Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

MacArthur Memorial Library and Archives: Record Group 5

Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
JCS 2180/2

[Washington,] December 28, 1950.

United States Policy Toward Japan

References:

a. J.C.S. 1380/90¹

b. J.C.S. 2180

c. J.C.S. 2180/1

the problem

1. As a matter of priority to draft a reply to a memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 15 December 1950 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 2180), in which the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested on an attached letter from the Secretary of State, dated 13 December 1950 (Appendix to J.C.S. 2180), together with a Department of State memorandum dated 13 December 1950² (Annex to J.C.S. 2180), all dealing with the above subject.

2. A memorandum by the Acting Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated 20 December 1950 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 2180/1), with Tabs “A” and “B” thereto (Appendices “A” and “B” to J.C.S. 2180/1), all dealing with a bilateral agreement referred to in paragraph 3(b) of the Department of State memorandum in Annex to J.C.S. 2180, was examined by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee in connection with its report.

3. In the preparation of its report the Committee also gave consideration to CINCFE’s Despatch C 52202 (CM IN 4736), dated 28 December 1950, and a memorandum by Major General Carter B. Magruder, USA, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on Japanese peace treaty matters, both dealing with the above subject.

recommendation

4. It is recommended that the memorandum in the Enclosure be forwarded forthwith to the Secretary of Defense.

[Enclosure]

Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, dated 15 December 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following views with regard to the terms of reference of a Presidential Mission to Japan as proposed by the Secretary of State.

2. On 8 September 1950 the President approved NSC 60/1,^* which provided, among other things, that “United States should now proceed with preliminary negotiations for a Japanese Peace Treaty”. Tim Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the situation which faced the United States at that time was radically different from that now confronting us.

3. On 8 September 1950 only North Korean forces were engaged against the United Nations Forces in Korea. Although the United Nations Forces were within the Pusan beachhead, the projected operations of the United Nations Commander gave every indication of an early and complete military victory in Korea. The Chinese Communists had given no firm indication of entering the conflict, nor had the USSR indicated that it would sponsor intervention. The United States position in Asia, exclusive of China, generally appeared to have possibilities for a satisfactory solution, and there appeared to be sufficient confidence in the United States among the friendly Asian nations to overbalance any possible bad effects of our military weakness in Japan as well as our previous lack of military victories in Korea.

4. On 8 September 1950 the position of the United States in Europe was not unsatisfactory. Although Soviet military strength was increasing, there were indications of improved solidarity and greater determination among the Western European nations. At that time no United States proposals for rearming Western Germany had been made.

5. During the past two and a half months the military position of the United States in the world in general and in the Far East in particular has radically altered for the worse. The United States has suffered especially serious reverses in Asia. The success of future United States military operations in Korea is now open to serious question. Communist aggression in Indochina is increasing. The United States is even on the defensive in the United Nations with regard to many features of its policy in Asia. The attitude of certain friendly nations on questions relative to Korea, China, Japan, and Formosa is now unfavorable to us, and any change in their position would require strong pressure on our part.

6. There are no United States combat forces in Japan available either for the enforcement of occupation controls or for opposing any possible military encroachment by the USSR into any part of Japan, nor does it appear probable that such forces will become available prior to resolution of the situation in Korea. Further, all major United States Navy and Air Force forces in the Far East are fully occupied in the military effort in Korea. In this connection, General MacArthur has made an urgent request that he receive substantial reinforcements of Army forces at once in order to provide reasonable safeguards against any sudden Soviet thrust at Japan while our forces are committed in Korea,^† Japanese internal security forces, although presently maintaining law and order, are wholly inadequate to resist any possible military aggression by the USSR and may not even be sufficient effectively to provide for the internal security of Japan in the face of internal communist activities. Thus, Japan is, in effect, a military vacuum.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view perceive but few possible advantages to the United States in the initiation of preliminary negotiations now for a Japanese peace treaty. All such advantages to the United States, however, appear to be speculative from the point of view of furthering United States security interests. From the Japanese point of view, however, such negotiations cannot be otherwise than beneficial for the Japanese people. Thus, it might be possible for the United States both to capitalize on this good will, and to cause Japan to be further oriented to the West. Further, it might be possible to obtain agreement to a favorable bilateral treaty. Some propaganda benefits might accrue if, in spite of the military base rights which the United States would require in the post treaty period, the United States could be absolved of charges of imperialism in Japan. On the assumption that Japan will agree to a bilateral treaty with the United States, firm military planning might be undertaken at once with respect to long-term United States military measures in Japan. Further, preliminary negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty might set the stage for parallel action with respect to a peace treaty with Germany.

8. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive many grave disadvantages to the initiation of negotiations now for a Japanese peace treaty. Such negotiations would of necessity be initiated under circumstances of extreme weakness on the part of the United States in Japan, and with our inadequate military forces fully committed in Korea and elsewhere. In this situation, the United States would be expected to offer many military and other concessions to the Japanese which, under other circumstances, probably would not be necessary. In this connection it must be anticipated that further concessions by the United States would be expected at the time of final negotiations.

9. In view of the security conditions in Japan now and in the foreseeable future, it would appear to be essential to make provision for an increase in Japanese security prior to any negotiations. Although it is recognized that the proposed negotiations are only preliminary in character, once initiated these should lead to a treaty of peace within a reasonable time. Failure to conclude a treaty within a reasonable time after initiation of any negotiations could be used as evidence of bad faith against the United States and any possible benefits derived from the negotiations could thus be lost.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, feel strongly that it is unacceptable to initiate a chain of events which might lead to the independence of Japan prior to the resolution of the situation in Korea since there is a strong probability that this would deprive United States forces of the use of Japan as the major base of operations in the Korean war. It is impossible now to predict when or how the situation in Korea will be resolved. There is a lively possibility that the hostilities in Korea may extend to overt war between the United States and the Government of Communist China. Further, the risk of global war has alarmingly increased. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree to the loss of Japan as a base for operations in a war against Communist China or in a global war. In view of these risks, even to Japan itself, and the danger of an unfavorable outcome in the Korean war, peace treaty negotiations now appear most untimely.

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that certain terms of the United States proposals for a peace treaty with Japan are unacceptable to certain friendly nations now represented on the Far Eastern Commission. These nations are opposing important United States military and economic objectives with respect to Japan in spite of the fact that these objectives, from the United States military point of view, will be essential if Japan is to be denied to the USSR in the event of war. If, in spite of this, the United States should proceed unilaterally, there might be serious disunity among the Western nations. Furthermore, a “paper” peace treaty, with an unarmed Japan, leaves that nation in no position to guarantee that the obligations therein would be enforced by future Japanese Governments. In any event, without effective security force in Japan or the support of Western nations, the enjoyment of our rights could be jeopardized by subversive nationalistic or communist acts.

12. It is obvious that there would be considerable provocation to the USSR if it were faced with a prospect of the rearmament of Western Germany concurrently with an overt program for the rearmament of Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from the point of view of the USSR, it would be greatly to that nation’s military advantage to block the creation of effective forces in Western Germany and in Japan. Further, the USSR might resort to global war before Japan could be overtly rearmed, particularly if United States forces had been withdrawn prior to such rearmament.

13. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military interests of the United States would now best be served by steps which would lead to the increased capability of Japan to provide for its own security and defense at the earliest practicable date. They believe that such an effort on the part of Japan, in order to be effective, will require changes in the Japanese constitution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel it essential, therefore, that no negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan should be undertaken until such changes have been made.

14. Although not a matter of primary concern, it should be noted that a Peiping Government radio announcement on 1 December 1950 stated, among other things, that “The Chinese will never tolerate a unilateral Japanese Peace Treaty … excluding China and the Soviet Union.” It should be further noted that a similar statement was made by the USSR in its note to the Eastern Powers regarding the rearmament of West Germany. There is considerable possibility that insistence by the United States at this time on the inclusion of essential military terms might lose us the support of our allies. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the military consequences of a war which might originate between the United States alone and Communist China, to be wholly unacceptable.

15. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the objectives of the United States toward Japan should, among other things, include the following:

a. A Japan which is oriented to the West;

b. The denial of Japan to the USSR in peace and in war;

c. As a corollary to b above, a Japan capable of offering substantial strength to its security;

d. The availability of Japanese bases for United States military operations in event of war; and

e. The availability of the war potential of Japan to the United States.

16. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that almost all of the above objectives can be achieved without the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Japan and that certain of those objectives can be achieved, possibly covertly, only under the leadership of SCAP. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have grave doubts that it would be feasible to attain these objectives through the medium of a peace treaty now, particularly in view of the fact that the support of friendly nations would probably not be forthcoming to accomplish those ends.

