Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

Ankara Embassy Piles: Lot 57F72: Turkish Airfields 1950

Memorandum by the Special Assistant, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (Oden)

top secret

Ankara, 28 December 1950.

Subject: World Situation

1. A conference was held in General Yamut’s conference room at 1015 hours, 23 December 1950. Present were:

Minister of National Defense, Mr. Refik Sebket Ince	U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Wadsworth
General Yamut	Major General Arnold
Lt Gen Egeli	Lt Colonel Oden
Admiral Uluson
Lt Col Hayri Saner

2. The conference opened with General Egeli summarizing his visit to Washington. While there, he met General Bradley, Air Marshal Tedder¹ and General Eli.² At his first talk with General Bradley, he was informed that the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean had not been discussed by the Standing Group, but that it would be discussed shortly and that they would inform him on the 3rd of November as to the outcome of their conference. Due to other urgent meetings of the Standing Group, however, he had no opportunity to see General Bradley again until the 13th of November. At a conference with the French General Eli, General Egeli was briefed on the organization of the North Atlantic Pact. He was told that the Eastern Mediterranean problem could not be discussed until the Turkish security system had been investigated and found secure. General Eli said that the Russians are buying the same coding equipment from Sweden that the Turks buy, that a new ciphering machine was being made in the United States and that perhaps the Turks could be furnished some of these machines. In any event, before the Turks are brought into any discussions of a military nature their entire security system must be investigated by a small party of investigators who in turn should be invited by the Turkish Government to come to Turkey to conduct this investigation. This investigating team should be invited through diplomatic channels. The Minister of National Defense has written the Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting him to invite such an investigation team to Turkey. The Foreign Minister will extend this invitation through the Turkish Ambassador in Washington.

3. The day after General Egeli had talked with General Eli, General Bradley and Air Marshal Tedder both desired to see him. During discussions with these officers, they implied that General Eli had no business discussing the Eastern Mediterranean with General Egeli, that it was not a problem for the Standing Group as such. Of the NATO countries only Great Britain and the United States have an interest in the Eastern Mediterranean. General Egeli was then informed that the defense of this area must first be discussed by Generals Arnold, Tate,³ Evans⁴ and Admiral Carney. Following the exchange of views by those officers, they will in turn discuss the problem with the British Commander in the Middle East to prepare the way for a full discussion with Turkish authorities. General Bradley told General Egeli that Italy is the bordering state of NATO and that the area east thereof must be considered separately. He said that defense of this area must be discussed by the U.S., Great Britain and Turkish authorities and should be separate from NATO. At that time, General Bradley had issued no instructions to representatives in the interested countries but promised to do so shortly.

4. General Arnold informed the conferees that except for brief discussions with Admiral Carney, conferences indicated necessary by General Bradley had not been held. Even in the discussions with Admiral Carney, only concrete facts pertaining to Turkey proper were mentioned. Mr. Wadsworth said that no overall discussions of the Eastern Mediterranean as such have been held by Admiral Carney, that he is calling in the key people separately, such as General Arnold, General Evans, General Jenkins⁵ and Admiral Ballentine⁶ prior to touring the area in person. The Ambassador stated that he assumed that the Turkish conferences knew that Admiral Carney would be in Turkey from the 10th to the 14th of January. General Arnold said that while in London he gave Admiral Carney his estimate of Turkish capabilities and informed him of their needs. He also told the Admiral that the Turks are striving for maximum readiness by 1 May 1951, that present disposition of Turkish Armed Forces are generally as we feel they should be disposed. Admiral Carney told him that he would hold a conference with General Arnold, General Evans, General Tate and the British Commander in the Middle East, probably around February; exactly where and when was not indicated. General Arnold also told Admiral Carney that General Yamut had informed him that it was absolutely essential that the Abadahn-Suez areas and Cyprus be secured; that that security should not wait but should be accomplished before these areas are taken. General Arnold also informed Admiral Carney that the plans of the Turkish Armed Forces, insofar as known to him, are in conformance with the JCS desires for this area. They will fight a delaying action in Thrace as long, as possible without getting too many forces committed in Europe. “When they have to withdraw to the Asiatic side they will defend to the best of their ability in the mountains of Northwest Turkey, fighting successive delaying actions and inflicting maximum casualties back to the Iskenderun area. Likewise, they pose a threat to the flank of any enemy moving south through Iran. If the Russians attack from the East, the Turks will withdraw and delay back to the Iskenderun area. As a consequence, General Arnold stressed the absolute necessity of building the Iskenderun area as a port. He was asked his opinion of Iran, but informed Admiral Carney that he had little knowledge of that country and thought it best that General Evans brief him thereon. He also told Admiral Carney that as of now our capabilities are not as great as they will be 1 May. Every additional month we are in a better position to meet the enemy. If all goes well by Spring, Russia will have to use sizable forces to effect a quick victory in Turkey, and Turkish dispositions on the Eastern Front will force Russia to deploy much greater forces than she would have to normally prior to moving south toward the oil fields. Admiral Carney was also informed of our anxiety regarding the Bosporus and of our efforts to strengthen it. The Admiral was pleased with that information and indicated that he has a very high regard for the Turk Armed Forces and the Turkish people.

