Office of the Historian

357.AA/10–250: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (Doolittle) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret   priority
Djakarta, October 2, 1950—4 p. m.

453. Gocus 902. Events have now outrun UNCI efforts peaceful solution Ambon problem. Regrettably either Indonesian Government has knowingly mislead commission or military have taken action on own initiative. Chronology and information from Dutch sources only in spite our efforts obtain official Indonesian story are: September 25 UNCI letter to Roem,1 26th Indonesian cabinet meeting favored direct action, 27th Cabinet reversed decision and sent Lemeina via Macassar (Gocus 9012), 28th radio Ambon reported Indonesian plane machine gunned Amboina, 29th–30th attack begun and APRI battalions landed on both sides narrow neck north Ambon at Tolehu and Hitu Lama, October 1, 2 further battalions landed. Meanwhile Ambonese ex-soldiers [Page 1074] on Ceram Island reported to have surrounded APRI forces Amahai.

September 29th and 30th Indonesian officials denied all knowledge attack. UNCI unable last ten days obtain interview Prime Minister Natsir (Gocus 8963). Sultan also invisible.

UNCI today received following letter from Roem dated September 30 which we consider flat rejection offer and hands off warning.

[Here follows the letter expressing thanks to the UNCI for the offer of good offices but indicating that it can not be accepted, principally because it may give encouragement to the rebellious parties by seeming to bring their case to an international level.]

We are again today insisting on interview Prime Minister Roem at which will demand statement facts. Answer will be sent after definite information and if possible learning Dutch reaction here and in Holland. So far no reports from Assembly camps here re Ambonese ex-KNIL.

Department pass The Hague.

Doolittle
  1. Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 422 (Gocus 898), September 26, not printed; this letter asked that the UNCI be allowed to proceed to Ambon and contact the persons in control there with the idea of persuading them to enter negotiations with the Republic of Indonesia looking to the settlement of the Ambon situation. (357.AA/9–2650)↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Not printed; it reported on UNCI and Military Executive Board visits to 13 camps where Ambonese and other ex-KNIL soldiers were being held. (357.AA/9–2450)↩