Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/10–1250

Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency

top secret

[Washington,] 12 October 1950.

A. Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea¹

i. statement of the problem

1. To estimate the threat of full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

ii. capabilities

2. The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacking requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict.

iii. factors bearing on intent

3. Indications of Intentions. Despite statements by Chou En-lai, troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities and border violations, there are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea.

4. Factors Favoring Chinese Communist Intervention.

a. Intervention, if resulting in defeat of UN forces, would: (1) constitute a major gain in prestige for Communist China, confirming it as the premier Asiatic power; (2) constitute a major gain for World Communism with concomitant increase in Communist China’s stature in the Sino-Soviet axis; (3) result in the elimination of the possibility of a common frontier with a Western-type democracy; and (4) permit the retention of sources of Manchurian electric power along the Yalu River.

b. Intervention, even if not resulting in a decisive defeat of UN forces, would: (1) enable the Chinese Communists to utilize foreign war as an explanation for failure to carry out previously announced economic reforms; (2) be consistent with and furnish strong impetus to anti-Western trends in Asia; and (3) justify a claim for maximum Soviet military and/or economic aid to China.

c. Intervention, with or without assurance of final victory, might serve the cause of World Communism, particularly the cause of the Soviet Union, in that it would involve the Western bloc in a costly and possibly inconclusive war in the Far East.

d. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Soviet bloc particularly face the prospect of a major set-back in the struggle with the non-Communist world if UN forces are permitted to achieve complete victory in Korea.

5. Factors Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention.

a. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear the consequences of war with the US. Their domestic problems are of such magnitude that the regime’s entire domestic program and economy would be jeopardized by the strains and the material damage which would be sustained in war with the US. Anti-Communist forces would be encouraged and the regime’s very existence would be endangered.

b. Intervention would minimize the possibility of Chinese membership in the UN and of a seat on the Security Council.

c. Open intervention would be extremely costly unless protected by powerful Soviet air cover and naval support. Such Soviet aid might not be forthcoming because it would constitute Soviet intervention.

d. Acceptance of major Soviet aid would make Peiping more dependent on Soviet help and increase Soviet control in Manchuria to point probably unwelcome to the Chinese Communists.

e. If unsuccessful, Chinese intervention would lay Peiping open to Chinese resentment on the grounds that China would be acting as a Soviet catspaw.

f. From a military standpoint the most favorable time for intervention in Korea has passed.

g. Continued covert aid would offer most of the advantages of overt intervention while avoiding its risks and disadvantages. Covert aid would enable the Chinese Communists to:

(1) Avoid further antagonizing of the UN and reduce risk of war with the US;

(2) Promote the China-led Asiatic peoples’ “revolutionary struggle,” while ostensibly supporting peace;

(3) Maintain freedom of action for later choice between abandonment of aid or continuing such covert aid as might be appropriate to Chinese Communist needs in Korea;

(4) Satisfy the “aid Korea” demand in Communist circles in China and Asia generally, without risking war with the US.

iv. probability of chinese communist action

6. While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950. During this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans.

1. This document was included in a briefing book of background material prepared under the direction of Mr. Rusk on possible items for discussion at the Wake Island Conference. Copies of the briefing book were sent to the White House and to the other participants at the Conference.