5. In General Egeli’s conference with Air Marshal Tedder, the Marshal informed him that the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean had not been discussed by the Standing Group, that that area is a British and US concern, and for that reason the US and Britain will take up the problem outside of the Standing Group. He said that the Turkish authorities will be approached on this problem by the US and Great Britain and that the problem must be taken up as soon as possible following the conference of the American and British officers as indicated by General Bradley. Marshal Tedder told him the reason for British and US officers meeting together prior to discussion with the Turks is because most of them are new to their areas. Marshal Tedder was anxious about the situation in Egypt. He expressed the importance of the Suez Canal in supplying the Middle East area and asked what Turkey could do to appease Egypt. General Egeli promised to convey his message to the diplomatic authorities in Turkey.

6. General Yamut then discussed Mediterranean Geopolitics from the military point of view. He indicated that if he were incorrect in his views, he desired the U.S. Ambassador and the Minister of National Defense to correct him. General Yamut said that every country that borders the Eastern Mediterranean has its own ideas of the defense of that part of the Sea which is contiguous to it. This area, however, must have an integrated defense plan, but such has not been discussed as yet. Starting with the World situation, General Yamut said that there are two blocs today, the Democratic and the Communistic. The leaders of the Democratic bloc are the US, Great Britain and France. The bloc leaders must trust each other and have mutual plans which enable the remaining countries in the Democratic bloc to rely on them. The Communistic bloc, of course, is controlled by one command. Actually, there is no Korean question and no Chinese question. There is only one problem to be considered and that is world communism. Some countries in the world that need material and moral help, consider themselves helpless and in a vacuum. In needy and backward countries, communist agents are unnecessary. The neediness creates the turmoil desired by the communists. The Mediterranean is a sea that enables countries to receive aid. Countries bordering that sea are bound together and are an ethnic bloc.

The passages through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles are one entrance to the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal considered together with Aden is another passage, and the third passage is Gibraltar, with Spain and Africa as the hinterlands thereof. If the passages cannot be defended together with their adjacent areas, the defenses are weak. It is necessary for Great Britain to consider the hinterlands in that area in the defense of Gibraltar. Reported Spanish claims to Gibraltar cause General Yamut anxiety.

France has a coast along the Mediterranean, is not only a member of NATO but considers herself the key to NATO. As such, her main interest must center there. Italy is a purely Mediterranean country due to geography. The military strength of Italy and her role in future defense problems is the concern of NATO. Yugoslavia and Albania must be considered together. From the Democratic bloc viewpoint, the security of these two countries is important and the Democratic bloc must control them.

Like Italy, Greece is a complete Mediterranean country. Scarcity of natural resources and materials, however, make Greece of no value in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean without outside aid; this despite the Greeks’ goodwill. General Yamut said we all know the Turkish situation.

