795.00/11–1850
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations
US/S/1579
Subject: Plans for Handling Chinese-Communist Representatives
| Participants: | Ambassador Ales Bebler, Yugoslav Delegation |
| Ambassador Ernest Gross, United States Delegation | |
| Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Delegation |
Ambassador Bebler stated that he wanted to discuss with us the problems he would face as President of the Council in dealing with the Chinese Communists. The first question on his mind was how rigid he Should be in confining them to the Formosa question during the discussions of this matter. Of course he recognized their Government and did not wish to be put in a position of being hostile to them. He was anxious not to give Malik the opportunity of pretending that this was the case. The question on the agenda is American Aggression Against China, and there would be some justification for the Chinese ranging fairly widely and in particular touching upon the Korean question. He understood that the United States position was that their action in regard to Formosa resulted from the necessity to neutralize Formosa during the Korean operations. He was anxious to know what our views are and to find out from the other Members of the Council what kind of backing he would get for whatever position he took.
Ambassador Gross indicated that we had always had great difficulty in confining discussions in the Security Council rigidly to particular issues. In this case there were probably advantages in letting the Chinese speak their mind, and he was sympathetic to the idea of the Chairman being fairly liberal in his attitude towards efforts to limit the discussion. It was possible, of course, that the Chinese Communists might take such an extreme position that it would be necessary to stop them.
Noyes pointed out that it might be highly useful if the President, in his preliminary discussions—if he had any—with the Chinese Communists, should warn them in fairly strong terms that he would, as President, be forced to call them to order if they insisted on speaking to the substance of the Korean question. It might be hoped then that the Communists would keep within reasonable bounds and that the Chairman could take a liberal approach.
[Page 1187]Noyes pointed out that the Chairman might be in a difficult position if he should permit the Chinese Communists to refuse the Council’s invitation in the Korean question and yet attain the advantage of saying their full say by disregarding proper Council procedure.
Bebler indicated he would hope to have advance talks with the Chinese Communists in his capacity as President, in order to find out a convenient time for meetings, and to explain to them the general situation.
Mr. Gross indicated that these talks might be most useful not only with regard to procedure but also to obtain some idea what is in their minds with regard to substance. He indicated that in view of the general situation, we were interested in finding out the Chinese Communist views on a number of subjects, in particular the Korean question, and that while we would of course take no initiative, we would have no difficulty in meeting the Chinese Communists informally and talking with them. This would of course in no way affect our position in that we did not recognize their Government, and we should have to take care to preserve our position in that regard.
Bebler raised the question of discussions in regard to Chinese Aggression in the Korean question. He understood the Chinese had refused the Council’s invitation to be heard on that matter on the ground that they were invited as the accused to explain only their position with regard to MacArthur’s Report.
Mr. Gross indicated that from the technical point of view there might have been some misunderstanding on this question. Mr. Malik’s original motion had been too broad. The British motion which was passed might, on its part, have been misunderstood. He thought the true technical position was that the Council had invited the Chinese Communists to be heard in regard to the question on the Council’s agenda, i.e.: Aggression Against the Republic of Korea. This invitation should not be interpreted to mean that they are invited to sit at the table for all discussions of that question. What the Council is particularly interested in, obviously, is the situation which had arisen as a result of Chinese intervention. He thought that the President might explain to the Chinese Communists that this was the situation.
Bebler asked what we thought of the idea put forward by Ran some time back that the nonpermanent members might be designated as a subcommittee of the Security Council to consider and make recommendations in regard to Chinese intervention. We discussed the precedent of the Berlin case,1 and Mr. Gross left the impression with Bebler that this might be a useful instrument. In particular it might help get around the problem created by Dr. Tsiang’s Presidency of the [Page 1188] Security Council during December. Mr. Gross indicated lie thought Dr. Tsiang would step aside on the Formosa question, and he might also step aside when the problem of Chinese intervention in the Korean War is considered. This was less certain. In any case the possibility of following the precedent of the Berlin case, or something along similar lines, was worth considering.
- For related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, pp. 1197 ff.↩