756D.5 MAP/7–1550: Telegram
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State
62. Tomap. Since receipt Deptel 461 last night have considered carefully and discussed with Counselor and CAS. Regret unable consult NA on trip Manila and MA in Bandung. We agreed any official request on RUSI Government to receive MAAG immediately would be inopportune.2
[Page 1031]Current cables to Department report situation of present RUSI Government with Hatta as Prime Minister. Meeting scheduled for nineteenth between RUSI and Republican Cabinet delegates to discuss draft of provisional constitution for unitary state. Most important point in dispute is whether Vice President of unitary state shall be permitted function as Prime Minister in event emergency where under President unable form Parliamentary Cabinet. Strong pressure from left to relegate Hatta to inactive Vice Presidency and eliminate him from responsible leadership and authority within new government. Opposition criticizes his acceptance of RTC agreement which did not cut Indonesia away entirely from Netherlands and his friendship for western powers with particular emphasis on likelihood his being influenced by US.
If Hatta functions as Prime Minister after contemplated setting up unitary state August 17 he will keep moderate group about him with whom he can work. It is much to US advantage for Hatta to be retained not only because he is most experienced and efficient of prospective appointees but also most appreciative of benefit to Indonesia of US friendship and support.
With foregoing in mind I decided not to make formal request of RUSI Government for immediate dispatch MAAG group Indonesia. On other hand I was unwilling give Department negative recommendation without sounding out Hatta and endeavoring prepare way for later assignment MAAG group. Consequently called on Hatta noon fifteenth. I requested and he agreed consider my visit secret and strictly personal. I told him of urgent desire Defense for MAAG group here immediately for conference and coordination with RUSI. Hatta asked explanation of difference in functions of expected survey group and of MAAG. After I provided this he expressed strong preference survey group arrive first. Said he would be much embarrassed politically if MAAG group should precede survey team and gave reason for conclusion that he, Hatta, had already reached agreement with US on various phases of military aid without letting his own government know and he now suggested group to advise not only his present government but prospective unitary government. I let Hatta know for first time probable size survey group. He is concerned lest so conspicuous group arouse criticism of government even though he ready to cooperate in explaining purpose of visit to several countries including Indonesia. Although I explained again that survey members would wear civilian clothes and would work with his government and Embassy closely he feared reaction from arrival so many military men at one time and suggested arrivals be staggered. I explained group would of necessity travel in their own plane and must all be together. I stressed, however, that considerable portion would be civilians from State and ECA.
[Page 1032]Considering tense Indonesian political situation I recommend Hatta’s preference be respected and arrival MAAG group be delayed until survey group has visited Indonesia and arrangements are made whether through formal agreement or otherwise, for kind and extent of military aid.
I emphasized to Hatta seriousness world situation and intimated US military authorities might be even more conscious than we are here of Communist threat to Indonesia. I felt sure he would not want to delay unnecessarily in considering arrangement which US might be disposed to favor for help Indonesia. He indicated genuine appreciation our interest and hopes everything can be worked out within next few weeks. Said in meantime his government exercising increased vigilance against Communist dangers from within. Said SOBSI Communist labor groups endeavoring sow dissatisfaction among soldiers as well as working people because inability government be able provide textiles and other presents for distribution this great religious holiday. Expressed satisfaction first items to be released by US under ExIm Bank credit will be automotive vehicles. Said these urgently required to improve transport pointing out Djuanda unable get textiles distributed part of Java because lack conveyance. Again reiterated engineering group should be first of STEM to arrive.
In answer my query what would happen if Communist uprising followed liquidation KNIL July 26 and preceding setting up unitary state August 17 Hatta said RUSI forces could unquestionably control situation everywhere except perhaps part of east Sumatra where Communists have infiltrated with weapons from Malaya. Then I raised question whether alternative government to his moderate group might likely be so radical as to warrant present government retaining office on emergency basis with benefit outside support he dismissed such thought. Said no danger Communist group dominating government from within if economy can be strengthened and policies of present government continued without too serious modification.
Masjumi leaders inform Embassy their party realizes Indonesia must eventually take sides with US. They believe move this direction may be consummated after unitary government established. Admit however that present US military reverses Korea cause fear at least temporarily among lower ranks of party.3
I recommend we move cautiously for present giving survey group opportunity consult with Hatta government frankly. Believe US ends can thereafter be reached with a little patience (if Hatta heads unitary state) rest should not be difficult. With any other likely government, believe negotiations would be feasible unless surprising swing to left. In such event pressure could be used through threat [Page 1033] of withholding protection by our navy or support of economic character. My belief is our best policy will be to respect sensibilities of our friends during their trying times, negotiate with them fairly and patiently and not resort to pressure unless our own military situation makes it absolutely imperative. Even then results would be less favorable than if reached through amicable arrangements.
- Not printed; it informed Ambassador Cochran that the proposed Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) would consist of 10 officers, enlisted men, and civilians. (756D.5–MAP/7–1350)↩
- In two other telegrams Cochran had protested to the Department of State over the size of the military survey mission. ECA plans for a “basic organization which is usual extravagant administrative and advisory group,” and the suggestion that the Griffin plan activities in Southeast Asia be coordinated from Djakarta. His objections stressed the inadequate facilities in Indonesia to support and house these missions and the fear that they would be construed as an effort to press Indonesia for commitments to the United States, “thus provoking strong left-wing local reaction which in turn could jeopardize Hatta’s already delicate position in formation new government.” Telegrams 11 and 63, July 3 and 15, from Djakarta, neither printed (756D.5–MAP/7–350 and 856D.00/7–1550).↩
- For documentation on the Korean situation, see volume vii .↩