The Arab countries must be considered in regard to both the Mediterranean problem as well as the defense of Turkey. These countries form the hinterland for the easternmost coasts of the Mediterranean, but they change color with events. The security of Turkey and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean demands serious consideration of this area as far east as half-way into Iran. If the security of these countries is not guaranteed, they form a vacuum in defense plans. We must establish security in this area now.

We can expect movement of communist forces at any time, south into India through Nepal. The Baku area in Russia supplies fuel for the motorized units of the Russian Army, and as a consequence, is vital to Russia. Loss of this area would paralyze Russia. Consequently, the Kurds, under communist direction, may assist in seizure of Azerbaijan area to provide Russia a buffer state south of this vital area. Also, Iraqian and Syrian Kurds may seize the area in the vicinity of the Mosul oil fields.

Mr. Wadsworth inquired if General Yamut thought that the Turkish Kurds would participate in such seizure. General Yamut informed him that a small number near the border areas may participate, but for the most part those who did would be relatives of the Syrian and Iraqian Kurds, but even if they did, the number participating would be of no significance and are a Turkish problem.

Egypt causes General Yamut anxiety as it does Marshal Tedder. Egypt must be considered in the Eastern Mediterranean defense problem. Left to itself, Egypt would see turmoil and uprisings. Bengazi and Tripolitania are stable countries whose people are reliable as fighters. When these two countries were part of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks considered the recruits from there separately from those of Egypt and treated them entirely differently. The people of Bengazi and Tripolitania have strong character and have always been friendly to Turkey. Their troops are most effective and their officers are excellent. Tunis, Algiers and Sfax, under control of the French, are unreliable.

When the Greek Chief of Staff was here, General Yamut told him that Turkey and Greece should be considered as a whole from geographical and historical points of view. Due to the fact that the two countries are separated by the Aegean Sea, they can help each other at this time only by praying. Neither Greece nor Turkey can stop a concerted attack from Bulgaria on Grecian Thrace. Main Turkish, forces must be concentrated on the Anatolian side of the Straits. Neither can Greece maintain its forces in Grecian Thrace. General Yamut again talked to the Greek Chief of Staff before he left and told him that Turkey and Greece must be considered as one country as their destinies are bound together. Both Turkey and Greece are strong fortresses. Together they will make one very strong fortress. They must, however, complete arming and establish strong communications across the Aegean between the two countries. The fortress will be provided by Greece and Turkey, but the equipment, arms and required communications must be furnished by their strong allies. As strong as this mutual fortress will be, there is a weak wall on the Bulgarian frontier. A strong aggressive force, in one step, can reach Salonika. Furthermore, unless Yugoslavia is secured by the Democratic bloc, her frontiers with Greece must be considered weak. If Yugoslavia is secured, then Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey form the strongest defense force in the Eastern Mediterranean. The armies of these three countries have been tested often in the past. Against such a bloc, a Bulgarian or a Bulgarian-Roumanian attack will be of no significance. Security of Yugoslavia’s borders permits us to ignore Albania. Cyprus and Crete are included in the fortress. From naval and air force supply points of view, Crete and Cyprus are the most secure bases in the area.

If Yugoslavia is secured, the three countries can produce a force of 50 to 60 divisions, more than all the NATO countries can produce at the moment. If the German Army can be utilized, the Democratic front will extend north from Yugoslavia’s eastern border to the Baltic. In that case, a balance of power between the Democratic and Communist blocs can be established in Europe. General Yamut said he knew the Germans well and has worked closely with them in the past. Seventy million Germans, armed or not armed, will eventually need room for expansion. If this population is confined, it will cause another explosion. If the Germans study the lessons of the past, they will try to expand to the East, not to the West. If armed now, the Germans will be of great use.

