751G.55/9–1950: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
priority
393. Deptel 278, September 15 [16] indicates that studies are at present in progress in Washington preparatory for final high level decision as to extent and character US participation national army project for IC states. I recommend most urgently that any preliminary discussions and studies this problem should be carried on in first instance, and at least concurrently, here in Saigon and that French Government be requested authorize Pignon and his high command to discuss matter with me fully and without delay.
I submit that it is necessary that any French requests be screened here before any high level decision taken.…
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With all respect we doubt whether any group of high level French in Washington can sift these discrepancies and sort out command and political relationships of this complex congeries of forces at distance of 12,000 miles without preliminary or concurrent discussions in [Page 883] Saigon. We suspect that final blueprints for such an army have not been drawn, and will not be until Alessandri, Pignon, Carpentier and Bao Dai get their heads together in Saigon. In this connection I would point out that MAAG here has been designated as having full primary responsibility for receiving, screening and passing on requests for military assistance in IC, and would be in position follow closely creation of national army.
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There is little doubt in our minds here that if we are to find a fairly rapid cure for this “civil war” which invites further Chinese intervention, native forces in the field must be greatly increased. This will of course involve more equipment and cash. Legation cannot state of course whether or how much it would be possible for French Government to increase its cash outlay in IC at this time. French finances might be able to afford some increase in their IC budgets. If they cannot, however, meet full bill for maintenance of increased national army and urgently needed pacification troops, then we shall be obliged to contribute some direct financial aid if we want this dangerously festering situation cleared up. I trust that French delegate now in Washington can provide prompt estimates as to French and Associated States financial possibilities in this regard.
Politically, I strongly hold opinion that purpose of national army concept will be dissipated unless Vietnam, (and Cambodia and Laos as well) are brought into discussions, their wishes consulted and their desires met to the extent that military efficiency will permit. In this connection President Huu’s most recent press conference in which he declared that only Viet forces could obtain necessary rallyings and pacification brought him close to position advocated by nationalists of Nguyen Phan Long-Dam Viet stripe. Key figure in such consultations will of course be Bao Dai and I cannot emphasize too insistently my belief that the US should make no definite large-scale commitments for the support of the national army project without consultation with Bao Dai and determination exactly where he stands and what role he proposes to assume vis-à-vis the Viet national army.
Finally, but with equal importance, I would strongly urge that definition of US participation in policy and strategic decisions affecting the use of national armies and of American assistance furnished to them accompany any underwriting of the sort French have requested. This participation would involve continuing consultative relationships with French commanding general, with French military missions to the Associated States and with the high military committee and cannot be worked out, in its initial phases, away from IC.
Legation is highly gratified decision has at length been taken to hold strategic conversations in FE (Deptel 278). We should like to [Page 884] suggest, however, that these be combined or paralleled by further political conversations and that members of the Legation staff attend (see Legtel 382, September 17).1 We do not believe that the military elements of solution in IC can be divorced from political aspects. Frankly we have felt that delay in creation of national armies has been due not only to French hesitancy in making so capital a concession but also due to skepticism of some technical military opinion both French and American about value native troops.
We shall submit further suggestions for questions on technical aspects of French project by cable tomorrow.2
Sent Department 393; repeated info Paris 167. Pouched Hanoi.