751G.00/9–2850: Airgram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation at Saigon
A–50. Dir PSA1 recd Ngo Dinh Diem2 Sep 21 and in course of conversation emphasized fol: (a) emergence truly independent stable IC States impossible until Commie menace now centered Tonkin contained and ultimately liquidated; (b) that US attaches greatest importance legitimacy and constitutionality of states which it supports; that Bao Dai Govt legitimate and constitutional recipient powers already transferred and now in course of trans from Fr; (c) US therefore eager that Diem and Catholics give present govt every possible support.
Diem, evidently impressed by certainty US position, asked if US cld provide arms to Catholic Armies. (Diem identified one Catholic armed group in Phat Diem area. Said also that second Catholic Army was in existence in Hue–Tourane area in early ’47 but this group later dispersed when Fr, according to Diem, withdrew financial support because of its outstanding success.) Dir told Diem that US now considering ways and means assisting formation and development Natl Armies and that Catholic contingents if part of Natl Armies wld therefore receive US assistance.
Diem was reminded of longstanding US interest supporting genuine Nationalist non-Commie states in Asia and in promoting mutually beneficial assoc between new states and old metropolitan power on [Page 885] voluntary basis, citing Indo and Phil as evidence genuine character Amer intentions.
Bishop3 kept reiterating fol two points for solution IC problem: (1) US must maintain pressure upon Fr to grant greater concessions to Vietnam than contained Mar 8 Accords. (Despite rptd questions Bishop at no time clearly identified specific concessions necessary. He resorted to generalities such as reduction in nr Fr civil servants now Vietnam, stating this connection that Fr officials IC exercising executive as opposed advisory role in VN Govt); (2) Creation Natl Army. When questioned re risk that Vietnamese armed by West might subsequently support Ho, Bishop said nucleus Natl Army shld be created from among Catholics whose reliability was unquestioned. When asked re use to which such army wld be put, Bishop emphasized that when Bao Dai supported by Vietnamese bayonnets, he wld speak with much greater authority. Bishop made clear that Bao Dai wld use such authority when acquired, as much, if not more, against Fr than Ho. Bishop felt that large majority partisans Ho wld flock to Bao Dai when it apparent that Natl Army created and true independence Vietnam assured Bishop felt Natl Army cld be under only indirect Fr control and was specific in excluding Fr cadres for Viet Army.
Diem, who seemed obviously to be coordinating his remarks with those made by Bishop, said Fr shld turn over control Cochinchina entirely to Vietnamese who wld then be in position pacify country. Diem pointed out Fr unable to distinguish between Commie and non-Commie Viets, something which Viets themselves cld accomplish with ease particularly as in Cochinchina, he himself had list of all powerful Commies there. Diem felt that after Viet control Cochinchina accomplished, Fr shld withdraw frm Annam into Tonkin where Fr forces wld provide shield against Chi aggression. Diem contd that after Annam pacified, problem Tonkin cld be examined. Bishop consistently deprecated nrs and strength Commies what he consistently referred to as “resistance.” He said Reverend Pham Ba Truc, now member Ho’s Govt, had permission from his Fr Bishop to protect Catholics in Ho dominated area. Bishop said that he himself had sent twelve priests in his diocese to work with anti-Fr forces. Bishop made clear that he felt more strongly about presence Fr than he did Viet Commies. While constantly reminded by Dept officers of position church in other countries now under Commie domination, Bishop did not seem greatly affected. Just before leaving Wash on his trip to Canada, Bishop in only display of strong, deep feelings said that church wld never identify itself so completely with Bao Dai that his collapse wld mean eradication church also. At another point in response to question, he said it was useless for his brother to become Premier at this time because latter’s prestige under present circumstances wld be destroyed [Page 886] within few months. Bishop asked that Heath visit dioceses of Phatdiem and Bu Chu to examine particularly provinces Ninh Binh and Nam Dinh to see progress Catholics have made restoring order these two provinces. He said this connection (using Heath’s visit as evidence of US interest) that Catholic hierarchy wld instruct parishoners to form Catholic party within next six months and intimated that plans this connection wld be drawn up at meeting five Vietnamese bishops at Rome scheduled for late Oct.
Dept found Thuc to be more voluble if not dominating one of two brothers. We were impressed that he, thru the Catholics, might even be important factor in present IC complex. Diem impressed us as less precise, realistic and authoritative. Influence of Thuc’s clerical background and position with its evident bearing on his thinking was apparent throughout.
Ngo fitted more into mould of present-day Vietnamese politician, steeped in oriental intrigue and concerned equally if not more, we suspect, with furthering his own personal ambitions than solving complex problems facing his country today. Like other prominent Vietnamese, i.e., Nguyen Phan Long, Diem is ever prepared to deliver endless dissertations on the errors of the past and hopelessness of the present but is either incapable or unwilling offer any constructive solution to current dilemma other than vague and defamatory refs to Fr and implications that only US can solve problem, thru him to be sure. Dept officers reiterated view that Vietnam’s problems cld be solved only by Vietnamese, that West cld help, but that burden of solution rests with Viets.
Pls advise Dept and Paris any action you believe shld be taken consolidate Thuc, Bao Dai and Diem, or any other action deemed desirable in premises.
Thuc and party depart US Oct 15 for Rome via Paris.