Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/11–1450: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

secret

Moscow, November 14, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 14—7:09 p. m.]

1023. Embtel 1013 November 13.¹ Devotion of entire back page of Pravda November 13 to blatant announcements and attempted justification of Chinese intervention in Korea followed by one column quoting three leading Chinese newspapers on same subject today, gives domestic readers and western world clear indication extent Chinese “volunteer” effort. It is possible that this theme will be featured by Communist propaganda (secondary of course to WCPP) during period pending participation Chinese Communist representative in UNSC meeting on Taiwan aggression and that this represents Soviet propaganda build-up for initial Chinese Communist appearance at UN. Although whole Communist propaganda structure is based on twin false assumptions that, first, US started Korean war and is aggressor, and second, that US real aim is to invade Manchuria, effectiveness of “big lie” in Communist controlled areas well known and objectives this campaign deserve study. Obvious that while first assumption above has been trumpeted by Communist world since outbreak Korean war, second is relatively recent, receiving attention with publication here November 5 of “Joint declaration Chinese democratic parties”.²

As to implications this publicity re question of whether Chinese in fact intend to engage maximum resources in NK this time, while Soviet attitude may seem ominous, we are still inclined feel that CPG is not in fact inviting war with US and UN and in support this view offer following comments:

1. Chinese Communist Government has not yet made any formal statement, to our knowledge, committing itself to defense of Korea. Emphasis thus far has been on service of “volunteers”. While the nature of this type intervention misleads no one, in realm international relations it retains significance and CPG has not chosen to go beyond this. It provides CPG with way out if UN is not intimidated by implied threat of large scale Chinese intervention and resolutely proceeds with mission in Korea. Despite ominous undercurrent in both “joint declaration” and November 11 statement by MFA representative,³ CPG still retains degree freedom of action.

2. Strikes Embassy that both documents targeted as much for domestic consumption as for impact abroad. We do not believe Chinese people want foreign war or can regard without apprehension at this time prospect of war with US; certainly CPG must take strong steps if it is determined to sell idea. Degrees of opposition, antipathy and support can best be determined by reaction to statements such as those already issued. But caution of CPG reflected by fact that November 11 statement made by unidentified official, not Chou En Lai himself. And although “joint declaration” signed by all parties, no names of party leaders appeared (at least in Soviet press). In society where names of individuals carry much weight, thus far we know of no top rank CPG official who has publicly carried ball.

3. Publicity describing Chinese “volunteer” participation Korean war probably aimed at least in part at WCPP to furnish justification for intervention and possibly to establish model of approved method “fighting for peace”.

4. Without minimizing present and potential danger of Chinese full scale intervention, we note that Soviets, who also share border with Korea, have given no publicity to participation Soviet “volunteers” in Korean war. This points to probability that Soviets are using Chinese for catspaws insofar as practicable but that Soviets still unwilling touch off World War III prematurely. If CPG continues be careful not to commit itself, it appears likely magnitude Chinese intervention will depend upon degree force exerted by UN and ROK and that CPG will not pour huge numbers troops into Korea indefinitely.

5. Appears possible that present Chinese threat represents final Soviet effort salvage something from its gross miscalculation in ordering NK aggression on ROK. Seems doubtful that CPG, which did not come forward to assist NK when UN forces occupied only corner of South Korea, or when Inchon landing made and appearance strong Chinese forces might have halted UN advance at 38th parallel, would now decide on basis sober military estimate to enter fray all out. Despite their truculence and bombast, it appears to us here that Chinese Communists have scarcely proceeded far enough with their economic and social reform and development programs in China and with consolidations of their nationwide strength and popularity as a party, to plunge their country into a war against the most formidable array of opponents in the world today. If CCP has learned anything from Soviets, its leadership must be aware that risking its existence without better than fair chance of success is contrary to interests and normal strategy world Communist movement.

6. This raises question of how far Soviets want CPG to go at this time. In absence indications requiring revision Embassy estimate of Soviet intentions, we are reluctant assume Soviet yet prepared precipitate World War III. If this conclusion still sound, we feel that amount and number unofficial and semi-covert assistance to NK by Chinese “volunteers” (actually highly trained, well equipped and supplied regular troops), will probably depend on: first, their chances of preserving extensive area in NK for operations; second, on degree UN determination eliminate this intervention. Parenthetically, Embassy recalls relative success of ROK forces in reducing NK guerrilla activity below 38th parallel prior to June 25 and believes that major burden of driving Chinese forces from hinterland below Chinese frontier should be assumed by ROK army, which should be expanded as rapidly as practicable to cope with this task.

7. It is clear that continued use of Chinese territory for military operations (including AA fire on UN planes over Korean territory, air bases, and for movement military supplies) directed versus UN forces, presents UN with provocative and trying problem. From legal standpoint, we assume CPG will claim that no violation Korean sovereignty involved, as CPG recognizes NK and crosses frontier at latter’s invitation (analogous to Allied position in Greece).

Kirk

1. Not printed.
2. See footnote 2 to telegram 1124 from New Delhi, received at 11:13 p. m. on November 7, p. 1094.
3. The text of this statement is printed in U.N. document S/1902. It acknowledged the presence of Chinese volunteers in Korea and indicated that the Government of the People’s Republic of China saw no need to hinder such efforts to aid the North Koreans. The statement pointed to French voluntary efforts to aid the American colonists during the American Revolution and, more recently, to American and British volunteers who fought on behalf of the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War. It went on to call for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea as a step toward a peaceful settlement there and condemned the United States for launching a war of aggression. Finally, it supplied a lengthy list of U.S. Air Force overflights and attacks in the area of Northeast China between August 27 and November 10, 1950.