Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 18 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)¹

top secret

Washington, 23 August 1950.

Subject: United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia and the Furnishing of Military Assistance to Yugoslavia in Case of Aggression.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have restudied the matter of the military steps which might be taken to implement United States policy as set forth in NSC 18/4² toward a conflict between Yugoslavia and the USSR or its satellites.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

… Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should plan for and take all possible steps now which would enable it promptly to furnish military equipment to Tito in case of aggression. The Department of State should ensure that Tito learns of this policy.

5. It is in the military interest of the United States now … that a military assistance program be planned for Yugoslavia and that funds be provided for this purpose. Although Yugoslavia could now be provided military aid in an emergency, it would have to be at the expense of other presently approved and urgently needed programs. A preliminary estimate of the funds to be provided should be based on the intelligence data in the memorandum forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 16 February 1950³ until more specific information is received from Yugoslavia. … In any event, specific lists of Yugoslav military requirements and the ability of the United States to meet them should be correlated at the earliest practicable date.

6. Another step which, from the military point of view, should be taken to implement United States policy toward Yugoslavia would be the stockpiling of necessary materiel. It would be preferable for this materiel to be stored in Trieste, in North Africa, in some noncommunist country in Europe, or in the United States for transfer when an evaluation of the situation warrants. … [T]he criteria should be that the materiel must be reasonably secure from enemy capture and should be furnished promptly in the event that Yugoslavia resists invasion.

7. It is not wholly realistic for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make recommendations regarding implementation of a military assistance program for Yugoslavia before the program is agreed to and specific lists of Yugoslavia’s military requirements in accordance therewith have been received, screened, and correlated with availability lists and production schedules of the Western Powers. Any substantial aid in the form of U.S. supplies and equipment must come from U.S. military stocks, already in short supply; approved MDAP country programs currently behind schedule; or new procurement; the latter necessitating a delay of from 12 to 24 months. It may be necessary to limit military assistance to Yugoslavia to such materiel as land mines, demolition supplies, ammunition, motor vehicles, signal equipment, and medical supplies. On the other hand, if decision should be made to furnish Yugoslavia more complicated equipment, the Yugoslavs would not, in all probability, be familiar with the use and care of such equipment. In such event, the materiel would be of comparatively little value until appropriate training had been given. …

8. It is understood that the Department of State has presented aide-mémoire to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, summarizing the major conclusions of NSC 18/4,⁴ in an effort to co-ordinate United States policies and programs with those of the British and the French and to ascertain what military assistance, if any, these nations might be able to furnish Yugoslavia. It is further understood that the British and French have replied to the United States aide-mémoire,⁵ and as a result, the Department of State has suggested that a small group of British, French, and American technical experts meet in Washington to coordinate planning in the event it is agreed that the Yugoslavs should, in the future, be accorded certain military aid.⁶ From the United States military point of view, it is important that the policies and programs of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France with respect to a military aid program for Yugoslavia be coordinated without delay.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that it would not be appropriate at the present time to seek additional funds which may be expended to implement the policy with respect to a satellite attack on Yugoslavia. However, draft bills should be prepared in advance for submission to the Congress in order to obtain necessary additional funds, including the recapture of the Department of Defense funds which may be expended to implement our policy with respect to Yugoslavia.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the current United States over-all policy of providing military aid to Yugoslavia, short of actual participation by United States military forces in the event of Soviet aggression, should be continued in effect.

11. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense obtain approval in the National Security Council of the following actions:

a. That the United States Government insure that any political action taken in the United Nations with respect to an attack on Yugoslavia does not set up an irrevocable commitment for the employment of United States military forces in Yugoslavia without preserving the right of decision in this matter in the light of the situation existing at the time;

b. …

c. That in order to permit refinement of planning for a military assistance program for Yugoslavia on both grant and payment bases, these plans be coordinated at the earliest practicable date with the plans of the U.K. and France. When political considerations permit the Department of State should secure from Tito lists of military equipment required; and

d. That since an attack by the USSR or its satellites upon Yugoslavia is a continuing possibility and such attack may well meet with success, our Balkan plans and policies should be reviewed and revised to include steps which should be taken to meet this contingency. Specifically, our policies with respect to nearby countries should be reviewed in the light of this possible development, with consideration to the following:

Greece—The security of this country would be in even greater jeopardy if its entire northern border were manned by units responsive to the Kremlin.

Albania—The link-up of this isolated Soviet satellite would create a new situation in the Adriatic and eastern Mediterranean.

Italy—The presence of Kremlin-dominated units on Italian borders and on the eastern shore of the Adriatic would materially increase the Communist threat of internal and external aggression, and would immediately raise the question of lifting the Treaty limitations on the Italian Armed Forces.

Trieste—The advisability of the planning for the taking over of the Territory of Trieste (to include Zone B) should be investigated.

Austria—This threat to the security of the western Zones would require a re-evaluation of our policy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. National Security Council Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr., circulated this memorandum for the information of the Council on September 5, 1950, at the request of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. It was also referred to the NSC Staff for use in connection with review of NSC 18/4 (see footnote 2, below). Secretary Johnson stated that he concurred in the recommendations contained in paragraph 11 of this memorandum.
2. For text of NSC 18/4, November 17, 1949, “United States Policy Toward the Conflict Between the USSR and Yugoslavia,” see p. 1341.
3. The document under reference here is not further identified.
4. See telegram 179, January 13, to Paris, p. 1353.
5. See footnote 4, p. 1354; the memorandum of conversation by Campbell, May 2, p.1410; and telegram 2074, May 4, to London, p. 1412.
6. See telegram 186, July 12, to London, p. 1432.