Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

611.90/4–350

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Policy Information Officer, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

top secret

[Washington, April 3, 1950.]

Oral Report by Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup Upon His Return From the East¹

On March 23 in a meeting at 10:00 a. m. in Room 5104 New State, Ambassador Jessup summarized the impressions he had received of the situation in the East to the following officers:

S	The Secretary	NEA	Mr. Hare5
U	Mr. Webb	CA	Mr. Sprouse6
C	Mr. Kennan2	PSA	Mr. Lacy
G	Mr. Rusk	G	Mr. Smith
FE	Mr. Butterworth	S/A	Mr. Gibson
E	Mr. Thorp3	FE	Mr. Ogburn (Recorder)
P	Mr. Barrett4		Mr. Case7
A	Mr. Humelsine		Mr. Fosdick8

Ambassador Jessup began by stating that both he and the Bangkok Conference of Chiefs of Mission were in agreement with the Department’s report to the National Security Council (No. 64 of February 27)⁹ which held that all measures should be taken to prevent Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. The United Kingdom representatives consulted are also in accord with this view. He considered that Indochina is the key to the situation and that Southeast Asia is in balance. A situation comparably critical exists in the subcontinent. The danger of a war between India and Pakistan is very real. (Ambassador Jessup observed that Afghanistan is in a class by itself as is also Ceylon, and he therefore felt it well to omit them from discussion.) Among the other areas Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Malaya and Indonesia are to be considered less critical spots but are not to be neglected.

Recalling that he had visited 14 Asian countries, Ambassador Jessup emphasized that it would be a mistake to dwell exclusively upon China which has a population of 400 million as against 700 million in the other countries of the East.

Ambassador Jessup had found a situation of actual war existing in many areas. In Korea, Indochina, Malaya and Burma the war was a hot war. In the sub-continent the situation is one of near war, while violence is retarding recovery in the Philippines and Indonesia.

Ambassador Jessup said that in characterizing the problems confronting us in the East he would speak first of the difficulties that we have to overcome, which he enumerated under the heading “The Weaknesses of Our ‘Friends’ as follows:

1. The non-democratic character of governments in the area. Rhee¹⁰ is about as bad in this respect as anyone we have had to deal with as was demonstrated by his recent arrest of certain Korean assemblymen and his threats to others. Thailand in the eyes of other Asians is under the control of a completely autocratic, feudal aristocracy. In Burma, although Premier Thakin Nu holds the people together the actual power is exercised by General Ne Win.¹¹ In India, Patel¹² runs the security machinery with a stern hand although the reputation of the Indian Government is not thereby affected. For example, when Communists arrested by the Indian Government were about to be released for lack of specific charges against them, Patel rushed through a bill suspending the right of habeas corpus in order to keep them in prison.

2. Lack of trained personnel. In Korea, for example, there is no substitute for Rhee. In Indochina Bao Dai’s Government would be deficient in competent personnel even if all elements rallied to his side. The Indonesian Cabinet contains men of high caliber, and while there are many capable administrators on the lower levels in Indonesia, the middle ranks are weak. Both the Indonesians and the Burmese are unable to administer businesses, and Burma is in addition notably lacking in trained personnel.

3. Corruption and inefficiency. This weakness is conspicuous in the Philippines. Ambassador Jessup observed that the Secretary’s observations on this subject in his Press Club speech were very mild.

