795.00/10–1250
Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency
B. Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea1
i. statement of the problem
1. To estimate the threat of direct Soviet military intervention in Korea during 1950.
ii. capabilities
2. Soviet armed forces now in the Far East are capable of intervening overwhelmingly in Korea virtually without warning.
iii. factors bearing on intent
3. Indications of Intentions. The Soviet Union to date has given no indication that it intends to intervene directly in Korea. Since the beginning of hostilities the Soviet Union has sought in its official statements and in its propaganda to give the impression that it is not involved in the Korean situation. Moreover, the USSR has taken mo political or military actions that constitute direct armed intervention in Korea. However, the Soviet Government for some months has been increasingly improving its military capabilities in the Far East as well as in other strategic areas.
4. Factors Favoring Soviet Intervention. The defeat of North Korea would constitute a major set-back for the USSR. It would involve:
- a.
- The loss of a Satellite, and the establishment of a Western-oriented state on the frontiers of Communist China and the USSR.
- b.
- Giving the Western Powers a potential strategic bridgehead which the Kremlin would always regard as a threat to the industrial, communication, and military centers of Manchuria and the Soviet Far East.
- c.
- Weakening the Soviet military and political position vis-à-vis Japan.
- d.
- A loss to Soviet political prestige in that it would demonstrate that the Kremlin is not willing to support its followers effectively in a Soviet-instigated action.
- e.
- A loss to Soviet military prestige in that it woud lead to a tendency, whether or not justified, to re-evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet military equipment and tactics.
- f.
- A reduction in the prospects of the Soviet Union for expanding its political control by means short of war in that it would demonstrate the determination and capability of the non-Soviet world to resist effectively Soviet-inspired aggression.
5. Factors Opposing Soviet Intervention.
- a.
- In weighing potential gains and risks of intervention, the Soviet leaders must calculate, as an overwhelming consideration, that their open intervention would lead to direct hostilities with US and other UN forces over an issue on which the Western world has achieved a new degree of unity. Soviet leaders would have no assurance that combat between Soviet and US forces would be limited by the US to Korea or to the Far Eastern theater. Consequently, a decision to intervene openly in Korea, in the ultimate analysis, involves a decision to risk immediate and probably global war with the US.
- b.
- The Soviet leaders may estimate that it will be possible, without assuming this all-critical risk, to salvage some of the losses suffered from the Korean situation. US military activities could be obstructed by extensive guerrilla action, which might involve the US in an extended and costly occupation and which could contribute to Soviet efforts to develop in Asia a racial enmity toward the US and the Western Powers.
iv. probabilities of soviet action
6. It is believed that the Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses in Korea warrant direct military intervention and a consequent grave risk of war. They will intervene in the Korean hostilities only if they have decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but on the basis of over-all considerations, that it is to their interest to precipitate a global war at this time.