782.5 MAP/11–450: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 1
273. To enable me effectively answer Deptel 221, October 27,2 I had conversation November 1 with Minister National Defense during which for first time he was able give me any real indication regarding prospects Turkish military budget fiscal year 1951 beginning March 1. He said that to increase Turkish armed forces (now only fifty percent war-footing strength) from present 260,000 to 300,000 men, enlist desired additional NCO’s and implement minimum other urgent recommendations of Turkish general staff would require total National Defense budget of TL 580 million as against TL 458 million appropriated for current year.
He continued in substance: Our new government has pledged its best effort to balance over-all state expenditures and income. Consequently, although recognizing fully and giving maximum possible budgetary consideration to implications of critical international situation, it finds quite impossible budgeting for more than a very small increase, say to 475 million, for national defense.
In reply my further questions Minister said he could not cite, for they had not yet been determined by the government, either estimated total receipts or total expenditures for next year’s state budget; but (a) it was hoped that on revenue side ordinary receipts could be made substantially to total current year collections and (b) no expenditure side military non-defense expenditures would be cut at least 7 percent from present level.
(Note: ECA comments that Ministry State apparently accepts idea that 7 percent cut is merely first step to projected other non-defense budget reductions. If these be made in amounts sufficient to reduce total expenditures to this year’s estimated total revenue of roughly 1,300 million, I calculate that the proposed national defense budget of 475 million would be 36.5 percent as against this year’s 30.8 percent of total state budget appropriations.)
2. ECA Mission states it has been pressing Turks since early September for total estimate revenues, defense expenditures, refugee expenditures, normal government running expenses, and investment expenditures for 1951. It has recently received government estimate [Page 1329] total investment expenditures but is still awaiting data on extent to which these will be provided out of state budget. Pending receipt such data and determination Turkish policy regarding use of pension funds, ECA feels it impossible comment fully on economic impact proposed level defense expenditure.
Supplementing this ECA statement, I venture following comment: Current state budget as voted shows debit of TL 174 million; and only possible important new source of revenue known to us here is pension funds. Under new 1950 pension law some 100 million TL are estimated as available in 1951 for investment in Turkish Government bonds. However, part of this total has already been earmarked for financing Sariyar Dam and other projects and there is good reason believe Turkish Government wishes retain availability of balance pending solution Bulgarian-Turkish refugee problem. We have reported Foreign Ministry’s estimate that minimum of TL 120 million would be required to settle in Turkey the 250,000 refugees whose expulsion is threatened.3
3. Subsequently, however, one views over-all fiscal picture, the horizon is dark. Every government agency asks and could advantageously spend more money: For national defense, for investment development and for ordinary administrative running expenses; and there seems no way to obtain it from local sources. It would seem to follow that, if US wishes expanded and/or accelerated action to increase military potential of Turkey under MDAP, we must find a way with Turkish Government, directly or indirectly to defray cost thereof.
Ministry National Defense has authorized chief Turkish General Staff give General Arnold next Tuesday detailed comparative breakdown of national defense budgets for 1950 and 1951. I will telegraph any new information thus obtained which may supplement foregoing presentation, e.g., whether adequate allocation is made for expenses of Turkish brigade in Korea.
4. Deptel under reference stresses that requested “interim report” is “essential for consideration MDAP fiscal year 1951”. We believe reference is primarily to fiscal year 1951 supplemental appropriation, because our regular program for equipment and training has already been approved: For Army $36.6 million, Navy 9.8 million, Air Force 22.1 million; total of 68.5 million which is well within $75 million figure which we have been led to believe will be allocated on basis careful justifications already submitted. If Department has any special questions on this score, we believe they can be answered promptly by telegraph. JAMMAT’s “interim report”4 has been drafted and will [Page 1330] be completed and airmailed following General Arnold’s Tuesday meeting with chief Turkish General staff.
Remaining issue of importance today is then, as we see it in JAMMAT, how best to expend such allocation as is granted us under current $194 million GTI supplemental appropriation. We have recently heard informally that $87 million will be allocated Turkish program and are reprogramming recommendations for expenditure this amount for Army, Navy, Air Force. Double that amount could be advantageously programmed for emergency defense this bastion against westward Russian thrust.