4. Economic and financial difficulties. While a cause of basic distress, these difficulties had been given too great prominence by the poverty of India and China. The plight of the Indians is terrible. However, this is not true of the rest of Asia. There is some shortage of food in Japan. In Burma the problem is not endemic but is an outcome of the war. With regard to the problem of land tenure, good progress has been made in Japan, Korea and Okinawa. The Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction has done excellent work in Formosa. In Burma a solution of the problem awaits a settlement of the civil war. In Malaya the problem is connected with large plantation holdings such as the rubber estates. There is some distress in Pakistan about which it is not possible to do very much at present. Only in India does this problem offer a very fruitful ground for propaganda. Elsewhere it is to be doubted that great capital is to be made of it. The situation facing the peasant in most of Asia outside India and China is not so bad from his point of view although he is beginning to be roused. For the rest there are general financial and economic difficulties in the area. In Korea there is the problem of inflation. The financial difficulties of the Philippines are our own fault to the extent that American money was poured into the country without regulation. As an illustration of the results, Ambassador Jessup cited the market stalls at Baguio crammed with American luxuries. Indochina is fundamentally extremely rich. Indonesia faces serious financial difficulties but the outlook is hopeful. The granting of the Export-Import Bank credit was an excellent move. The general economic problem facing Burma is serious but the Commonwealth loan should help. With regard to Pakistan, an IBRD representative whom Ambassador Jessup had met in Karachi took a very dismal view of prospects owing to the trade war between Pakistan and India. He had reported that 500,000 tons of wheat was spoiling in Pakistan and that cotton and jute were piling up. In Pakistan and also in Indonesia and Burma, military expenditures are at the root of the economic troubles.

5. Military weaknesses in meeting Communist guerillas. The situation in Korea is improving owing to our efforts. However, the Republic requires anti-aircraft guns and planes, having nothing new with which it could meet an air attack from the north. The situation in Indochina is obvious, Ambassador Jessup observed, as it is also in Burma. In the latter country the Government is making progress against the Karens but refuses to come to a political settlement, recalling Generalissimo Chiang’s attitude in this respect. In Thailand the danger is potential. The nation is weak and will not attempt to stand up against Communist aggression.

6. Asian psychological attitudes. Both Pignon, the French High Commissioner for Indochina, and MacDonald, Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, believe that the Asians are inclined by their psychology to wait and see who is winning. The bandwagon attitude will be more important than questions of ideology in determining their decisions.

7. Local Communist strength. The overseas Chinese communities form one of the most important elements in the strength of the Communists in Asia. The Communists are able to work on these communities without encountering resistance by employing the threat of reprisals against the relatives in China of members of the communities. Chiang Kai-shek had expressed to Ambassador Jessup the opinion that nothing could be done about this situation. In Japan there is a potential danger of an increase in Communist strength. The other countries of the East either have a common border with China or else have strong local Chinese communities. Korea not only has a frontier problem but faces the danger that Rhee’s policies will produce Communism within the country.

8. Distrust of the West. The outstanding example is the feeling against the French in Indochina. Anti-western sentiment is not important in Malaya although the Malays bear a grudge against the British. In Burma there is not much anti-American sentiment but the country is at odds with the British. In India there is general distrust of the West and the Indian press is generally anti-American.

9. Lack of coordination among the western powers. The differences between the US and UK on recognition of Communist China are not understood in Asia. In addition there is lack of coordination between the US and the UK on one hand and the French on the other as to the moves to be made in Indochina. While in general the Indonesians are working surprisingly well with the Dutch, a hard core of Dutch colonial thinking remains which must be watched. The Westerling affair¹³ is a case in point. On the sub-continent the US is working well with the UK and France. Now that the new Kashmir resolution has been passed we should all try to help in the economic situation of the sub-continent and in the difficulties in Bengal. The French colonies in India are a source of mistrust between the Indians and the French. With respect to Japan, it is important that the position of the Western powers on a peace treaty be quickly solidified. In regard to Asia in general, it is necessary that the Western powers pool their resources. We ourselves are in a position to work well with the others but are not altogether doing so. The French requests for assistance in Indochina afford a chance for cooperation. With respect to aid to Burma, it would appear that the Burmese are attempting to play the US off against the UK. In addition to pooling our resources a great deal needs to be done in uniting Western efforts on the propaganda front. In particular the French are failing to put over their viewpoint on Indophina and Asia. They are conspicuously lacking in a sense of public relations. On the military side more use must be made of the skills in counter-guerrilla tactics that we acquired during the recent war. The French in Indochina are making somewhat the same mistakes that the British General Braddock made in the French and Indian Wars. In Malaya the British are now fighting the Chinese Communists whom they had trained and equipped for guerrilla warfare during the Japanese occupation. We are not pooling our skills as we did during the war. Ambassador Jessup raised the question whether the Philippine Scouts could be used in Indochina.

Ambassador Jessup had found no enthusiasm whatsoever for a Southeast Asian Union and does not believe that a regional pact is a very important subject.

