebb, Lie and Sharett raised the question of a cease-fire, a gradual withdrawal of forces on both sides and full use of the Peace Observation Commission. Chiao professed not to know what the POC was and this was explained to him fully. Sharett said there were no reactions from Chiao to any of foregoing three points, singly or in combination. Sharett said Chiao’s attitude was “exploratory”. He asked a good many questions.
At one point in the discussion question of Chinese representation arose and Chiao indicated very definitely that they wanted to be in UN.
Chiao apparently in this connection referred to six-power telegram to Lie requesting that item of intervention be put on agenda. Sharett said Chiao seemed to be very happy about the use in this telegram of title of Chinese Communist Government. He made some observation to effect that at last those people (Sharett thought he meant the people in Washington) are beginning to talk sense.