Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

868.03/10–1350: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

secret   niact

Belgrade, October 13, 1950—8 p. m.

365. Conversation with Tito this afternoon presented good occasion for emphasizing our position on both food relief and general credits (Deptel 261, October 21¹ which arrived hour before appointment).

Tito began by saying he had asked see me in order follow up various discussions in Washington and Belgrade re Yugoslav needs for food. (It seemed obvious that this was intended as follow-up to my conversations with Kidric² which Tito has decided to carry on himself.) Tito’s approach was along same lines as Kidric’s saying he wished explore possibilities for assistance and exchange views on how best proceed. He particularly wanted clarify whether Yugoslavia should now make formal written request. He expressed regret at divergence between Kidric’s statement to me and Popovic’s request in Washington, remarking with smile that Popovic had construed his instructions “somewhat more definitely than Yugoslav Government had expected”.

I handed Tito verbatim text of Secretary’s press statement³ which DepFonMin Mates⁴ translated. (Mates was only other person present.) I pointed out that in view confusion over whether formal request had been made, it would seem to me desirable for Yugoslav Government make formal request in writing, stating position clearly and exactly. I pointed out that if his position were not stated clearly in writing there would always be confusion re what Yugoslavia was seeking.

Tito expressed full concurrence and said that formal written request would be made in Washington within few days. Tito remarked at this point he would not wish American Government think he was trying take over negotiations from this end and primary locale would remain in Washington.

Tito said request would point out clearly Yugoslav losses from drought and would express hope American Government would find it possible render assistance but he thought it would be presumptuous for Yugoslav Government ask US for specific amount or suggest nature of assistance.

I then told Tito while emergency food situation and question of longer credits for industrialization were quite separate problems, my government felt time had come make our position unmistakably clear concerning the larger issue. I said US Government believed Yugoslav Government should put its case for long term credits into hands of IBRD. I expressed personal belief Tito should send strong delegation to Washington to continue conversation with IBRD and said although Vlado Popovic and Kidric had both told me President Black had interposed impossible conditions, I thought they were wrong. I said I felt confident Black was sympathetic to Yugoslav needs and that solution could be found if Yugoslav Government and IBRD approached problem with determination find common ground. I said US Government did not presume speak for IBRD, but as member of that institution my Government did not wish leave any doubts re its own position, which was that Yugoslav requests for long term credits were far beyond Yugoslav ability to repay. I said we had no quarrel with industrialization of Yugoslavia or concern over cost except in so far as we were asked to put up the money. Tito interjected with smile that as creditor, we were properly concerned that we collect our money. He agreed Yugoslavia should deal with IBRD on long term credits and said he would send delegation to Washington as soon as preliminary conversation had prepared ground.⁵ He felt confident compromise solution could be found by concessions on part of both IBRD and Yugoslav Government and said he was optimistic of reaching agreement with IBRD.

Tito showed little surprise and no resentment at my statement that $400 million additional credits were much larger than Yugoslavia could repay. Fortunately, conversation developed in manner which left no possible grounds for subsequent charge we are taking advantage of food situation to force relaxation of industrialization. I am inclined think Tito has decided in favor of more moderate elements in Yugoslav Government although it is still too early to be certain on this point. Conversation was friendly throughout.

Tito said there would be press speculation regarding our conversation and he thought a brief communiqué giving substance of it was desirable. I said I thought communiqué should be given by Yugoslav press office as coming from him, since he had requested interview.⁶

Allen

1. Ante, p. 1468.
2. See telegram 324, October 5, from Belgrade, p. 1459.
3. See footnote 2, p. 1468.
4. Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Leo Mates.
5. Telegram 379, October 16, from Belgrade, not printed, reported that Kidrič had informed Ambassador Allen that the Yugoslav Government had decided to send Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Velebit to Washington to carry on the discussions with the IBRD (868.10/10–1650).
6. Telegram 269, October 16, to Belgrade, not printed, expressed the Department of State’s gratification over the outcome of Ambassador Allen’s conversation with Marshal Tito (868.03/10–1350).