751G.00/11–150: Telegram
The Minister in Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
734. The present political-military situation in Vietnam is not happy one but it is far from hopeless. There are several things we can do and there are measures that we may be able to persuade French and Vietnamese to institute which, if implemented urgently and with determination, might solve situation of stalemate fairly rapidly. When I say “solve” I do not mean that improved and increased French and Vietnamese troops could hope to destroy Viet Minh forces in northern Vietnam during the six months’ dry season now beginning. Better generaled, immediately reinforced and equipped, and supported by effective Vietnamese Government action, however, the French forces conceivably might during this period be able to retake offensive and drive the Viet Minh back across border into China and/or into mountainous rather sterile northern tip of Tonkin. If and when that situation were reached it would be up to China, if she is the law-abiding member of the international community she pretends to be, to disarm refugee Viet Minh troops and prevent their re-crossing the border as military units. The above highly conditioned optimistic appreciation is, of course, based on assumption that China will not provide Viet Minh with sizeable air and tank force or will not herself actively emerge into open war with Vietnam.
The first thing we, ourselves must do is speed to the utmost delivery of essential armaments so urgently needed by French Union forces (see list Legtel 566, October 16).1 Deptel 446, October 26 and elaboration provided Army G–4/D–3 unnumbered telegram October 26 to Chief MAAG2 are most appreciated here. General Brink takes calmer and somewhat more hopeful view of ability of the French to hold onto Tonkin than American Consul Hanoi and our military attachés but even he describes situation as “critical” and its “solution” in sense indicated above as dependent upon arrival American equipment within next two months and proper support by a real Vietnamese Army and an energized Vietnamese Government. Brink’s estimate of military situation for defense should go forward shortly. [Page 915] We cannot overstate critical importance of next sixty days in Indochina. Stakes at issue here are such that we believe most liberal calculation of risk by CINCFE in its urgent shipment priority arms from FECom stocks is thoroughly justified.
Even if threat of the “newer and better” Viet Minh forces based in China were less grave than it is there would be extreme urgency in giving French forces the aviation and other equipment which they so sorely need. One of prime components of the resolution of this political and military stalemate, or worse, is an early victory of some proportions of French arms.
On the military side there are certain measures French should take without any delay. First of all it would seem that for the one part of the Union where war is actually in progress French should be able to scrape up reinforcements at least to the amount of a division without derogation to their duties under NATO. After six months the number of French troops in Indochina might possibly be reduced to their present strength. By that time proposed new Vietnamese battalions should be able to take to the field at least in quiet or “pacification” sectors releasing for active service French troops now engaged in occupation and “pacification” activities. Surely French can draw some troops from quiet sectors of their empire for temporary reinforcement in Indochina, Except for transportation costs, it should not even involve much added expense for French military budget.
If it is not practical for French to replace General Carpentier by brilliant and determined commander, at least he should be given more freedom on action than he apparently is allowed by Defense Ministry now. By same token, if he is not going to take personal command in north he must allow greater autonomy to General Alessandri or whoever commands in the north. One of the difficulties here is that war in the north is directed from Saigon, one thousand miles to the south. Furthermore, Alessandri has no regional coordinated naval and air forces under his direct command. His tactical use of these arms must normally await in each instance the OK of their separate command in Saigon. It seems obvious also that if Alessandri is to continue commanding Tonkin he should be relieved at once of his duties as Commissioner of the Republic. He has full-time job with his army.
There is no doubt that French will sooner or later and rather sooner than later have to proceed to some revision of March 8 agreements. I do not believe they need to do so at this precise moment and find some merit in Letourneau’s statement (see Legtel 657, October 25 [24])3 that to announce such re vision under present circumstances would be taken by Vietnamese as sign of weakness and opportunity [Page 916] for further anti-French statements and demands for new concessions. I still believe the Norodom Palace should be turned over to Bao Dai at earliest moment but I would not, in view of present worsened feelings between the Vietnamese Government and the French, urge that concession precise moment. The move might well wait few weeks to see whether Bao Dai is really making good on his promises to give personal direction to creation of Vietnamese National Army and actively to take up reins of state.
There are, however, certain concessions which French should make now. They should, for example, immediately sponsor Vietnamese (and Cambodian and Laotian) membership in the UN. I believe also they should promptly make best accommodation they can at Pau even at the sacrifice of initial position or with offense to French logic.
With an adequate conclusion at Pau and with proper inauguration National Army we would have reached point where public statement of intention by French along lines suggested Deptel 460, October 284 would be most opportune and influential. Accordingly, we would suggest statement be made at Paris in about two weeks. Its further present timeliness indicated by New Delhi conversations and stirrings of Asian consciousness re Indochina (Rangoon telegram 266, October 25 and New Delhi telegram 1022, October 29)5 prompted by Korean and Tibetan occurrences. In our view, declaration would need contain little more than reference paragraph plus appropriate exhortation to vigorous common effort. We would prefer to have as spokesman M. Auriol who represents both French and French Union, is above party position, and whose personal participation would add utmost generosity to this declaration of policy.
With these concessions to Vietnamese nationalism Letourneau should also order High Commissariat and the Army carefully to adopt an attitude of superiority and authority in favor of an all-out effort to cultivate the Vietnamese Government and the Vietnamese people and to foster legitimate Vietnamese pride and aspirations. Officially French behavior toward the Vietnamese is correct and in many personal instances even cordial. Pignon is not disliked by Vietnamese and he enjoys considerable respect. The general attitude of staff of the High Commissariat, which is much larger than it was pre-war, is not up to Pignon’s personal standard and he apparently has done nothing effective to insist on more cordial approach. The cordial approach in individual, official and social dealings with Vietnamese must be backed up by a really good publicity organization and drive emphasizing French affection for the Vietnamese, and their determination that Vietnam’s independence shall be complete (within the framework of the French Union) when the present Russia–China supported civil [Page 917] war is ended. The French propaganda system here is very definitely deficient. Pignon, Dugardier and other intelligent officials admit it, but have done nothing to improve it.
While on this chapter, French should be told in Washington and Paris and by me here that they must do something to improve their handling of foreign correspondents. Because of desire to prevent or delay an occasional article critical of French policy or revelatory of French military operations, the French local censorship is well on the way towards producing an hostile foreign press.
At an early date following implementation of this program by French and accompanying French improved public relations efforts in Indochina and abroad, we should indicate our willingness to make public statement at level of press or Secretary of our intention to see the Indochinese war of Communist aggression through and a declaration of American policy in behalf of true Indochinese independence and Far Eastern stability.
Persuasion of the French to take any action can only be accomplished effectively in Washington and Paris. But part and parcel of a better French performance here is agreement to set up the consultative arrangements between Legation and MAAG recommended in Legtel 703, October 28.6
But even highly improved French political and military performance here (and accelerated aid from us) will not solve this situation. Equally fundamental is problem of finding means of continually and effectively stimulating Bao Dai and the Vietnamese Government to the activities recommended in Deptel 384, October 18. This in the end is the central problem and the one element the US cannot supply, namely, the will and the capacity of the native government to govern.
Department pass Tokyo, sent Department 734, repeated info Paris 353, Tokyo 22.
- Telegram 566, not printed, contained lists of materials urgently needed by the French, The lists were prepared by the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon after consultation with French officials. (751G.5 MAP/10–1650)↩
- Neither printed.↩
- For extract, see p. 906.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Neither printed.↩
- Not printed.↩