794A.00/8–1650: Telegram
The Department of State to the Embassy in India
257. Eyes only Henderson, ReDeptel 115 July 25,1 it is suggested that at ur discretion you now take opportunity discuss with Bajpai question Formosa, with primary design ascertain probable Indian reactions to possible clash Amer and Chi Commie forces in event offensive action being launched by Commies against Formosa. Suggest fol line thought:
US of course most desirous avoiding extension present conflict even as is Bajpai himself (as for instance as reported Embtel 95 July 15).2 Amer action June 27 respecting Formosa was taken purely for reasons mil expediency and was without regard polit future island. Decision whether hostilities Korea are to be localized or will spread southward rests solely with Chi Commies, who will presumably be under pressure [Page 442] Moscow this connection. US itself will of course not undertake enlargement field hostilities Asia or elsewhere, but if Chi commies initiate overtly hostile action in any of Asian danger points, US wld of course be compelled react in appropriate manner. Action wld be with full intent localizing conflict, but as indicated in Emb reftel Indian leaders wld agree further aggravation present situation exceedingly dangerous.
Presumably Chi Commies who have to date refrained from overt participation Korean conflict will continue to do so. If they choose intervene, matter is one for consideration UN. Manner of retaliation against any such overt intervention by Chi Commies by extension hostilities over Korean border into China wld presumably be one for mil consideration under UN mandate. If Chi Commies were to launch hostile action against Formosa while we are engaged in supporting UN action in Korea and thus involve US fleet in hostilities, US wld again first seek localization action, but if Commies undertook intensify and enlarge hostilities we shld even as in Korea be compelled, though against our basic desires, carry retaliatory action to sources from which blows against us stemmed.
If Peiping acts as Commie cat’s-paw for extension of mil aggression, it can finally only bring grave damage upon itself, for any mil adventurism by Chi Commies outside their frontiers wld lead inevitably to aggravation internatl conflict now smouldering and ultimately bring in its train destruction China rail, water and highway communications, transportation system and meager industrial base Chi economy. China wld thus be pushed further back to level peasant society and its progress toward modernization be set back decade or more. History Sino-Amer relations past century shows clearly Amer desire is to foster econ progress and social well being China as a nation, but if Commies take up the sword they must be prepared accept consequences.
Same considerations wld be effective and same situation prevail in other danger points around China periphery. Interest US in maintenance stability Philippines well known Indian Govt. Indian Govt itself likewise presumably interested maintenance stability Tibet and Burma (see Rangoon’s 34 July 21 to Dept pouched New Delhi).3 This Govt also concerned with any threat to stability those two areas, but feels India’s interest there paramount and wld appreciate receiving expression current Indian estimate existing situation. Amer interest in maintenance stability Far East is conceived as being parallel to Indian interest and our desire is for mutual understanding and close coordination in so far as possible respecting overall problem. US desirous contributing if possible to econ advancement Asia, not to see econ progress retarded by war. US desires give fullest consideration [Page 443] Indian views on subj and moreover believes that frank exchange views re problems common US and Indian Govts wld be of great usefulness for overall aim of prevention extension present hostilities.
Above shld be used only as suggestive guide for conversation which, as indicated above, you wld undertake only at ur discretion and wld mould with due concern sensibilities Indian leaders. It is specifically suggested you not seek special occasion for this approach but allow it to come up informally and not as “instructions”. At this time chief aim wld be obtaining from such discussion good indication re Indian thinking on problem in point. For urinfo however you shld not be restrained in ur discussion by consideration that substance conversation might be transmitted Pannikar at Peiping and even through that channel leak to Chi Commies there. In fact Dept feels such leak might have salutary effect on situation, particularly if North Korean aggressors sustain mil set-back near future.
Urgency matter in point indicated by feeling Dept there is strong possibility Chi Commies launching attack on Formosa during Aug, whether or not aggressors Korean campaign continue advance.
Pls report urgently Dept any adverse reaction you may have this project.
- For the text of this message, see vol. vii, p. 466.↩
- Text ibid., p. 391.↩
- Not printed.↩