Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

851G.00R/7–2550: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath)¹ to the Secretary of State

secret

Saigon, July 25, 1950—10 a. m.

100. 1. On occasions cited in Legtels 52, July 15; 70, July 19; Toeca 140, July 21,² French have reminded us of special role reserved for French under the March 8 and collateral agreements and offered polite but unsolicited suggestions about course the mission should pursue in contact with Viets.³ They suggest changes in wording of my letters of credence to bring French Union to fore (Deptel 63, July 19);⁴ they urged on Blum inclusion of wording in draft economic aid bilateral to stress Vietnam obligations as member of French Union, and they have addressed to me the letter cited in Legtel 70 which asks us to caution MDAP survey mission not to enter into any commitments with Associated States’ representatives without consulting the French interest. This letter was sent without prior discussion of the subject or intimation to Legation that the High Commissariat considered such a caution might be needed.

2. I am confident that the French consider our attitude entirely correct. Our relations continue to be, as they have always been, genuinely excellent and marked by mutual respect. I report these matters merely for record and as characteristic of a special French touchiness already familiar to the Department. In view their delicate relations with Viets French are always afraid that some uncoordinated activity of ours might upset the apple cart or prompt the Viets to unrealistic plans and desertion of French-Vietnam understandings (this fear was evident during the visit of the Griffin mission, the naval visit and during the government crisis). Following Foreign Ministers’ conference French attitude became less uneasy, the more so since no apple carts had been upset by us in five months since our recognition of Bao Dai. I trust French realize that this mission would lose much of its utility to US and to the US-French entente if Viets were to consider it a tool of the High Commissariat.

3. I believe that there are several reasons why French chose to dot the eyes for us at this time:

a. The Korean episode suggests necessity of tightening the ranks and US-French cooperation.

b. Pignon is about to leave for extended stay in France and perhaps thought it well to make position clear before his departure.

c. Similarly my arrival here as the first diplomatic envoy to Vietnam may have seemed an opportunity to do the same thing.

d. Pignon recalls vividly the experience of the Griffin mission and the intoxication produced among the Viets by their first negotiations with outside powers. He has often said that if he had returned to Vietnam a few days before the beginning of the meetings he could have averted Phan Long’s defiance of the French on what was relatively an inconsequential issue. He knows also that Viets and Bai Dai himself have tended recently to call for revision of the provisions governing French and Vietnamese relations in military matters. He may have feared they would make the meeting with the military mission an occasion for pressing their demands. He knew also that the meeting would be largely directed by Bao Dai’s Minister for Armed Forces, Vinh, and that the Caodaists have lately shown signs of disaffection toward Huu Government and with French command.

4. For these reasons Pignon took special pains to coordinate the meeting sent us his letter and was in contact with Khac Ve, the acting president about agenda. Whether as a result of his interest or not Viets asked little that French had not already asked in their behalf (Legtel 84, July 22),⁵ stayed completely away from controversial issues and never mentioned the “Bao Dai” or “Quat” memoranda⁶ which were the only official outline of arms needs which we had previously received from them.

5. In cordial conversation with Pignon recently I referred to his letter and assured him that we were well aware of provisions of the March 8 and other agreements which might affect distribution of US aid and that the military mission was well briefed on these matters. My acknowledgement of his letter will be limited to about that same statement. I believe Pignon appreciates our position clearly.

Sent Department 100; repeated information Paris 57.

Heath

1. Minister Donald R. Heath arrived at Saigon on July 5.
2. None printed.
3. Reference is to the joint Mutual Defense Assistance Program survey mission to Southeast Asia headed by John F. Melby, Special Assistant to Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, Commanding General of the First Marine Division. For the press release announcing the dispatch of the mission, July 5, and other documentation on its work and recommendations, see pp. 1 ff.
4. Not printed.
5. Not printed.
6. The request for United States military assistance submitted by Bao Dai is summarized in telegram 69 from Saigon, January 31, p. 707. The “Quat memorandum” refers to a Vietnamese request for military aid presented to Colonel Duff, an observer with the Griffin Mission. Chargé Gullion discussed the memorandum with Vietnamese Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat on March 24. Quat indicated that the list was largely based on the Bao Dai request with a few additions. A summary of the list and the Legation’s comments on it were transmitted in telegram 204 from Saigon, March 25, not printed. (751G.00/3–2550)