Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/11–1750: Telegram

The Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State

top secret
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Canberra, November 17, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 17—10:48 a. m.]

154. Gist of Deptel 182, November 13¹ conveyed to Menzies within hour of receipt and notification sent safehand Sydney await Spender on arrival evening November 15. Watt² on instructions from Spender this morning gave Embassy tentative thinking with formal reply to follow. Australian Government position re Chinese Communist intervention Korea, pending further clarification objectives, remains in principle as stated Embtel 148, November 11.³ On other hand government recognizes military situation described Deptel 132 cannot be allowed continue indefinitely. Seeking method avoid precipitate action while producing practical effect deterring Communist Chinese Government from pursuing apparent present course, Australian Government tentatively suggests following procedure:

(1) Further MacArthur report to SC giving full military facts relative Communist action over Manchurian border, if these not already available to SC.

(2) Consideration whether it practicable for SC after considering such report to issue “declaration” citing facts, then “(a) deploring breaches international law, (b) assuming Chinese Communist Government (not formally associated with operations over Manchurian border) will be fully conscious of need prevent further breaches, (c) pointing out UN Forces under heaviest provocation have acted so far with great restraint to own military disadvantage, (d) indicating it unreasonable expect restraint continue indefinitely, (e) stating if Chinese Communist Government unwilling or unable prevent further misuse its territory, UN Forces in self-defense may be compelled pursue for limited distances into Manchuria any planes attacking them in Korea and seeking refuge over border, (f) stressing SC desire limit area of conflict and respect integrity Manchurian border, (g) expressing hope Chinese Communist Government will take immediate action insure integrity of border respected from its side”.

Watt offered following comments on tentatively suggested procedure:

(1) Any “declaration” must be in form not implying diplomatic recognition Chinese Communist regime.

(2) Suggestion of a “declaration” designed avoid possible veto of formal resolution.

(3) Suggestion made in effort devise procedure which while avoiding appearance of ultimatum would have effect of giving serious warning to Chinese Communist Government and might restrain present operations from Manchuria.

(4) If warning were ignored and present attacks continued so that military action of sort proposed became unavoidable, it would be clear all peaceful efforts had been exhausted.

Jarman

1. Same as telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p. m., to London, p. 1144.
2. Alan S. Watt, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs.
3. The Australian Government felt that the intervention of Communist China produced a new situation calling for caution and careful examination. Despite the provocation caused by use of the Manchurian sanctuary by the Communists, the Australian Government felt that the consequences of violation of the Manchurian border by U.N. forces would be so great that it would be best temporarily to ignore this provocation to the extent possible. (743.00/11–1150)