7. General Yamut said that the principal requirements for Turkey are being, and have been for some time, discussed by General Arnold and himself. Major requirements of the Turkish Army are for animals and tractors to move artillery, ammunition for arms of Turkish origin, assistance in manufacturing this type of ammunition or the need for replacement of those weapons. General Arnold told General Yamut then that we are requesting 3,000 light machine guns from the US and some equipment for the manufacture of .30 caliber ammunition. The light machine guns are being procured in the 1951 Program. Standardization of small arms was discussed, General Yamut feels that small arms should be standardized prior to manufacturing .30 caliber ammunition, while General Arnold explained phasing in the manufacture of .30 caliber ammunition while standardizing small arms over a period of time. With the information that 3,000 light machine guns had been requested, General Yamut stated that delivery of such would solve one-third of the problem of standardizing small arms. General Yamut said that he would like to discuss the small arms situation with General Arnold at some future time.

8. General Arnold told General Yamut that the ECA agricultural experts are conducting talks with the Minister of Agriculture in an attempt to persuade him to change the breeding plan from race horses to draft horses. Some of the major items included in the ‘52 Program were discussed and General Arnold said that we are attempting to repair the Skoda tractors which are in Turkey to place them in operation. A technical expert to survey military factories, with a view toward improving manufacturing methods, is due here now. We have been told that the Turkish Minister of State will release 7 million Turkish Lira in counterpart funds to the military factories for labor and materials. Mr. Wadsworth explained ECA assistance to the military factories and stated that the factories are ready to make things for the military as soon as the military tells them what they desire. General Arnold then informed General Yamut that ECA would soon provide an expert to assist in textile manufacturing. Mr. Wadsworth stated that General Arnold was making considerable progress in solving problems pertaining to animals, tractors and armaments. He desired that the Minister of National Defense know this and requested him to give thought to other improvements in which we can assist in future.

9. General Yamut then desired to talk about the Turkish Air Force. He said that they now have 281 light-bombers and fighters; some are British and some American; but duration of flight is rather short. Some of these aircraft are to be used in close support provided there is air superiority. In 1952 they are to receive 25 Jets. Gradually, by 1955, Jets are supposed to replace the present planes. If the Turks were provided with 300 Jets today, they would not have personnel trained to man them, and they also need longer fields for Jets which can be provided by the end of 1955. General Yamut then said if allies came today with Jets, airdromes are not available from which to operate. Consequently, we should expedite improvement of fields, not for Turkish planes but for the planes of Turkey’s allies. General Arnold stated that he believes some fields will be completed shortly as soon as current work now in progress is completed. General Yamut said that the Engineers have agreed to expedite completion of fields at Balikesir, Eskisehir and Diyarbakir. General Arnold said that Colonel Frye⁷ has just returned from Washington where he had been in an attempt to expedite construction. General Yamut stated that he wished to express his great gratitude to the US experts, and to the Ambassador, who were trying so sincerely to help them in supplying and improving the Turkish Armed Forces. He stated, furthermore, that the Minister of National Defense joined him in this expression of gratitude and that his statements were made in the atmosphere of a family circle. The Minister of National Defense stated that the conference had investigated possibilities of increasing the effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces and mutual defenses. He thanked Mr. Wadsworth and General Arnold for providing them with that opportunity. Mr. Wadsworth expressed his appreciation for the conference, stating that it will be extremely helpful to him in his talks with Admiral Carney when the latter arrives.

10. The Ambassador said that he had talked with the Ministers of State and Foreign Affairs the evening previously in regard to the present budget studies. These studies have been conducted jointly by those Ministries and ECA. It appears to him that it is the first time that the Turkish authorities and ECA agree as to what the facts are. Mr. Wadsworth then made the point that if we know the facts, and those facts indicate that the Turks will have a minimum gap of 250 million Turkish Lira between expenditures and resources, then we have guidance which will assist in doing something about it. We have long needed the information concerning the 250 million lira gap; 80 million Turkish Lira is for the Ministry of National Defense and 40 to 60 million for Bulgarian refugees. He then explained how, with this information, we include in our programs items with a view toward liberating funds in the Turkish Budget for other purposes. He requested the Turks to expedite the list of items which we have requested and which must be imported and bought with foreign exchange. The Minister of National Defense said that we agree in principle and that he spoke to the Minister of State on the telephone just prior to coming to the conference, and the undersecretaries of the two Ministries would meet that afternoon to reach an understanding.

