Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

768.00/1–750: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Reams ¹) to the Secretary of State

secret

Belgrade, January 7, 1950—9 a. m.

24. Foreign Minister Kardelj’s summation national situation in People’s Assembly last week² and close of year which brought crystallization Yugoslav Government struggle with Soviet Union provides convenient opportunity for Embassy in collaboration with SMA to offer final appraisal political economic and military aspects Yugoslav situation before arrival new Ambassador.

Political. Clearly Yugoslavia has come long way in period elapsed since Moscow brought dispute to head and outlawed CPY from Communist world. Self-possessed tone and forthright character Kardelj’s summation reflect growing confidence Yugoslav Government and its sense achievement and reasonable security. Soviet failure to follow up its threats and bluster last summer, Yugoslav election SC,³ gradually but perceptibly improved political and economic relations with west, awareness of sympathetic attitude world opinion, and feeling that Belgrade–Moscow quarrel has been elevated from dangerous local level to problem of world magnitude, have all combined to consolidate Yugoslav attitude into present firmness and resolution. Broad base Yugoslav national deviation evidenced by recent Cominform resolution which extended denunciation to numerous government leaders and was in effect an admission removal Tito would not alter character of regime.

Although at least 80 percent of population regard Communist Government with extreme disfavor and would welcome substitution democratic government closely associated with west, Tito regime has thorough control of country. We see no evidence of development elements capable wresting power from present government. Pro-Cominform sympathies are negligible; democratic elements though in majority are divided and dispirited, without focus in leadership, aims or program, and have no opportunity for constructive action under repressive Communist regime. Ironically, government’s sole source widespread support derives from its resistance to Communistic imperialism. Factor of popular pride in maintenance national independence and preservation unity Yugoslavia as nation is dominant one which may suffice sustain domestically unpopular government through critical period ahead. In brief, stability of regime has been increased by its foreign policy.

Important question now is how far will Yugoslavia alter her attitude toward west. It is evident to us that, although undeviatingly intent upon maintenance Communism, Yugoslav Government is giving clear indications its willingness evolve more normal and friendlier relations with US and other western countries. Herein lies essential difference for us between Kremlin Communism and what we may reasonably hope may be Yugoslav policy. We believe such approaches as there have been may be forerunners of others, and that our policy should be to take full advantage of this change of heart. If we can develop contact between people of US and Yugoslavia, it is bound to influence even Yugoslav Communists favorably toward us and would be happy alternative to evil policies we are faced within Soviet Union and its satellites. Whether this change of heart is more apparent than real or whether it will endure only time will tell, but it apparent Yugoslav Communist leaders have suffered a deep psychological shock in the ordeal of their relations with Kremlin. It is not unnatural that experience should serve as catharsis out of which good might come and that new element of conscience may be developing in Yugoslav Government as consequence its successful struggle to maintain independence.

An important feature in changing Yugoslav attitude toward US has been created by our policy of not demanding political concessions while Yugoslav Government has back against wall. From many sources we hear this policy has had profound influence on Yugoslav Communists from top down through rank and file. Moscow has replaced the capitalist west as warmongering and imperialist threat. Though they remain obdurately opposed to US ideologically, it is becoming evident our policy contrasted with Kremlin’s brutal tactics and hysterical propaganda no longer appears so reprehensible to them. Faced themselves with Soviet imperialism, they are presently less inclined view as aggressive our own defensive measures vis-à-vis Russia.

We feel that it would be wishful thinking, however, to expect closer relations with west to bring about any substantial or fundamental change in political character of government in foreseeable future. We do feel, however, that necessity maintaining internal control plus external factors will inevitably and by pressure of circumstance force Tito regime into general relaxation repressive measures which it is using to bring about socialization of state. There has already been some evidence for example of tendency toward decentralization of control. We anticipate some gradual relief to people through generally less objectionable government policy in dealing with Church, peasantry, and other problems. We do not expect this relief to come about by reversal of policy nor by admission of change but rather by negative action on part of government faced with problem maintaining control and not arousing popular opposition.

Being of highly nationalistic character, Tito regime is perhaps less insensitive to popular opinion than governments of Soviet orbit states and we do not doubt that it wants to get “closer to people”. There have been some recent indications though not yet clearly discernible that regime is more genuinely interested than heretofore in obtaining broader support. While not loosening its tight grip on body politic we nevertheless expect to see some softening of government attitude toward populace in its effort win larger measure of popularity.

