795B.5 MAP/5–1050
Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Ohly) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Proposed increase of military aid to Korea
I refer to the meeting held this morning at the request of Ambassador Muccio with Major General Lemnitzer, Lieutenant General Edwards and other Defense officers, Messrs. Galbraith and Stevens of S/MDA being present.
In summary, it appears that the Ambassador made the point that, while he does not advocate setting up a full-fledged Air Force for Korea, he does strongly urge that a combat force of anywhere from 20 to 40 fighter aircraft—F–51s being specifically mentioned—be provided.
The decision to approve the Ambassador’s recommendation would entail (1) revision of NSC 8/2 (since fighter aircraft are involved) and (2) obtaining funds to cover the costs of providing and maintaining such a force.
On the assumption that NSC 8/2 were modified to permit approval of the Ambassador’s recommendation, this office feels answers must be found to the following questions: (a) can arrangements be made to provide the training, maintenance and necessary operational facilities that the furnishing of such equipment makes essential. From General Edwards’ comments during this morning’s meeting this appeared doubtful. (b) From what source would funds be available to pay for the training, maintenance, spare parts and all the related items and services required to keep the aircraft operational? This question applies both to FY 1950 and to subsequent years. Even though funds for FY 1950 are found (such as from surplus funds becoming available from the Greek program) with which to acquire the aircraft no FY 1951 funds have been requested under MDAP for Korea which would permit support of a force of F–51s. The use of Section 303 funds is highly problematical, (c) According to Gen. Edwards, the supply of spare parts for the F–51s rapidly will become difficult, thus posing another serious problem.
It will be recalled that Defense has maintained, and still maintains that there is no military justification for military assistance to Korea. Consequently, in advancing the proposal that additional military assistance in the form of fighter aircraft be given to the ROK, the justification will have to be wholly on political grounds.
[Page 83]In this connection, the furnishing of additional Army and Coast Guard equipment can, in the view of this office, be justified on other than strictly military grounds. The real question concerns the provision of fighter aircraft to ROK.
This office believes that the first step in giving consideration to the furnishing of fighter aircraft to ROK under the MDAA is a clear cut statement indicating that the political advantages of such action (in disregard of NSC 8/2) outweigh the adverse factors which will arise as soon these craft become non-operational. As indicated above, attention should be called to the fact that the requested funds for military aid to ROK in fiscal year 1951 do not include an allowance for the support and maintenance of these aircraft, assuming spare parts can be obtained. This office would therefore be pleased to learn your views regarding solutions of these problems.1
- On the question of allocation of combat aircraft to the Republic of Korea, the Department requested further information from the Embassy in Seoul; see telegram 505, May 19, to Seoul, p. 85. With regard to the immediate allocation of funds for proposed additional military aid to South Korea exclusive of combat aircraft, Mr. Rusk sent to Mr. Ohly, on May 19, a memorandum suggesting that the matter be referred to the FMACC for approval (795B.5/5–1950). No action was taken by the FMACC prior to the outbreak of hostilities.↩