882.25/1–1251: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
priority
422. 1. By way of comment on first paragraph Deptel 318 December 19 General Arnold and I have never believed Turks were dragging their feet but rather, as reported in last sentence Embtel 326, December 1, felt that move should come from our side.
2. On December 14 Turkish and US military experts had full discussion Bosporus defense problems. On subordinate question of controlled mines US experts calculated 18 months for completion project. Turk Chief of Staff undertook solicit government approval for laying minefield leaving 200 yard gap for ship channel.
3. On December 23 I asked Minister National Defense let me have at least indication Turkish Government thinking on subject before arrival Admiral Carney January 10.
[Page 1354]4. On January 10, when calling with Admiral Minister informed me question had two aspects: Military and politcal. On military side there was full agreement on desirability lay mines. For exposition political considerations he asked me call on Foreign Minister.
5. On January 11 I called on Foreign Minister who said governments primary political interest in matter was that such action as it might take be irrefutably correct and consistent with its obligations under Montreux Convention. British aide-mémoire1 he said was definitely, perhaps intentionally equivocal; and Great Britain was signatory of that convention. He felt this aspect should be forth-rightly cleared up by British; but, in view my inquiry of Minister National Defense and favorable recommendation general staff, he would submit matter to next cabinet meeting.
6. I then asked Foreign Minister his view re probable Soviet reaction if project implemented (second paragraph Deptel 318 December 19). He replied that Moscow might be expected charge violation Montreux Convention with view to reopening question its revision. That was, he concluded, strong reason “for being sure we are clearly in the right”.
Embassy believes, if project pushed by US, that Turkish Government might well exploit any resulting Soviet hostility to urge need for US security commitment (re Deptel 339, January 8).2
Further comment by despatch.3
Dept pass Moscow its discretion.
- Dated June 19; enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Despatch 385, January 17, 1951, from Ankara reported that Faik Zihni Akdur, Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “has advised Foreign Minister Köprülü to ‘go slow’ on the project for mining the Straits. … Further … he has advised his Government to prepare the necessary groundwork and installations, to train the personnel required, and to stock mines in Turkey for eventual use. He believes that mines should not be laid before ‘zero hour’, and that, when the decision to lay the mines is taken, no announcement should be made. … he feels that the Russians are now more nervous than many people realize, and might easily go off half-cocked if faced with a confused pattern of tensions which they have not expected nor prepared for. For the moment, until the Far Eastern crisis has evolved into something more predictable, we would be well advised, he thinks, to refrain from any action which might produce a potentially discordant note.” (681.8229/1–1751)↩