668.81/8–2350: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State
161. Department’s 130, August 18, received August 22.1 In long conversation with Mates latter gave every indication of genuine desire to improve Greek-Yugoslav relations, which he is handling personally. He referred to keen Yugoslav disappointment that matter had again been interrupted by Plastiras resignation just when progress seemed likely.
Mates said that although Yugoslav Government considered Macedonian question existed while Greek Government did not, Yugoslavs were entirely willing to put this aspect aside, resting on contrary points of view already expressed by each government and proceeding with matters on which progress could be made. Yugoslavs would like to exchange ministers but did not wish to risk another rebuff. If Greeks were not ready to receive Sehovic credentials, he hoped they would at least proceed on other matters such as appointment of Greek-Yugoslav commissions to consider resumption post and railway communications, grant visas for Yugoslav representation to visit Salonika free port, or respond to Yugoslav offer on repatriation of children. Mates commented that Cominform alone benefitted from continued Greek-Yugoslav difficulties.
While I am fully appreciative of Greek annoyance over Yugoslav position on Macedonia, over-riding considerations make improvement Greek-Yugoslav relations imperative from every point of view. If Cominform should attack either Greece or Yugoslavia, absence of even telegraphic communications between these two neighboring [Page 1441] countries would be tragic. I am convinced Yugoslavs wish to improve relations with Greece, and failure to accomplish this while Plastiras was in office was contrary to our national interests. I believe we should make every effort now to foster improvement in both general and in specific matters. Yugoslavia desire to maintain neutral position in east-west conflict will not prevent Yugoslavia from going along. Moreover, I venture suggest we should not encourage such attitude by Yugoslavia even if it existed.
I believe we should avoid being involved directly in assurances by either Greek or Yugoslav Government and think British activity has tended somewhat too far in that direction but I welcome British initiative in attempting to achieve results.
Foregoing considerations apply with equal force to Yugoslav-Italian relations. I think we should constantly encourage both governments to reach settlement of Trieste and other outstanding questions. Yugoslavia and all her non-Cominform neighbors are under same threat from east. Need for improved relations to coordinate opposition to this threat far outweighs petty national prestige issues. Balkan politics as usual is criminal under present circumstances.
Sent Department 161, repeated info Athens 14, Paris 15, Rome 10, London 10, Trieste 13.
- Not printed. In August 1950 British diplomatic representatives in Belgrade and Athens undertook to foster the resumption of negotiations between Greece and Yugoslavia for the normalization of their relations. The British efforts ceased following the resignation of the Plastiras cabinet in Greece on August 18. In the telegram under reference here the Department of State took interested note of the British efforts. The Department remained of the opinion, however, that neither Yugoslavia nor Greece was currently ready to take the necessary steps to improve their relations. In particular Yugoslavia continued to emphasize its so-called neutral position in the East-West conflict in order to avoid giving credence to Cominform allegations that Yugoslavia had aligned itself with the West. The Department therefore felt it to be inopportune at least for the United States to continue to encourage either the Yugoslav or the Greek Government to improve relations (641.68/8–150).↩