Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/8–1150: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

New York, August 11, 1950—9:20 p. m.
[Received August 11—10:08 p. m.]

265. For Hickerson. Pursuant to our phone conversation this morning, I talked with Rau on a purely personal and exploratory basis concerning a possible statement of position on peace aims in Korea. I said that it seemed to me important to keep clearly in mind the avoidance of any implied military commitments of a sort which might prevent UN forces from taking action which may prove necessary in order to effectuate SC decisions to repel aggression and restore international peace and security in the area. For this reason, it seemed to me important to avoid the use of general and undefined terms such as “cessation of hostilities” or “withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel”. Instead, I believed that it would be preferable to use a formula such as “immediate cessation of aggression including withdrawal of armed forces” and “measures necessary to assure the, ROK against renewed aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area”. Rau agreed generally that the distinction was an important one.

With respect to “peace aims”, I outlined (stressing the purely personal and unofficial nature of my thinking) the following as possible points for consideration:

1. Reaffirmation of GA policy for establishment of independent and unified Korea.

2. Reaffirmative GA policy of establishment of a government in a unified Korea through free popular elections under UN supervision.

3. Statement of UN interest in creation of conditions in Korea essential to maintenance of free institutions.

4. Statement of intention on part of UN to give all appropriate assistance to people of Korea in the achievement of these conditions.

5. Guarantee by UN of frontiers of an independent unified Korea.

6. UN guarantee of neutrality of a de-militarized Korea.

7. Establishment of UN advisory council, appropriately composed and preferably with India as chairman. Function of such council would be to render all assistance in accomplishment of UN objectives in Korea, involving steps leading to the establishment of democratic government for a re-unified Korea and assistance to such government, when established, to set up a stable democratic regime.

8. Admission of a re-unified Korea to the UN.

Rau, while withholding specific comment, generally felt this outline might form basis for a UN policy.

However, Rau expressed belief that it would not be advantageous for USG to make such proposals. He felt they would be attacked by USSR if only because they were proposed by USG. Instead, Rau repeated his interest in seeing the SC establish a committee composed of non-permanent members, prime purpose of which would be to formulate a “peace plan”. Rau volunteered the thought that it should be quite simple for such a committee to formulate, in a fairly short time, policy recommendations somewhat along the lines I had suggested. He thought that such recommendations, coming from a committee composed of non-permanent SC members might have a better chance of acceptance by USSR.

Rau said he was planning this week-end to communicate with Malik and discuss his proposal with him. Rau did not know whether Malik would wish to talk with him but said that he wanted to be in a position to tell Malik that the idea of establishing a committee was Rau’s own idea, and that he did not know what the reaction of the USG would be. Rau therefore asked me to refrain from comment.

However, I said that without commenting upon the merits or demerits of the proposal, it seemed clear to me that it would be deplorable if any device were put forward which might be seized upon by USSR as an excuse for dilatory tactics. Rau replied this might be taken care of by making clear in putting forward such a proposal that the committee would be expected to report within a fixed short period and that in any event a minimum essential condition would be withdrawal of North Korean forces and compliance with SC resolutions. I also pointed out the danger of cushioning USSR from strong world pressures by diverting attention from necessity for compliance with SC decisions. I pointed out such diversions might occur by a protracted debate in SC concerning the desirability of establishing a SC committee, settling its composition and terms of reference, etc. Rau agreed that such danger should be avoided.

I concluded by saying that I wanted him to understand that we might consider it essential to make a statement and that I did not wish him to feel that if we concluded it weren’t necessary or desirable to so do, we had in mind “stealing a march on him”. He said he appreciated my frankness and certainly did not consider that he was “engaged in a race with us” to table his proposal before we stated what we considered would be appropriate aims. However, I said that before we did so, I was sure my Government would wish to consult with GOI in line with our customary friendly frankness, so as to secure as close a meeting of the minds as possible. He expressed gratitude for this assurance.

Rau said he would communicate with me as soon as he had talked with Malik and transmitted the results of his conversation.

Department may wish to repeat to New Delhi.

Gross