Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795B.5 MAP/5–1050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Bond)¹

secret

[Washington,] May 10, 1950.

Subject: Military Assistance to Korea

Participants:	State: NA—Ambassador Muccio
	Mr. Niles W. Bond
	Mr. Arthur B. Emmons
	S/MDA—Mr. Galbraith
	Mr. Stevens
	Army: Maj. Gen. Lemnitzer
	Navy: Capt. Murdaugh2
	Air Force: Lt. Gen. Edwards3

Ambassador Muccio opened the discussion by pointing out the extent of American financial aid thus far committed to south Korea and the necessity of plugging certain “gaps” now existing in the Korean defense picture so that our stake in south Korea could be more adequately protected. These “gaps” included the lack of any defense against possible attack by air, and a similar lack of sufficient coastal patrol facilities, in both of which respects the Koreans themselves, from their own funds, had been endeavoring to provide a remedy.

General Lemnitzer pointed out that the question of military assistance to the Republic of Korea at the present time was essentially a political one, in as much as south Korea was not regarded as of any particular value to the overall American strategic position in the Far East, a point to which the Ambassador agreed. The General continued by saying that the funds to be employed in military aid in this case were therefore a matter of concern principally to the Department of State which should take the initiative in obtaining the allocation of such funds from Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act or any other source available for that purpose.

Mr. Galbraith pointed out that it continued to be the opinion of S/MDA that there was no provision for the support of an air force in the present NSC directive on Korea, and that a revision of that directive solely on a political basis would have to be made were an air force to be so provided. The Ambassador pointed out that a fully effective air force was not essential but that south Korea should have a few combat planes at least for morale purposes. General Edwards stated, and several times reiterated, that the position of his Department was that the terms of NSC 8/2⁴ were intended to cover liaison aircraft only and that a revision of that paper would be necessary to cover combat aircraft. In response to a question from the Ambassador, General Edwards expressed the opinion, however, that the present language might be stretched to include a limited number of transport aircraft, such as C–47’s, for logistic support of ground forces.

The Ambassador then emphasized the difficult position in which he had been placed when President Rhee had learned that surplus fighter aircraft, including F–51’s, were being “junked” by FEAF in Japan, a thing which the Koreans found very difficult to understand in view of what they regarded as their desperate need for a few such planes. In this connection General Lemnitzer remarked that if F–51’s were to be transferred to Korea from Japan, the Air Force would have to be reimbursed for their handling and transportation even though they might be surplus and involve no initial cost of acquisition. The General went on to add that, in his opinion, the Department of State would have to take the policy initiative if it wished to bring about the establishment of a Korean Air Force fighter group, but that the Department of Defense would support such a program if the NSC directive were to be appropriately amended. Since the question was a political one, however, he did not feel that Defense should sponsor such a policy revision.

Mr. Bond then pointed out that the request for combat aircraft comprised only a part of the Mission’s recommendations for additional military aid to Korea for FY 1950, well over half of the recommended program being made up of items which fell well within the terms of NSC 8/2 as presently written. Principal among these, he added, were ground forces items designed to bring the total U.S.-supported ground forces in Korea to the level of 65,000 called for by the terms of NSC 8/2; these items, he said, together with the coast guard portion of the proposed additional aid, accounted for almost 5.9 out of a total of 9.8 million dollars. He then urged that prompt action be taken to obtain an allocation of funds to meet this 60% or more of the program which did not involve the question of the transfer of combat aircraft and whose implementation, therefore, should not have to await a decision on that question.

With reference to the question, raised by Mr. Galbraith, of future financial support for a Korean air force program, Mr. Bond suggested the possibility of finding funds for support of the program from within the $10 million to be allocated for military assistance for FY 1951 or from an increase over and above that amount, to which Mr. Galbraith replied that he did not believe the Bureau of the Budget would be inclined to view any increased expenditures along this line with favor at this time. No conclusion was reached on this matter.

General Edwards agreed that the Air Force would be willing to examine a Korean air force program with a view to going along with it, assuming the State Department would provide a political justification therefor. The Ambassador reiterated his earlier point that a full scale Korean air force was not necessarily desirable, and that what was contemplated was merely a few defensive combat planes, for morale purposes.

The Ambassador then raised the question of the training of Korean ground crew personnel by FEAF in Japan, for which a precedent had already been established in the training of Korean Army officers in FECOM. General Edwards replied that the Air Force would go along with such a proposal insofar as it could, and suggested that the matter might be arranged locally with FEAF. The question was then discussed of sending technical training personnel from FEAF to Korea for a short period to train Korean personnel in the operation and maintenance of American planes. General Edwards commented that many demands were now being made upon the Air Force to furnish such personnel in many areas in the world, and that it would be difficult to find such personnel who might be available at the present time. In this regard Mr. Bond asked whether State’s request for the temporary assignment of FEAF personnel to assist the Koreans with their newly-acquired AT–6’s had ever received Air Force consideration. General Edwards did not know that it had. Captain Murdaugh, sitting for Mr. Halaby to whom State’s request had been addressed, promised to look into the matter.⁵

The Ambassador then read a telegram from the Embassy in Seoul (No. 662 of May 9, 1950)⁶ concerning the reaction of the Korean Government to the request of the U.S. Air Force for a defected north Korean Stormovik plane⁷ and containing the suggestion of the Chargé d’Affaires that it might be highly desirable for the U.S. to compensate the Koreans with one or more F–51 aircraft. He also asked whether the question of additional advisers under KMAG for the Korean Coast Guard, as requested by the Mission, had been given consideration. General Lemnitzer replied that he did not know what had been done but that he would look up a telegram on this subject which the Ambassador said General Roberts had sent to the Department of the Army some time before.

Adverting to the point which he had raised earlier, Mr. Bond asked whether it would be a proper procedure on the part of State, pending consideration of the question of the revision of NSC 8/2 to permit the transfer of combat aircraft, to request the immediate allocation of funds to cover the other portions of the requested additional aid to Korea, so that the entire program would not have to be held up. General Lemnitzer said that he perceived no objection to that procedure and that such a request would be sympathetically received, particularly in the light of the strong case which Ambassador Muccio had made before both the FMACC and the Deputy Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added that his present thinking was that the necessary funds could be more expeditiously obtained from surplus Title II fund[s] than from funds available under Section 303, but that the final decision on this point would have to be left up to the FMACC.

1. The memorandum was codrafted by Mr. Arthur B. Emmons of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.
2. Capt. Albert C. Murdaugh, Assistant Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.
3. Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Air Force.
4. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 969.
5. See the letter from Mr. Allison to Mr. Halaby, January 31, p. 24. No action was taken on this matter prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (795B.5/6–1450).
6. See footnote 2 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Drumright, May 9, supra.
7. See telegram 683, May 11, from Seoul, p. 84.