Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Department of Defense Files

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Department of the Army

top secret
personal for jcs

Tokyo, December 28, 1950.

C 52202. Reurmsg JCS 99159, Dec. 18, 1950.¹ My views on questions 1 through 9 are as follows:

(1) To the contrary, there is every reason why we should proceed at once to call a peace conference for Japan. We are fully committed to such action, the Japanese have earned the right to a treaty of peace, and our failure to proceed cannot but cause loss of faith in our moral integrity and leadership, not only in Japan but throughout Asia;

(2) No objection;

(3) Leaving the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands under Japan’s sovereignty is highly objectionable from a military point of view. The Japanese are fully resigned to the loss of these areas as a penalty for waging war. They form a vital segment of our lateral defense line and our control thereof is formally established and universally recognized. It would be unthinkable to surrender control and render our use of these areas, fortified at United States expense, subject to treaty arrangement under Japanese administration. It would but be to transform strength to weakness without the slightest moral or legal reason for so doing;

(4) No objection. (The foregoing views apply with equal force whether or not it is contemplated that the armed forces assigned to this theater will be materially increased);

(5) The United States should fulfill her moral and legal obligations vis-à-vis the restoration of Japanese peace whether acting alone or in consonance with other Pacific powers;

(6) It is impossible to predict what, if any, influence personalities might have upon Japan’s future course with respect to rearmament. It is patently clear, however, the degree of such influence on such matters by the United States or any of its representatives is dependent in large measure on the future course of American policy in Asia, and specifically the manner in which we meet the present crisis in Korea;

(7) I regard it as utterly impossible to formulate an acceptable peace treaty for Japan without restoring in full the sovereign power. The post-treaty retention of powers now vested in SCAP would render such a treaty wholly unacceptable and invalid in the eyes of the Japanese;

(8) Under normal conditions, in the absence of a threat of imminent hostilities, an army of four divisions with other TO components, all at full strength plus marine and air detachments and comparable navy and air force complements, would suffice for the security of Japan. This should be a basic security force subject, however, to immed. reinforcement upon any increase in international tensions to the point that hostilities aimed at Japan become imminently threatened. In such eventuality, the extent of reinforcement should be guided by global studies of points of enemy concentration indicating the nature of the treat and the potentiality of possible enemy action. When any such threat of imminent hostilities has subsided, the security force should be reduced to its basic strength. Long-term military security of Japan should obviously be based on placing all possible reliance upon the United Nations acting in collaboration with the government and people of Japan in which Japan will be expected to develop and maintain such indigenous forces as will assure her internal security and assist in her defense;

(9) My views with respect to a Japanese peace treaty are fully on record and I know of nothing further that I could helpfully add at this time.

[MacArthur]

1. In this telegram the JCS had transmitted the verbatim text of Mr. Acheson’s letter of December 13 to Secretary Marshall (ante, p. 1363.) and had continued “Your opinions as to the four numbered questions in second para of Sec State ltr are desired both on the basis (1) that there will be substantial increases of your armed forces and (2) that strength of your armed forces will not be materially increased.” The JCS had concluded:

   “In addition to your opinions on foregoing, JCS further desire your opinions on foil questions to which reply will, in all probability, be required in order to prepare position on the subject:

   “Question 5. Should the United States unilaterally seek an early conclusion of a Peace Settlement with Japan without assurances of participation by friendly FEC Nations and in spite of lack of their support?

   “Question 6. Would Japan accept rearmament without your leadership?

   “Question 7. If USSR is not a party to the treaty, in view of terms of armistice relative to Allied military controls over Japan through SCAP, could or should CINCFE retain functions of SCAP in order to counter possible USSR action seeking to assume those functions?

   “Question 8. If Peace Treaty eventuates quickly, what long-term and short-term military measures would, in your opinion, be necessary in order to insure security of Japan against USSR?

   “Question 9. Have you other comments, from the military point of view, on the general subject of a Japanese Peace Treaty now?” (Department of Defense Files)