11. Mr. Wadsworth then stated that he had also discussed with the Foreign Minister the evening previously, replacements for the Turkish Brigade in Korea. He had heard from General Arnold that the Turkish military is quite willing and desirous of sending replacements, and that we have received a radio from General MacArthur⁸ saying that he is most anxious to fill the ranks of all his units. To that end, a transport will be made available when the Turkish Government decides to send replacements, and that he had asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs if the government had taken, or is considering taking, action on the matter. The Foreign Minister had informed Mr. Wadsworth that the question had not yet been submitted to the government. Mr. Wadsworth gathered that the Foreign Minister felt that replacements for Korea was a problem that should first be discussed within the Party before taking it up with the Government, which in turn would decide whether or not it desirable to take the question to parliament. He was left with the impression that no decision will be taken in this matter for some time. He impressed upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, the urgency of the situation and requested that it receive serious consideration as early as possible. He told the Minister that he had no instructions from the US Government, but that he did know that the military people considered the matter urgent. He then requested the Minister of National Defense to press for an early decision.

12. Mr. Wadsworth referred to the recent conference⁹ held on the Bosporous defenses and to the information obtained from General Arnold to the effect that General Yamut is submitting the problem of installation of a controlled mine field in the Bosporous to the Turkish Government. Mr. Wadsworth said he remembered his first conference with the present Minister of National Defense, the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister, at which the latter said, “We will lay those mines as soon as we get a proposal from the military”. The military has now submitted the proposal. He desired a decision on this matter, or at least a definite indication of the official government thought, by the 8th of January 1951 to assist him in his talks with Admiral Carney.

13. The Minister of National Defense said that the replacements to Korea is a political problem now. The Prime Minister has informed him that there is no doubt that the Turks will keep their promise and send replacements, but that he felt the Turkish people must first realize that the US appreciates the Turkish sacrifices and that the Americans are making similar sacrifices. Mr. Wadsworth informed the Minister of National Defense that he had never seen such unanimity of high praise as that of the Americans for the Turkish Brigade in Korea. American casualties in the Korean war, he pointed out, have been proportionately higher than those of the Turks. The Minister of National Defense said that in addition to material help, Turkey must have greater and closer cooperation with the United States before they can act. Mr. Wadsworth then reviewed the steps which must be taken by the Turks before they could be included for consideration in the overall Atlantic defense. He stated that the reason that he was trying to give an answer then was because he had heard that argument before. He said that there are no two countries in the world today in greater harmony in their thinking and implementation of defense matters than America and Turkey. The Minister of National Defense said that these relations would be valuable in the future. Mr. Wadsworth agreed but reminded the Minister of National Defense that in the matter of replacements for the Brigade in Korea, it will take 25 days for a transport to reach here, following a decision by the Turkish Government to send replacements. As soldiers, Turkey has gained great support in the United States and as soldiers we want this prestige to continue. The Minister of National Defense said that he would convey the urgency of his American friends regarding the sending of replacements for troops in Korea to his government. He would also take up with the government the problem of the controlled mine field. The decision of his government regarding the laying of a controlled mine field will be conveyed to General Arnold through General Yamut.

At 1407 the conference adjourned.

Delk M. Oden

Lt. Colonel, USA

1. Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Lord Tedder, British Member on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council.
2. Gen. Paul H. R. Ely, French Member on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council.
3. Brig. Gen. Robert F. Tate, Chief of the U.S. Air Force Group, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey.
4. Maj. Gen. Vernon Evans, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission With the Iranian Army.
5. Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Aid Group to Greece.
6. Vice Adm. John J. Ballentine, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet.
7. Lt. Col. Arthur H. Frye, Jr., Chief of the United States Engineer Group, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey.
8. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.
9. The conference under reference was held on December 14; see paragraph 2 of telegram 422, January 12, 1951, from Ankara, infra.