Office of the Historian

795.00/11–1850

Memorandum by the Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence (Howe) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

top secret
[Washington,] November 18, 1950.

For whatever use it may be to you I attach a proposal for a revised estimate on the Korean situation. This we are submitting to General Smith for consideration in the Intelligence Advisory Committee. General Smith will then issue it, with whatever revisions the IAC makes, as a national intelligence estimate which can accompany your conclusions and recommendations. This, I believe, is in accordance with the plan we agreed upon.

General Smith tells me he is ready to move ahead on it with the view to submitting a final estimate to you on Tuesday.1

Fisher Howe

[Annex]

top secret
November 17, 1950.

Estimate of the Most Probable Course of Soviet-Chinese Action With Regard to Korea

1.
The immediate situation with regard to Chinese intervention in Korea is as follows:
a.
The military activity of Chinese troops in Korea so far is not sufficiently extensive to indicate a plan for major operations.
b.
Military preparations being carried out in Manchuria and China generally are on a scale that suggest (1) plans for a major operation of prolonged duration, (2) expectations of extensive US air attacks on Chinese, particularly Manchurian, cities.
c.
The climate of opinion prevailing in China, including circles close to Party leadership, appears on the basis of extensive reports to reflect expectations of war.
d.
Chinese propagandists for the past three weeks have mounted an intensive war spirit campaign centering on the charge that US military [Page 1189] action in Korea is aimed at an attack on China and calling for all-out sacrifices to meet and defeat this threat through support of Korea. A sub-theme of the campaign has been American impotence in a war with China.
e.
Neither Chinese officials nor Chinese propaganda has thus far committed the Chinese Government to a line of action in Korea. Discussion of preparation for support of Korea has been only in terms of volunteer action.
f.
The Soviet press has reported with approval Chinese preparation for support of North Korea. Soviet official statements and Soviet propaganda have identified the struggle of the North Koreans with the Communist cause generally. However, neither source has in any way committed the Soviet Union to any line of action, including support for the Chinese.
g.
There has been no suggestion in Chinese propaganda or official statements that the Chinese support of North Korea has a limited objective, either protection of power plants, establishment of a buffer zone on the border, or withdrawal of UN forces to the 38th parallel. In fact, none of these has been mentioned by the Chinese. All Chinese treatment has been in terms of the necessity of bringing about a withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea.
2.
While there are no indications regarding the role that the Soviet Union has played in decisions reached by Chinese leaders in regard to Korea, Chinese pressure on the US position supports known Soviet objectives, and, if successful would result in a substantial improvement in the Soviet power position as against the US; while a failure of Chinese pressure on the US would represent a notable worsening of the Soviet power position as against the US.
3.
The Soviet Union has made no open commitment to support the Chinese. However, planes drawn from the Soviet air force have been increasingly observed in Manchuria and over Korea. Soviet propaganda has recently called attention to USSR obligations under the Sino-Soviet treaty to support China in case of aggression on the part of Japan or any power directly or indirectly associated with Japan. Soviet officials and propaganda have recently stressed US use of Japanese troops in Korea and US preparations to use Japan as a base for aggression.
4.
Chinese activity in regard to Korea follows extensive indications of an acceleration and intensification of Soviet political and military preparations for war with the US and comes at a time when Soviet armed forces are in such an advanced state of readiness for war that offensive operations could be initiated on all appropriate fronts in Europe and Asia without additional warning.
5.
Chinese activity in regard to Korea also follows a period of increased militancy on the part of the USSR in its prosecution of its struggle with the US. The releasing of the North Korean aggression [Page 1190] must be regarded as an integral element in this increasing militancy.
6.
At no time since 25 June have the Russians taken any steps to diminish the likelihood of US mobilization, which they must regard as one of their greatest dangers. Indeed, they have taken or allowed only actions which would increase that danger.
7.
In view of all factors involved, the intelligence organization of the Department estimates the most likely Soviet-Chinese course as follows:
a.
Continuation of Chinese-North Korean holding operations in North Korea until Chinese over-all preparations have been completed and until prospects of securing US withdrawals from Korea through intimidation and diplomatic maneuvers have been exhausted.
b.
In case of the failure of these tactics, increasing unofficial Chinese intervention in Korea to, if necessary, the point of large scale military operations.
c.
Increasing Soviet support of the Chinese in the form of equipment, planes, technical advisers, and, if necessary “volunteers” to the extent required to prevent a Chinese defeat.
8.
The intelligence organization of the Department estimates that the situation already existing in Korea and the events likely to follow carry with them grave risks of a general war developing and believe that Soviet rulers have allowed for this possibility and feel prepared to cope with it.
9.
The intelligence organization of the Department also feels that the indications of a possible Soviet intention to launch general war, while definitely not conclusive, are sufficiently serious to merit close and constant attention.

  1. November 21.↩