17. In connection with the above, an analogy can be drawn between the occupation of Japan under United States leadership of SCAP (Supreme Commander, Allied Powers) and that of Eastern Germany under the SCC (Soviet Control Commission). The Soviet Control Commission has, through overt and covert means, adjusted its controls over East Germany to further the objectives of the USSR, while at the same time providing to East Germany most of the benefits which would be expected to be derived from a peace treaty. East Germany has been granted a very large measure of ostensible autonomy; it has been clothed with certain outward forms of independence, particularly in the field of its diplomatic relations; it has made a number of international agreements partaking of the nature of treaties; it has raised powerful military forces; and it has made apparently satisfactory trade agreements with other nations acting in its own right. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that comparable measures could be taken in Japan without coercion, and to the satisfaction of the Japanese people (in view of the immediate threat to them of communist aggression) without unduly increasing the risk of general war, and while retaining for the United States its military base rights there.

18. In the light of all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff views with respect to the four specific questions posed to the Secretary of Defense by the Secretary of State in the basic memorandum are as follows:

Interrogatories: From the military point of view, are there any objections to:

(1) Seeking an early conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan without awaiting a favorable outcome of the situation in Korea?

Response: The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge most strongly that the United States refrain from proceeding now with any negotiations with Japan leading to a peace treaty, and that any such negotiations await a resolution of the situation in Korea. In view of the precarious military situation of the United States in the Far East, and in view of the unpreparedness for global war of the Military forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the foregoing recommendation should have overriding priority.

(2) Discussing this peace settlement with assumption that the United States intends to commit substantial armed force to the defense of the island chain of which Japan forms part?

Response: Whereas it is recognized that the security of the United States would be greatly assisted by measures which would provide for the security of our position in the Asian offshore island chain (as well as for the security of Western Europe), it is doubtful that the United States alone, in a global war, could provide an effective defense of that chain. Further, a commitment by the United States such as that proposed, would remove the incentive to the Japanese to provide adequately for their own security. The present risk of global war leads the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the conclusion that the United States cannot agree to entering into such a formal obligation to Japan as would make the security of that nation a military commitment of the United States. Therefore, the United States should not formally agree now or in the foreseeable future to committing substantial armed forces to the defense of the island chain of which Japan forms a part.

(3) Leaving the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands under Japanese sovereignty, subject to the provision of the contemplated military security agreement which would presumably take special account of the position in Okinawa?

Response: The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly disagree to any relaxation of the terms of approved United States policy relating to these islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fail to perceive any reason for such a gratuitous concession. On the contrary, they consider that exclusive strategic control of those islands must be retained by the United States in order for us to be able to carry out our commitments, policies, and military plans in the Pacific in peace or war. In this connection, a military security agreement in perpetuity would be inconsistent with the concept of Japanese sovereignty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, consider the proposed concession to be entirely unacceptable, and they firmly adhere to the minimum requirements of the pertinent approved United States policy as stated in NSC 60/1 as follows:

“Its terms must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan.”

(4) Exploration at this time of a possible Pacific Pact along the lines outlined in paragraph 4 of the attached memorandum?

Response: Inasmuch as such action would be directly related to peace treaty negotiations (as discussed in the above reference), the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive serious military objection to the exploration at this time of a possible Pacific Pact either along the lines suggested or along any lines other than as the outgrowth of a series of effective regional pacts among neighboring states which have demonstrated their stability.

19. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reserve their comment on the Annex to the basic letter entitled “Japan”, because they consider that the conduct of any negotiations with Japan on the subject of a peace treaty should be dictated by approved United States policy thereon as appearing in NSC 60/1.

20. In light of all the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this time also reserve comment on the memorandum from the Office of the Secretary of Defense dated 20 December 1950 and its appendices listing proposed points to be considered in connection with Draft Number 3 of a proposed bilateral agreement on security.³

1. JCS 1380/90 is the Department of Defense designator for the document which is printed in this compilation as an enclosure to the letter of September 7 from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, p. 1293.
2. Ante, p. 1363.
3. J.C.S. 1380/90. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. CINCUNC despatch to J.C.S., No. C 51559, dated 18 December 1950, CM IN 1671. On file in the J.C.S. Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. In JCS 2180/3, January 9, 1951, a note to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Rear Adm. William G. Lalor (ret.), Secretary to the Joint Chiefs, and Mr. L. K. Ladue of the Joint Secretariat, it is stated that the report in JCS 2180/2 was used as a basis of discussion by the Joint Chiefs in their meeting with State Department representatives (headed by Mr. Acheson) held on January 8, 1951. Documentation concerning this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1951, volume vi . (MacArthur Archives, RG 5)