611.94A/8–1850: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State
273. Eyes only Rusk from Rankin. Deptel 144, August 14 received only yesterday and as yet I have not discussed contents with Barrett and Moyer. Distribution being limited to them and Strong.
Following is therefore initial reaction to be supplemented as necessary after further consideration here:
Part I on interim policy seems to me practically unexceptionable and sufficiently comprehensive. This comment based on assumption that text in reftel for highly restricted distribution during foreseeable future and not to be given to press or allowed to leak without detailed reconsideration. I should appreciate opportunity to comment, in advance of publication, on any important statements to be made.
Part II on long-range policy necessarily leaves something to be desired. Undoubtedly you are fully aware of inherent weaknesses in our position but I venture mention certain considerations which also have important bearing on interim problems. NSC decided sometime ago Formosa could not be held without use of American ground forces which decision served as basis for adoption passive US military policy. [Page 444] Whether or not that decision entirely justified it recognized necessity of more effective aid than we now prepared to give and implied longer term policy than we have so far adopted. May be questioned whether long-range policy described reftel is adequate to encourage Chinese Nationalist forces to fight effectively in event Communist landings on Formosa and to refrain from turnover in response initial Communist successes. Without US ground forces our position evidently much more dependent on behavior Nationalist forces. But proposed long-range policy could be taken by Chinese Nationalists to indicate our intention help them militarily only for few months until Korean affair settled and Japanese treaty negotiated; then feel ourselves free to recognize Communists and let them cut throats of military and political leaders on Formosa who had collaborated with us. Desirability more positive and comprehensive long-range policy at earliest possible moment seems obvious.
Part III on official responsibilities would be greatly improved by inclusion two sentences somewhat as follows: “The chiefs of the diplomatic mission, the ECA mission and the military liaison group shall keep each other fully and currently informed on all significant political, economic and military matters in order that there may be the closest coordination of all US activities on Formosa. While the three chiefs should not burden each other with unnecesarily detailed information, there shall be in principle no secrets between them.” While I anticipate no difficulties whatever with ECA, instructions in reftel could be interpreted by military as allowing them to tell us practically nothing as has been practice to date. Meanwhile they are in position take steps of greater actual political effect than anything Embassy likely to be authorized carry out. Examples are MacArthur’s visit, daily flights of USAF jets over Taipei, presence of two US major generals and staffs from Japan and Philippines and constant coming and going other general officers most of whom Embassy hears about only by accident. [Rankin.]