Having concluded his itemization of the weaknesses of our friends, Ambassador Jessup then took up the credit side of the ledger, i.e., the strength of our friends in Asia, which he enumerated as follows:

1. Democratic progress. Progress in democratic methods has been achieved in Japan and in the Philippines. In Malaya the British have put on a good demonstration of democratic progress. An important and useful role is being played in India and Pakistan by officials trained under the British.

2. Economic potential. Food surpluses, actual or potential, exist in Korea, the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Burma and Pakistan. In addition, many of the countries of the area have other resources to contribute.

3. Military strength. Our forces in Japan and Okinawa, our bases in the Philippines, the French army in Indochina, the British forces in Hong Kong and Malaya, and the trained armies in India and Pakistan are all assets in the area.

4. Anti-Communist feeling. Anti-Communist feeling is strong in Japan, strong and intense in Korea, very considerable in the Philippines, considerable in Malaya (where it is combined with anti-Chinese sentiment), fairly considerable in Indonesia, existent to a certain extent in Burma, considerable in Thailand and also existent in India and Pakistan. Such feeling has a religious basis among Buddhists, Moslems, and Catholics. This factor should be kept in mind, especially in Indochina where the Catholics form an important element. (Mr. Butterworth interpolated that the strength of Communist sentiment in the overseas Chinese communities will be affected to an important degree by conditions in China. He recalled that the recent railway strike in Hong Kong had failed after some of the striking employees had visited Canton and observed the very unpleasant situation existing there.)

5. Pro-American sentiment. The US has had a good build-up in Japan. Pro-American feeling is very strong in Korea, is continuing in the Philippines, exists definitely in Indonesia and Thailand, is rather strong in Burma and is fairly considerable in Pakistan. At the same time, anti-Chinese sentiment or a fear of China is present. Between Indochina and China hostility is traditional and is perhaps being intensified by the propaganda emanating from the Peiping radio, which advances Chinese claims to a protective interest over Indochina—in effect a manifest destiny. The Malays are strongly anti-Chinese. Indonesians fear and dislike the Chinese and were prone during recent disorders to pillage and kill them. In Thailand where the Chinese minority is feared and possible Chinese movements into Indochina and Burma are regarded with apprehension, the feeling against the Chinese is very strong. The Burmese take a dim view of the Chinese Communist movement to liberate Tibet, fearing that Burma may find itself in the same category. Nepal is extremely concerned over the threat to Tibet, and India is concerned to the extent of considering supplying the Tibetans with some quantity of arms. By exploiting indigenous fear of the Chinese in Asia we can gain a momentary advantage but it is less clear what the effect would be 20 years hence.

Ambassador Jessup next considered the prospect of Western coordination in Asia. With regard to the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers in May,¹⁴ Mr. Schuman in a conversation with Ambassador Jessup had cited Bevin’s sensitivity on Far Eastern matters owing to British relations with the Commonwealth.¹⁵ Mr. Butterworth observed that the British consider that the French are pressing for Western solidarity in respect to the Far East and are using the technique of leaks to the press to force a US declaration on the subject. The British, he pursued, are embarrassed, having been pleased by the tensile strength of the Commonwealth demonstrated at the Colombo Conference, which they would not wish to see jeopardized.

Ambassador Jessup next considered the question of appointing a US official for the area who would in a sense be an opposite number to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. He recalled that Messrs. Case and Fosdick and he were strongly in favor of such a step. MacDonald had urged in Singapore that we have such an official who could deal with him. MacDonald had observed that Consul General Langdon in Singapore is geared into the work of his office and is a good official but is unable to speak for the United States with respect to the whole area. Ambassador Jessup recalled, however, that the Bangkok Conference had been unanimously against him in this matter. The Conference had instead considered that a regional office of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development might be set up. The Conference believed that the local governments would rely heavily upon such an office which through its ability to offer unpalatable advice would be very useful in the area.

