Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 69 Series

Memorandum by the Department of State Member of the National Security Council Senior Staff (Jessup) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

secret

[Washington,] October 11, 1950.

Subject: Export Controls and Security Policy: Transmittal of Report of Progress in Export Control Negotiations with Great Britain and France at Foreign Ministers’ Conference, New York, September 18–19, 1950.

Reference: NSC Action No. 347 a, August 24, 1950.²

It is requested that you circulate to interested departments and agencies the attached report of progress in export control negotiations with Great Britain and France at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in New York September 18–19, 1950. These negotiations were undertaken pursuant to NSC Action No. 347a of August 24, 1950.

It will be recalled that initial discussions on the subject of security expert controls were undertaken at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in London during May, 1950. The Secretary of State’s proposals met with stubborn resistance from the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and: France at that time. The principal stumbling block was the conviction of the British and French Foreign Ministers that security export controls would inflict disproportionate damage on their national economies. Despite the difficulties, the Secretary of State was able to make some progress toward acceptance of the U.S. point of view.³

Negotiations were continued on the expert level in Paris during the summer. These negotiations were protracted by the necessity of bringing the divergent points of view closer together and by considerable additions to the proposed list of restricted commodities.

NSC Action 347a of August 24 called for the making of an effort in connection with the September Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New York to obtain agreement on an export control policy corresponding as closely as possible to existing U.S. policy, subject to review at periodic intervals as the Western European Defense Program develops.

As the enclosed report of progress indicates, the Secretary did succeed in New York in enlarging the area of agreement and was able to convince the British and the French that they should come much further than they have before to meet our views as to the necessity, from a security standpoint, for thoroughgoing export controls.

While the agreed minute of September 19 (Attachment 3)⁴ is a compromise between our draft of September 9 and the UK draft of September 18,⁵ it represents a much closer approach to our stand than any earlier position taken by the British and French. On October 6 the British Government imposed licensing controls over all power-operated metal-working machine tools to all destinations except the United States and the British Commonwealth. We have been informed that no licenses will be issued for Eastern European destinations pending completion of a list of machine tools and other strategic articles being prepared for the purpose of assessing allied defense requirements.

There will be further reports to the NSC on this subject as developments warrant.

Philip C. Jessup

[Enclosure]

Report Prepared in the Department of State

secret

[Washington, undated.]

Report of Progress in Export Control Negotiations With Great Britain and France

(Foreign Ministers Conference, New York, Sept. 18–19, 1950)

Reference: NSC Action No. 347 (a), August 24, 1950.⁶

As the result of the representations made to the British by the State Department at the direction of the Secretary of State, the British had substantially altered their position at the time of the Tripartite Ministers Meeting in New York. Prior to this the British had maintained that they were unwilling to consider limitations on exports to the East on any items but the most critical war materials which could be embargoed. They took this position for two reasons: (1) The economy of Western Europe and its rearmament effort would suffer seriously from the loss of trade with Russia and its satellites; and (2) It was impracticable to establish any limitations other than outright embargoes. At the time of the meeting they were prepared to agree that quantitative restrictions could and should be established on appropriate items. They were also prepared to agree that goods which were needed for European defense should not be exported to the Soviet bloc.

When the British studied our draft of an agreement (Attachment I)⁷ they were not satisfied with it as they did not think sufficient emphasis had been placed on the importance of economic considerations in determining East-West trade policy. They consequently submitted a draft (Attachment II)⁸ which eliminated some of the specific language in our first draft and which brought in economic considerations more forcefully. The Secretary of State did not feel that the British draft was satisfactory and, consequently, an Agreed Minute was adopted (Attachment III)⁹ which represents a compromise in the wording of the two previous drafts.

From the US point of view very substantial progress was made. The British and French accepted two basic principles which the US has sought unsuccessfully in the past: (a) that strategic considerations should be predominant in selecting items for control; and (b) that controls should be extended to cover “selected items in key industrial areas Contributing substantially to war potential”. Now that these principles have been agreed to it should be possible to discuss the items on the 1–B list in a reasonable atmosphere. How far the British and French will be willing to go will only be determined through negotiations on specific items, but it is to be hoped that with agreement on these new criteria controls may be established over many of the items on the 1–B list heretofore rejected for control.

However, the Agreed Minute does not give us an agreement on some of the more specific principles which we had hoped for as a guide in future negotiations at Paris. The British argued that they could not accept anything so specific until there had been opportunity to study the matter more fully, taking into account the impact of more extensive controls on the economy of Western Europe. They also wish to consider the means of making good any losses in essential supplies from Eastern Europe as a result of the control program.

By agreement of the Ministers, further tripartite negotiations will be undertaken at once, beginning at London in mid-October, in order to reach agreement on a specific list of strategic items which should be controlled. Such a list would then be presented to other countries participating in the Paris Group. The results of these negotiations will be brought to the attention of National Security Council members.

1. The source text was circulated as a National Security Council Progress Report by the Department of State on the Implementation of Export Controls and Security Policy, October 11, 1950. It was considered by the National Security Council at its meeting on November 2; see the Record of Actions of that meeting, p. 225.
2. Ante, p. 179.
3. Regarding the meetings in May under reference here, see the memorandum by Martin, p. 123.
4. Ante, p. 187.
5. The American draft agreed minute under reference here, subsequently circulated at the New York Foreign Ministers Conference as document 33, September 13, is printed in vol. iii, p. 1285. Principal differences between the American draft and the British draft under reference here were analyzed in telegram 1483, September 22, to Paris, p. 191.
6. Ante, p. 179.
7. Not printed here, but see footnote 5, above.
8. Not printed, but see ibid .
9. For the Agreed Minute of September 19, see p. 187.