PSA Files: Lot 54D190
Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
Representatives of FE, EUR, S/P, as well as Ambassadors Jessup and Bruce have agreed that the military situation in Indochina is so grave as to require the very highest priority treatment by the United States Government.
It was the consensus of those identified above that you be asked to meet with General Marshall (you should have present the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air) to urge him to dispatch to Indochina by air, if possible, all those items in the Melby–Erskine recommendations which can be made available from the Korean Theater.1 We were particularly [Page 901] concerned that planes (the fifteen B–26 bombers) be flown from the Korean Theater instead of being awaited from the U.S.-Korean pipeline as was [we?] notified the French on Friday.2 We have no objection to American pilots flying these planes to Indochina.
The group also agreed that we should sustain and if possible increase our pressure upon both Bao Dai and the French to accelerate the formation, equipment and dispatch to the front of national army contingents. FE has already dispatched the necessary telegram to Bao Dai;3 Ambassador Bruce will do the necessary with the French Government.
- A memorandum by the Secretary of State to Matthews, October 20, indicates that Acheson discussed the matter briefly with General Marshall before that day’s Cabinet meeting. The Secretary of Defense had stated that he had already instructed the military establishment to review the question of the 15 bombers in an effort to get them to Indochina. He was also attempting to expedite the shipment of other requested material. (Acheson Papers, Harry S. Truman Library)↩
- October 13.↩
- Reference is to telegram 384 to Saigon, October 18, p. 898.↩