Our current recommendations if implemented would make possible a certain expansion and acceleration of our regular long-term program with a view primarily to assisting present Turkish forces to attain maximum state of readiness in shortest possible time. They would not defray, except in part, the costs of several projects believed essential to this end and/or of special interest to the US. The eight most important and pressing of such special projects are:
NCO program, latest available details and estimated costs of which were submitted in JAMMAT telegram Tap 8278, October 20.5
Training teams, accepted by Turkish Government November 1 as reported in JAMMAT telegram Tap 8295 November 2.5 Implementation would double present JAMMAT military personnel.
Bosporus Sea Defense, favorable decision on which was also taken by Turkish Government on November 1.
Subsidiary naval base at Iskenderun, for which we understand $4 million has been tentatively earmarked. Desirable related port development would considerably increase cost.
Acceleration of military airfields reconstruction programs including possible rehabilitation Iskenderun airfield.
Joint military communications center to serve Turkish forces and tie in with our own existing world network. Unutilized $500,000 allotment in fiscal year 1950 program for portable station would meet only fraction cost this project.
Prime movers for non-American artillery. Recent initial survey this problem has established pressing need; detailed study now being made.
Stockpiling. Current war reserves of certain types ammunition, POL and other strategic materials, winter clothing and shoes are distressingly meager.
5. Military elements of desired “final report”6 should be available for analysis and presentation by JAMMAT this month, but ECA states and I fully concur that to make adequate reply to all questions [Page 1331] raised in Depinst April 257 requires information not now available to us or even known to Turkish authorities themselves. Such information is basic. Department will recall that it was not possible for me to submit last year’s report until November 17 (Embdesp 389, November 17, 1949).8 It contains considerable information which is still of basic interest to our present presentation.
6. By way of tentative comment, ECA does not feel present 260,000 armed forces is (or that 300,000 would impose) serious burden on agricultural or industrial production. Since Turkey has little war production potential, ECA does not believe prospects of diversions of resources to this field are substantial. It believes principal impact increased defense expenditures would fall on either investment program or alternatively on general standard of living through inflation or increased tax burdens. Pending receipt estimates total resources versus total obligations, ECA provisionally tends feel substantial cuts in investment program would be necessary if budget is to be balanced and taxes not increased. Pending receipt data requested, it is unable estimate whether such cuts would occasion serious harm.
Personally, I feel that this ECA comment, although accurate and pertinent so far as it goes, should not substantially influence Department’s decisions. There is so very little fat in Turkish economy that it seems unrealistic to suppose any situation short of imminent war would lead Turkish Government materially to increase national defense expenditures at serious expense other necessary government services. And to increase taxes materially at this time could, in my personal view, but harm that economy and weaken domestic position of new government which, earnestly oriented to MDAP principles, is seriously endeavoring within its possibilities and limited experience to keep its national economy and state finances on even keel.
If, however, after fiscal position thus sketched has been crystalized by budget submission to GNA, we could, I believe, induce Turkish Government to increase national defense expenditure in any section we feel should be strengthened, were we to offer additional grant ECA or MAP aid. It is with this consideration also in mind that I again urge careful study in Washington of all special projects listed herein.
- Several garbled passages have been corrected after comparison with copy in Ankara Embassy file 58F33.↩
- To the military assistance program mission at Ankara, not printed; it requested an interim report on the military aid program for Turkey, containing all information available for use in consideration of the military defense assistance program for fiscal year 1951 (782.5–MAP/10–2750).↩
- See footnote 3, p. 1293.↩
- Enclosure to despatch 269, November 14, from Ankara, 782.5–MAP/11–1450, not printed.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- Enclosure to despatch 454, February 16, from Ankara, 782.5 MAP/2–1651.↩
- Instruction 28 to Ambassador Wadsworth, signed for the Secretary of State by John H. Ohly, Deputy Director, Mutual Defense Assistance, Department of State, requested a study of the military aid program for Turkey, 782.5 MAP/4–2550, not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