Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

661.68/1–1350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret

Washington, January 13, 1950—7 p. m.

179. President has recently approved NSC paper on US policy toward Yugo–USSR controversy.¹ We have informed UK of major conclusions² and believe desirable likewise inform Fr. Accordingly Emb shld inform FonOff along fol lines, leaving aide-mémoire:³

1. As Fr Govt is aware dispute between Yugo and Sov bloc has had effect of easing pressure on democratic nations. Continued ability of Tito regime to maintain Yugo’s independence is obviously of great importance to Western Europe and Atlantic community. US has found it advisable to extend certain degree of economic support to Yugo with purpose of strengthening Tito’s ability and determination to hold out. UK also has followed similar policy exemplified by recent agreement involving credits and extensive trade commitments. We consider that the problem is one of direct concern to France and other Western nations as well as US and UK since all support principle of right of nations to independence, all benefit by existence of split in formerly solid Sov-Communist system, and security of all wld be in danger by Sov success in replacing Tito with Cominform regime.

2. Dept and other agencies of US Govt have reviewed Yugo situation in light of possible future developments with the purpose of laying out lines of policy to be followed in certain contingencies. Dept desires to communicate to Fr Govt principal conclusions which have been reached and to invite Fr views thereon. Conclusions fol in numbered paras 3–7 below.

3. Present limited economic support of Yugo by Western powers shld be continued with such added help as is necessary to enable Tito regime to maintain its resistance to Sov pressure.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7. It is considered desirable to coordinate US policies on Yugo question to extent practicable with those of UK, France and other Western nations. Accordingly, Dept wld welcome comments of Fr Govt on points raised above, including Fr estimates of possible Yugo requirements of arms and means of meeting such requirements.

Since NSC document on which present tel based is classified top secret Emb shld recommend to Fr FonOff utmost discretion in handling this info. Substance is also being communicated to Fr Emb here.⁴

Acheson

1. The reference here is to document NSO 18/4, November 17, 1949, which was approved by President Truman on the following day. For text, see p. 1341.
2. An aide-mémoire summarizing the principal conclusions and recommendations of NSC 18/4 was delivered to the British Embassy in Washington on December 20, 1949.
3. In his telegram 200, January 16, from Paris, not printed, Ambassador David K. E. Bruce reported that an aide-mémoire containing the substance of the telegram printed here was conveyed that day to Maurice Couve de Murville, Director General for Political Affairs of the French Foreign Ministry, who indicated keen interest, promised to take up the matter promptly with French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and indicated that French Prime Minister Georges Bidault and Minister of Defense René Pleven would also be consulted (661.68/1–1650).
4. An aide-mémoire dated January 18 and containing substantially the same information included in the telegram printed here; (filed separately under 661.68/1–1850) was handed to French Embassy Counselor Gontran Begoügne de Juniac during a call at the Department of State on January 18. Charles W. Yost, Acting Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, took the occasion to emphasize to M. de Gontran that the United States was giving aid to Yugoslavia because its defiance of the Soviet Union was of great benefit to all the Western nations and hoped that France and other nations would likewise contribute as best they could toward the common objective. Yost also expressed the hope that the French Government might feel able, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of compensation claims for prewar French properties in Yugoslavia, to encourage Franco-Yugoslav trade during 1950 while Yugoslavia was engaged in the initial process of reorienting its trade from the East to the West (memorandum of conversation by John C. Campbell, January 18, 1950: 751.5 MAP/1–1850).