With respect to possible actions we might take, Ambassador Jessup observed that no single plan is possible since the sub-continent must be considered separately. He then took up the following specific matters:

1. A Japanese peace treaty is of prime importance and we should move on the matter as soon as possible. General MacArthur supports the Department’s line. Admiral Toyoda had told Ambassador Jessup that there must be American bases in Japan. The position of the Occupation is all right today but will become more unsatisfactory as time passes. Ambassador Jessup reported that Nehru had expressed to him the view that maintenance of US troops in Japan would be acceptable if agreed to by the Japanese.

2. With regard to a settlement in the sub-continent Ambassador Henderson is doing everything possible. A settlement is so vital that all our efforts are justified. In this connection Ambassador Jessup touched on the matter of the balance of power in Asia and the question whether India or Japan should be built up. The Bangkok Conference had concluded that it would be a mistake to build up India. For one thing, trouble with Pakistan would result.

3. On the subject of China, Ambassador Jessup said that he had little to say since he did not visit the country. As for Formosa, Ambassador Jessup considered that the reports being received are in general accurate. Mistrust and backbiting are continuing under the Generalissimo. General Sun Li-jen¹⁶ is in a pocket. He states that he has no authority over the air force and navy and has no one at “court” to espouse his cause. There is a great deal of bitterness among the Formosans towards the Chinese, but the independence movement means little in terms of action. Touching on the second thoughts of the governments which have recognized the Peiping regime, Ambassador Jessup recalled that the Governor General of Hong Kong had said that things had not worked out as well as had been hoped. MacDonald had confessed that difficulties had resulted in Southeast Asia. Officials in Rangoon had been miffed by the original Chinese Communist rebuff. In New Delhi Bajpai¹⁷ had said that little progress in the development of relations was taking place and did not appear very happy about the situation. Liaquat Ali Khan in Karachi had stated that the Chinese Communist reply to Pakistan’s overture was not considered a rebuff but that nothing was developing. Dening in the British Foreign Office thought that events were proceeding but had little evidence at present of any progress. Ambassador Jessup concluded that there was general disillusionment among the governments which had recognized the Peiping regime.

4. The movement towards some form of Asian association was considered by the Bangkok Conference to show no signs of strength but Prime Minister Phibun of Thailand had expressed the view that occasional meetings of the Southeast Asian Prime Ministers would be useful. Prime Minister Thakin Nu of Burma had spoken in favor of close relations among his country, Pakistan, India and Ceylon. No other Southeast Asian leaders had exhibited any enthusiasm at all for any form of association.

(At this point it was brought out that a heated discussion had taken place in the Bangkok Conference on the desirability of our drawing a military line in Indochina. The participants were split on the question of what the United States should do in the event of the Chinese Communists’ invading the country, some foreseeing that active intervention on our part would lead to the third world war. The desirability of a statement on the subject by the United States Government was considered. Mr. Butterworth observed that we have called upon the Department of Defense for an estimate.)¹⁸

5. With regard to Point Four, Ambassador Jessup had found an encouraging amount of understanding on the part of the Southeast Asian governments which foresee real benefits accruing to their countries. Projects capable of producing a quick psychological effect as well as those designed to attain long-range results are both desirable in the view of the Bangkok Conference. The Conference considered that supervision would present difficulties. Sukarno,¹⁹ who had talked to him after visiting Nehru, stressed the sensitivity of the Asians and opposed administration of the programs by the United States. Nehru’s opinion was that we should help but not attempt to exert control. He recognized that we should have to see that the funds were effectively employed and thought that great tact on our part would be required. Ambassador Jessup regarded the question of attaching strings and conditions as an important one. He had been impressed by the work of the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction and recommended that it be taken as a pattern. Training in government administration would be a good field for Point Four technical assistance. It would be important, for example, for us to help with problems of tax collection. We must make sure that our efforts are unified. Our posts in the field are baffled by the multiplicity of missions which had been arriving. Moreover, large missions excite local suspicions. In some countries a 40-man mission would be regarded as tantamount to an invasion. Ambassador Jessup had received the impression that there are many people running around and very little is happening. We should recognize both the difficulty and the importance of obtaining qualified personnel for technical missions. Ambassador Jessup found that Japanese personnel would be generally welcomed outside of Korea, Malaya and the Philippines.

