793.00/11–1450: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received November 14—4:30 p. m.]
716. ReEmbdesp 440 August 311 and Depcirtel 148 November 11.2 Netherlands FonOff has made available substance two telegrams dated November 11 and 12 from Chargé Peking. These present analysis of Chargé re Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and may be summarized as follows:
November 11 cable:
CPG intervention primarily influenced by fear US aggression, particularly US aims re Manchuria which CPG seems compare with pre-war Jap policy. This attitude discussed at some length new Chinese news agency. Chargé comments that, in principle, he believes this CPG fear real. On other hand, because this exaggerated by CPG, he expresses reservation that alleged fear being used as pretext for anti-US propaganda purposes.
He believes long term CPG aim Korea establishment really independent Korean state which would not be threat China. Primary CPG prerequisite could be demand that it be allowed discuss this view on status Korea in SC. (FonOff comments that what CPG really after is full UN membership.)
Short-term aim protection Chinese frontiers. Chargé believes they would be satisfied with 50 mile border zone free UN troops. Says argument for justness latter claim (1) fact that CPG did not intervene immediately upon UN crossing 38th parallel, (2) actual resistance began only when UN forces approached Yalu river, (3) Chinese troops suspended their resistance after repulsing UN troops some distance from Manchurian border. On other hand, Chargé observes opposing argument fact that Chinese planes have been operating behind UN lines from Manchurian bases. Nevertheless, believes CPG wishes avoid hostilities with UN troops, providing latter remain outside 50 mile zone. Actually that zone has now been created as result CPG intervention, yet intervention force composed alleged “volunteers” enabling CPG disclaim all responsibility. Chargé acknowledges “possibility remains that intervention may be part prearranged Sino-Soviet strategy” (FonOff comments that it believes letter “too complicated” to be likely).
November 12 cable:
Chargé comments SC invitation to CPG and most recent Peking propaganda trends give him another impression about three arguments (set forth above), that CPG strategy may possibly be intended [Page 1153] as trap for UN air force and planes with aim being extending conflict into Manchuria. By this, fiction of US intervention and aggression could be upheld. Furthermore CPG would be able rally full support Chinese people which interestingly enough Chargé describes as “still doubtful now.” (Latter at variance with Netherlands FonOff thinking, because it has always contended Mao regime enjoyed popular support.)
Furthermore, extension of US action into Manchuria would give CPG opportunity appeal all other “people’s democracies” that China now victim of aggression. (FonOff comments that such appeal would be useless because no “people’s democracies” would come to aid CPG unless Soviet Union so instructed.)
Chargé gives little credence British MA report that there are half-million Chinese Communist troops massed along Manchurian border and 160,000 actually in North Korea.
Report concluded with Chargé urging greatest caution particularly that no UN forces should enter Manchuria thereby giving Mao strong rallying point.
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed. It requested certain missions to establish a regular channel with the Foreign Ministry in order to secure intelligence on Communist China’s political and military intentions in hopes that this would overcome the gap caused by lack of American representation in mainland China. (793.00/11–1150)↩