Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

460.509/10–1350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret   niact

Washington, October 13, 1950—4 p. m.

1917. Excon for Bohlen.² Embtel 1941, Oct 12.³ Summary of main points in instrs for USDel tripartite talks follows:⁴

I. General objectives of USDel. Refers to NSC action⁵ directing effort obtain agreement close as possible to existing US policy, and to Agreed Minute⁶ directing effort obtain agreement on control list. Sets forth broader objective strengthening West and spells out goal of relative advantage. Says agreement shld be as specific as possible and shld “substantially complete internatl embargo of US IA items and extend effective controls over most items on US IB list”. Draws attention to NSC decision re denial exports to friendly countries if they ship identical items or equivalent amounts to Sovbloc. States USDel shld seek Brit and Fr implementation of controls agreed at London (as implied in AM), in addition to their support in CG/CoCom.

II. General Tactics. We shld encourage Brit to state their present or proposed Excon policy, but keep discussion within context of IA and IB lists as in CoCom. We expect agreement may be obtained on embargo list more extensive than we have asked (i.e., more IBs even if not all IAs), but expect continued opposition to effective quantitative controls, hence suggest approach emphasizing from outset importance we attach to latter, incl a hold-the-line policy on items listed for exchange of info. Believe impt emphasize also need for maximum number of items under control (i.e. licensing or admin action) to provide accurate intelligence re shipments. Recommend that agenda might usefully follow general outline provided in fol sections of this instr.

In connection with general statement US Excon policy, and in context of background explanation of US attitudes, Del shld make reference to US policy of denial impt strategic items to friendly countries when they ship identical items to Sovbloc, adding that policy not adopted for purpose of pressure for internatl agreement on controls since US does not intend deny license to any country simply because goods involved are not accepted for internatl control, but will examine each case in light all available info as to likelihood transshipment or export identical items from local production. (FYI, Commerce Defense and ECA concur in this para and agree that this aspect our Excon policy shld be made simply matter of record at London talks, to avoid any impression of bad faith (US is opposed to coercive tactics) or of US dissatisfaction with London results if policy were announced afterward, and that matter shld not be given emphasis or discussed in detail, since in fact details still being worked out)

III. Interpretation of Agreed Min. This section emphasizes FonMin agreement on extension of controls to cover key industrial areas and on predominance of strategic considerations. No justification seen for large-scale rejection items on IB list. “Key industrial areas” open for discussion, with history these negots generally supporting our IB criteria as to categories, since most argument has concerned depth of control within categories. (As between “selected items” in para 2 and “key items” in para 4, we believe former states principle but see job of justification facing Intelligence Advisers.) Predominance of strategic considerations applies to drawing up control list, with econ factors to be taken into account when recommending (mainly) extent to which item shld be “restricted” (i.e., mainly in connection with quantitative controls). Brit at NY accepted principle that strategic aspect predominant if items also have peacetime uses, but strategic importance shld be demonstrable. Mil/Intelligence opinion re strategic importance might be sought from MPSB if needed; wld establish facts but not determine degree of control which shld be imposed. Other points of interpretation in subsequent sections.

IV. Intl List I: Embargo control. Only general instrs possible until Brit proposals known.

(a) Items of “direct strategic value” (AM para 4) refers to impt strategic industrial type items whether on our IA or IB lists.

(b) Residual IA items can and shld be introduced for embargo under “direct strategic value” formula, and also some of IA items not yet discussed in CoCom (instrs follow). In pressing for embargo, Del shld consider possibility of numerous requests for exception and undesirability of weakening embargo nature of Internatl List I. Items not accepted for embargo shld be proposed for presumptive denial (token shipment).

(c) Items needed for western defense. Brit offered no definition at NY. Concept might be considered to cover some items of lower strategic rating than our IBs, but USDel shld concentrate effort on items which can be correlated with US lists and which are (1) items any PC has obtained, is requesting or reasonably certain to request from US under MDAP, (2) items which one PC needs to obtain from another for its defense program, and which are in short supply, (3) items needed for existing stockpile programs, and (4) items urgently required for defense programs of non-PC friendly nations (e.g., Commonwealth, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Sweden, etc.). Continuing liaison between CoCom and MPSB seen necessary to keep abreast urgent defense needs.

V. Intl List II: Quantitative controls. Little guidance in Agreed Min.

(a) Presumptive denial or “token shipments”. USDel shld reintroduce proposal made at NY (and hardly discussed) for special category in List II involving presumptive denial and ex post facto justification to CoCom in specific cases of exceptions. Del shld seek agreement on conditions justifying token shipments.

(b) Percentage curtailment. Other items agreed for List II shld be subjected to average 50 percent reduction as compared with whatever postwar base period is acceptable. (Detailed percentage formula and a slightly modified alternative are in instrs.) We want substantial overall reduction combined with maximum latitude for PCs to work out details for specific items. In addition, all PCs shld report to CoCom steps they propose to take and also report actual shipments. CoCom wld review action being taken or proposed, study recommendations of various PCs and recommend specific goals to be sought in limiting total shipments of individual items. CoCom wld take econ considerations into account in making recommendations.

(c) Relative priority of items. Instrs to follow later.

VI. Exchange of info. USDel shld request that items introduced for discussion and of possible strategic importance be placed on a List III “for further consideration and exchange of info”. There shld be sufficient control to provide detailed info on shipments. Since these items might later be restricted (i.e., exports actually reduced), PCs shld agree to take steps to prevent an increase in exports to Sovbloc. Specifically, PCs shld make effort in TA negots to avoid commitments to export in future greater quantities than they have allowed in past.

VII. Considerations of Econ Impact. Believe this shld be discussed from overall standpoint early in negots, rather than in connection individual item discussions. Recommend USDel approach along fol lines: (1) econ considerations are secondary to strategic factors; (2) econ impact shld be considered mainly as it relates to quantitative controls, first in arriving at agreement on percentage reduction and second in connection with CoCom recommendations of goals for limiting specific items; (3) expanded controls may cause some impact but extent has been generally overestimated, so burden of proof shld rest with PC affected and shld include consideration of offsetting factors; and (4) there shld be agreement in principle that some degree of econ sacrifice may have to be accepted; objective shld be to find practical ways to reduce this to minimum. Remainder of instr is brief review of line of argument USDel might adopt in discussing impact attributed to (1) loss of export markets, (2) loss of essential supplies, and (3) adverse effects on balance of payments position. General line is that impact cannot be predicted in advance, wld probably be small and manageable through ad hoc measures, with ultimate impact probably felt as pressure on dollar resources which are however benefitting as result increased aid programs.

Acheson

1. This telegram, which was cleared in substance by the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and the Economic Cooperation Administration, was repeated to London as 1904.
2. Charles E. Bohlen, the Counselor of the Embassy in France, had been designated Chairman of the United States Delegation to London Tripartite Conversations on Security Export Controls scheduled to begin on October 17.
3. Not printed. In it Bohlen expressed concern that the new Department of Commerce policy directive on export licensing (see telegram 1498, September 23, to Paris, p. 194) would upset the forthcoming tripartite discussions on security export controls in London. Bohlen also pointed out that the United States Delegation to the London discussions still had not yet received any general instructions or indication of objectives (460.509/10–1250).
4. The full text of the instructions summarized here, comprising 17 pages in the source text, was transmitted as an enclosure to an instruction of October 13 to Bohlen in London, not printed (460.509/10–1350).
5. See the Record of Actions of the National Security Council Meeting of August 24, p. 179.
6. Ante, p. 187.