Economic. Leaving aside question of economic consequences of possible large-scale guerrilla attacks or worse, Yugoslav economic outlook for 1950 has improved considerably over last six months as effects Cominform blockade gradually overcome in large part through trade shift to west, loans or credits from US and other western countries and IMF drawings. Recent British credits and possibility IBRD loan help brighten prospects particularly as regards capital equipment. Non-agricultural production for both export and consumption should be higher this year than last. Negative factors such as inadequate food, clothing, shelter and health conditions for workers, shortage of skilled labor and management, and bureaucratic red tape will continue to operate but probably with somewhat less force than in past. Agricultural production (which will depend primarily on weather) has gotten off to good start with favorable conditions for fall planting. Recent pace collectivization so rapid any effects on production not yet apparent. Fully three quarters’ land now collectivized was planted as private land past crop season. In long run blighting effect of destruction individual proprietorship may be offset by advantages mechanization, improved seeds and breeds, superior technology generally. These latter factors, however, will be relatively long time coming while adverse factors deriving from large element unwilling participation in socialized method with consequent lack incentive full production effort are immediate. This might suggest likelihood falling yields and declining production immediate future or until positive effects mechanization, etc. can offset. Although large element compulsion in collectivization farms and enforced delivery products bitterly distasteful majority peasants, no violence to be expected. Negative resistance already manifested generally ineffective. Economic sabotage whether Cominform inspired or spontaneous believed unlikely reach significant proportions. Unless serious crop failure 1950 should be better year economically than 1949. Even if such crop failure should occur, believe Yugoslav Government would have better than even chance prevent economic collapse by changes in import program consequent upon loss agriculture exports and possible need unusual agriculture imports. In this connection probable population could and would endure additional privations charged by regime to crop failure or other factors obviously beyond its control. Nevertheless, in view uncertainties regarding production, transport, and trade help forthcoming from western and international agencies and extent to which regime will in “fact adjust its industrial and import programs in light economic realities US should continue watch situation closely as possible and be prepared if necessary in order to insure continued resistance to USSR and satellite pressure to furnish additional financial or material assistance.

Military. Loyalty and morale armed forces at present time considered good with no evidence indicating otherwise. Further, there are sufficient personnel in high positions in armed forces of long association with Tito to insure loyalty and support.

Equipment of armed forces not too good; it consists of conglomeration matériel obtained from Russians, British, Germans, Italians, and USA. Undoubtedly 1950 will take toll of equipment as regards obsolescence, repairs, maintenance, and upkeep. Air Force particularly needs replacements, not only in aircraft but in spares for available aircraft. Although Air Force equipment obsolete, it is considered Yugoslavs still maintain superiority in air strength in Balkans unless Russia provide satellites with modern aircraft. Aircraft in satellites principally similar that of Yugoslavia and World War II Soviet type. However, it must be assumed satellites will soon receive modern aircraft from Soviets and that their crews being trained in USSR. Similarly Yugoslav armed forces are superior to those of neighboring satellites collectively or singly. It is believed investment in military industry for past three years and for 1950 will begin pay dividends this year in categories ammunition, firearms and light equipment.

It noteworthy that Yugoslavians, although apprehensive and alert, have never publicly exhibited fear of attack from satellite countries or even Russia. Actually in view all reported border incidents their patience has been outstanding. However, it felt Yugoslavs will meet attacks any aggressor from any source whether it be satellite or Russia and will meet this attack to limit their ability and prosecute defense vigorously.

Possibility Russian or satellite attack upon Yugoslavia is considered remote but threat nevertheless exists. We can assume that any attack would not be preceded by an obvious movement of troops or that aggressor would in any way knowingly expose intentions in advance. Attack upon Yugoslavia would probably be sudden and without warning with primary purpose to prevent outside aid reaching Yugoslavia in time and also to present world with fait accompli.

Sent Department 24; pouched Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Paris, London, Rome; State pass Defense.

Reams

1. R. Borden Reams, Counselor of Embassy in Yugoslavia.
2. The reference here is to the speech on foreign policy made by Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Edvard Kardelj to the Yugoslav Federal People’s Assembly on December 27, 1949. The speech was reported upon in telegram 1338, December 31, 1949, from Belgrade, not printed (860H.00/12–3149). For an extract from the speech, see Margaret Carlyle (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 495–496.
3. Yugoslavia was elected to the United Nations Security Council on October 20, 1949. Documentation regarding the 1949 Security Council elections is included in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ii, pp. 188 ff.