795B.00/6–1950
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)1
| Participants: | President Rhee |
| Mr. Dulles | |
| Foreign Minister Ben C. Limb | |
| Ambassador Muccio | |
| Mr. Allison |
President Rhee requested a special unscheduled interview with Mr. Dulles this morning with the apparent objective of impressing upon Mr. Dulles his view that more positive action must be taken to make more difficult the task of the communists in North Korea.
President Rhee was also apparently hoping for some definite commitment of continuing American aid and was seemingly apprehensive least [lest] Korea be left alone while other countries in Asia united in some form of regional association. The President stated that before [Page 108] the Chinese communists have an opportunity to consolidate their position in China the division of Korea at the 38th parallel must be removed. He also expressed deep concern over the fate of Formosa, saying that its loss would be greatly deplored by Korea. He referred to a report he had received that Chinese, Korean and Japanese communists have recently had a meeting in Japan to discuss ways and means of making trouble for South Korea and went on to say that should Formosa fall to the communists Korea would then be threatened by communist elements from the south as well as from the north. At a later point in the conversation the President did state that his desire for positive action did not necessarily mean action by armed forces but he was insistent that unless something was done the cold war would be lost.
Mr. Dulles went to considerable length to explain that formal pacts, alliances or treaties were not necessary prerequisites to common action against a common foe and that the important thing was for a government to prove by its actions that it was in fact a loyal member of the free world in which case it could count on the support of the other members of the free world against the forces of communism. Mr. Dulles explained that it was the opinion of the best informed minds in the U.S. Government that Soviet Russia did not for the present wish to become involved in a shooting war but that its more likely action would be to foment insurrection, intrigue and sabotage within countries. He pointed out that no country could guarantee another country against the results of a third world war with its potentialities of atomic warfare and that if such a war was precipitated the attack might just as likely come first in New York as in Seoul. However, the other form of indirect aggression which appeared more likely was one in which America could help but it could only help if the governments threatened were themselves taking active steps to create conditions within their countries which would prohibit growth of communism. A true allegiance to the principles of representative government and a real effort to self-control and hard work to create a stable economy and a government which deserved the support of its people would insure the continuation of such additional aid as might be needed. President Rhee had raised the question of the Baguio conference2 of southeast Asian countries along with the various conferences of the British Commonwealth group and seemed to feel that there should be some such grouping which Korea might join. Mr. Dulles pointed out that neither the United States or Korea had been present at the Baguio conference and that he did not think either country needed to be concerned about what happened there. With respect to the British Commonwealth, this was a good example of a group of countries bound [Page 109] together by their mutual allegiance to freedom and democracy rather than because of any written documents. In fact, it was pointed out, the only formal document binding the Commonwealth together, the Statute of Westminster, was a document which gave each member of the Commonwealth the right to go its own way completely independent of the others if it so desired.
With respect to President Rhee’s concern over Formosa Mr. Dulles pointed out that this problem was of equal concern to the United States and was under-going constant review within the Department of State. He made clear that economic aid to Formosa was continuing and he explained that just before he left Washington licenses had been issued for the exportation to Formosa of various forms of military equipment. Mr. Dulles asked President Rhee whether or not there was any likelihood of elements of the Nationalist Government wanting to come to Korea for asylum should Formosa fall to the communists and the President replied that while there had been rumors that such might be the case and that while he obviously would want to do what he could for a friendly neighbor it was his opinion that each country should stand on its own feet and not make use of its friends in such ways. Without directly answering Mr. Dulles’ question it was apparent that President Rhee did not look with any favor on any requests of high Chinese Nationalists for asylum in Korea.
Mr. Dulles concluded by assuring President Rhee that if the Korean Government continued along the path it is now following it would not need to rely on formal agreements to obtain continuing aid from the U.S. in such measure as possible but that the main thing was for the Koreans to realize that they had the primary responsibility to show that they were really attached to the principles of free representative government.3
- Mr. Allison accompanied John Foster Dulles on his trip to Japan and Korea; see footnote 2 to the letter from Mr. Muccio to Mr. Rusk, June 1, p. 96.↩
- See footnote 1 to the letter from Mr. Muccio to Mr. Rusk, May 25, p. 88.↩
- For the text of a statement made by Mr. Dulles before the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on June 19, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 12.↩