Mr. Thorp raised the question of what use we could make of the United Nations in the field of technical assistance. Mr. Butterworth commented that the IBRD should prove especially useful since the governments in the East would take advice from it which they would resent coming from us.

6. Ambassador Jessup considered that we are weak on propaganda. He raised the question of whom we are trying to reach and recommended that more thought be given to methods of reaching our audience and to the themes we are trying to put across. The story of the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction should certainly be told and could be very effective. Representatives of American labor like Jim Carey²⁰ should be sent to the Far East. While in Karachi Ambassador Jessup had found the bookstalls filled with Communist literature. There were few American books and these were high-priced. Mr. Fosdick interpolated that he had found that there was a restriction on second class mail to China under a post office regulation of November 4, 1949. Mr. Butterworth suggested that Communist China had probably refused to meet its obligations under the International Postal Union. Ambassador Jessup stated that the way must be found to solve this problem.

7. As a final point Ambassador Jessup brought up the problem of coordination among United States agencies. This is especially important with respect to the Departments of State and Defense. He noted in this connection that some of our air attachés feel that they must fly around the area to show the flag after the manner of the Navy, but are unaware of the construction that may be put upon some of their activities.

In conclusion Ambassador Jessup offered the view that the situation in the East is bad but not desperate. The area cannot be written off. We are committed. Burma and Indochina are key points. Indian-Pakistan relations are a critical point. Short-range efforts on our part are indicated but must be fitted into an over-all plan. Much depends upon the situation in China of which a careful estimate is required. The Southeast Asian governments are not encouraged by developments in Peiping and the Peiping government itself is in difficulties.

In reply to a question from the Secretary with respect to the outlook for Formosa, Ambassador Jessup offered the opinion that if the Generalissimo is content to hold the present position, to stop the bombing, and to call off the blockade, the national government could hold out on Formosa much longer than would otherwise be the case. These activities are doubtless designed to assist the Nationalist lobby here in the United States. While the Chinese Nationalist air force is fairly efficient, our military attachés say that the armed forces are not very good. Sun Li-jen had indicated to Ambassador Jessup that there are far too many troops and that he cannot equip them. For example, many of the pill-boxes which have been constructed are without machine guns. The situation on Formosa is much like what it used to be on the mainland, with the subordinates not knowing what cards the Generalissimo holds. While doubting that there will be a turnover to the Communists on the island unless an important figure in the National government defects with his troops, Ambassador Jessup considered that Chiang could never pull the Chinese together, and observed that in the universal Asian view Chiang is discredited.

1. From December 15, 1949, to March 15, 1950, Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup conducted a 14-nation fact-finding tour of the Far East. For the text of his radio address reporting on the trip, April 13, 1950, see Department of State Bulletin, April 24, 1950, pp. 627–630. Documentation on Jessup’s visits to Japan, Formosa, Indochina, Indonesia, and Burma appears in bilateral compilations in the present volume. For documentation on the portions of his trip spent in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, see bilateral compilations in volume v . Regarding his visit to Korea, see volume vii .
5. Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
6. Philip D. Sprouse, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.
2. George F. Kennan, Counselor of the Department Of State.
3. Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
4. Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
7. Everett Case, President of Colgate University; consultant to the Secretary of State on Far Eastern policy.
8. Raymond Bland Fosdick, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation; consultant to the Secretary of State on Far Eastern policy.
9. For the text of NSC 64, February 27, 1950, see p. 744.
10. Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea.
11. Deputy Prime Minister of Burma.
12. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Deputy Prime Minister of India; Minister of States and Home Affairs.
13. See footnote 3, p. 969.
14. Documentation on the London Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, May 11–13, 1950, is scheduled for publication in volume iii .
15. For the memorandum of Ambassador Jessup’s conversation with Foreign Minister Schuman in Paris on March 13, see p. 754.
16. Commander in Chief, Taiwan Defense Headquarters; Commander in Chief of the ground forces of the Republic of China.
17. Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General, Indian Department of External Affairs.
18. See memorandum by Deputy Under Secretary of State Rusk to Maj. Gen. James H. Burns (ret.), Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, March 7. p. 752.
19. President of the United States of Indonesia.
20. James B. Carey, president of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, Congress of Industrial Organization.